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There is. no theme more familiar to constitutional law than the
clash between federal power and state autonomy. The history of that
struggle reveals, by and large, a long losing battle by the states. Over
the years, the Supreme Court has recognized far-reaching congres-
sional powers,' rebuffed efforts to rein them in through use of the
tenth amendment,2 and saddled the states with every significant re-
straint imposed by the Bill of Rights. 3 From time to time, however,
1. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
3. See L. TRInE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11-2, at 772-73 (2d ed. 1988).
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the currents of constitutional doctrine run in favor of local control. In
recent years, for example, the Court has stemmed the tide toward con-
stitutionalizing the law of criminal procedure, 4 and cut down federal
judicial authority through development of the abstention doctrine5
and state-favoring constructions of the eleventh amendment. 6 This ar-
ticle focuses on another important vehicle through which the modem
Court has moved to protect local prerogatives: the market-participant
exemption to the dormant commerce clause.7
The core of the Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence is
well-settled: "The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits dis-
crimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or
method . *..."8 Over the past two decades, however, the Court has
lifted this prohibition when states act as "market participants" rather
than as "market regulators." 9 Invoking this distinction, the Court has
shielded from commerce clause attack blatant favoritism of local inter-
ests when a state or municipality buys printing services,10 sells ce-
ment, 1 purchases goods, 12 or hires workers. 13
This article explores the market-participant rule. Part I traces the
rule's evolution and shows how it has proven less rigid than some ini-
tially feared. Part II probes the roots of the rule by challenging justifi-
cations for it suggested by other observers. Part III offers an
alternative theory of the market-participant doctrine, arguing in par-
ticular that it rests on a cluster of rationales that properly have led, the
Court to uphold marketplace preferences as the "general rule." 14 Part
IV builds on Part III to advance a new, four-part framework for evalu-
ating market-participant issues. Part V then uses that framework to
4. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
5. See, eg., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6. See, eg., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
7. The ternm "dormant commerce clause" is widely used as a shorthand description of the
principle derived by the Supreme Court from the Constitution - and art. I, § 8 in particular -
to protect interstate commerce from impermissible interference by the states. See, e.g., Regan,
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).
8. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938).
9. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (discussing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)); see, e.g., Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce
Clause Analysis - Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, 697-98 ("certain state actions
taking the form of market participation will be summarily upheld that would, in a different form,
be summarily struck down as invalid per se").
10. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (three-judge
court), affd. mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1973).
11. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446.
12. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
13. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
14. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440.
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apply the market-participant rule to nine key categories of cases. This
article rejects an all-or-nothing approach to these cases, advocating
instead a sensitive application of the market-participant rule in light of
its underlying justifications.
Many observers have attacked the market-participant rule.' 5 This
article seeks to show that these challenges are misplaced. The Court's
market-participant decisions reflect a sound, if complex, accommoda-
tion of competing constitutional values. This article lays bare those
values and details the course they suggest courts should follow in de-
ciding future market-participant cases.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT RULE
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States .... -"16 The provision, by its terms, grants legislative pow-
ers to Congress. For more than a century, however, the Court has
recognized that the commerce clause also limits the authority of
states. 17 These limits on state power emanate from the "basic pur-
15. See, eg., Blumoff, The State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 76-77; Tarlock, National Power,
State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980's: Scaling America 's Magic Mountain, 32
U. KAN. L. REV. 111, 133 (1983) ("state-produced goods immunity is without merit"); Note,
State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review - Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 893, 901 (1977) [hereinafter Boston College Note]
(attacking Alexandria Scrap); Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for
State Control of Natural Resources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 601 (1982) [hereinafter Geo. Wash.
Note]; Comment, State Discriminatory Action Against Nonresidents: Using the Original Position
Theory as a Framework for Analysis, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 583, 587 (1985) [hereinafter Har'. J.
Leg. Comment]; Comment, Commerce Clause Immunity for State Proprietary Activities: Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 365, 365 (1981) [hereinafter Har. Pub. Poly Com-
ment] (market-participant rule "is ill-founded"); Casenote, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1575, 1590
(1981) [hereinafter Wayne Casenote] (citing "the artificiality of the market participant-market
regulation distinction"); see also Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEXAS L. REV.
1097, 1138 (1988) (describing market-participant rule as "often criticized"). But see Regan,
supra note 7, at 1193 (arguing that market-participant principle is not within the proper "defini-
tion of protectionism"); Wells & Hellerstein, The Government-Proprietary Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1134 (1980) (market-participant rule "may produce
satisfactory results"); Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural"Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1317 (1989) [hereinafter U. Pa. Comment] ("market participant exception makes sense"); The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV: 4, 78 (1983) (market-participant decisions "pro-
vide a foundation for a recognition of community contribution and empowerment"); but cf
Note, The Disposition of State-Owned Resources Under the Commerce Clause, 21 Hous. L. REV.
533, 558 (1984) [hereinafter Houston Note] (viewing market-participant rule as a "mixed bless-
ing"). For a recent judicial critique of the market-participant rule, see Swin Resource Sys., Inc.
v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 262 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Eg., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317-19 (1851); The Passenger
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pose" of the commerce clause: 18 the creation of a "federal free trade
unit"'19 to foster "material success"20 and "the peace and safety of the
Union."'' z To protect these commerce clause values, the Court has
propounded two main rules.22 First, state laws that effect "simple eco-
nomic protectionism" are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalid-
ity."2 3 When New Jersey barred all local landifils from accepting out-
of-state waste, for example, the Supreme Court struck down the law.24
It reasoned:
Whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by
discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the
State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the law] violates this
principle of nondiscrimination. 25
Second, the Court will not abide state measures that impose "an
undue burden on interstate commerce. '26 In Hunt v. Washington
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 559 (1849); see Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245 (1829). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 6-2 to 6-5.
18. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
19. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
20. 336 U.S. at 538.
21. 336 U.S. at 533 (quoting I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 259-60 (1833)); see 336 U.S. at 534-35 (clause designed to promote "solidar-
ity and prosperity"); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (Constitution
"framed upon the theory that ... in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division"); Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 518 (1981)
(collecting citations to The Federalist for the proposition that "[d]ecreasing the significance of
state residence tends to strengthen interstate attachments and thereby diminish the likelihood of
interstate conflicts. At the same time, external threats to the country's security are more likely to
be deterred if the nation is cohesive and not split along state lines.").
22. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-24; accord, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New
York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). The Court also has articulated more focused
rules to deal with such specialized problems as state taxation of multistate business activity, see,
e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274-(1977), and state regulation of foreign
commerce, see, eg., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). These
additional rules, however, in large measure constitute refinements of the two rules identified in
the text and are of little importance in understanding the emergence of the market-participant
rule.
23. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; accord, eg., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
336-37 (1979).
24. 437 U.S. at 629.
25. 437 U.S. at 626-27.
26. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951). The leading modern state-
ment of the Court's dormant commerce clause "balancing" test appears in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). There the Court stated:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted).
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State Apple Advertising Commission,27 for example, North Carolina
barred all producers selling crates of apples in the state from display-
ing any reference to quality other than the USDA grade. The statute
was "neutral on its face."' 28 Its impact, however, fell on Washington
growers, who had developed a distinctive and costly labeling program
to supplement the USDA grading system.29 Undertaking "an accom-
modation of the competing national and local interests, ' 30 the Court
struck down the North Carolina law. It reasoned that the burdens the
statute imposed on interstate apple sales outweighed North Carolina's
espoused interest in avoiding buyer confusion. 3' Upon invalidating
the statute, the Court recognized, "some potential for 'confusion'
might persist."' 32 It was, however, "the type of 'confusion' that the
national interest in the free flow of goods between the states demands
be tolerated. '33
The Supreme Court first applied these restrictions in cases involv-
ing government regulation and taxation of private market activity.3 4
The Court's decisions thus left open the question whether dormant
commerce clause restraints applied in another context: when states or
municipalities prefer local interests in choosing their own trading part-
ners.35 The Supreme Court has grappled with this question in the se-
ries of cases recognizing and refining the market-participant rule.
B. The Supreme Court's Market-Participant Decisions
The Court first embraced the market-participant rule in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp. 36 That case involved a Maryland subsidy pro-
gram designed to encourage the recycling of abandoned cars known as
27. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
28. 432 U.S. at 340.
29. 432 U.S. at 336-40.
30. 432 U.S. at 350.
31. 432 U.S. at 351-54.
32. 432 U.S. at 354.
33. 432 U.S. at 354. A later comment by the Court may be read to suggest that the decision
in Hunt rested on a finding of "discriminatory purpose." See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Cream-
ery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981). This suggestion, however, contradicts the Court's ex-
plicit statement in Hunt that "we need not ascribe an economic protection motive to the North
Carolina Legislature to resolve this case." 432 U.S. at 352; see also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 286 n.2 (11th ed. 1985).
34. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 805-07 (1976) (reviewing earlier
cases).
35. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 808 (stating that "until today" the Court had not
confronted any case involving a state "as a purchaser, in effect"); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978) (leaving open question whether state could discriminate in
affording access to state-owned, rather than private, landfills).
36. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
[V/ol. 88:395
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"hulks." The program, as initially implemented, afforded subsidy pay-
ments on an equal basis to both in-state and out-of-state scrap proces-
sors for each Maryland-titled hulk the processor destroyed.3 7 The
Maryland legislature, however, later imposed stricter requirements for
establishing good title on out-of-state firms, thus producing a "precipi-
tate decline" in the number of abandoned cars delivered to out-of-state
processors.3 8 Invoking the commerce clause, the lower court found
the law invalid because of the "substantial burdens" it imposed on
interstate commerce.3 9 The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell explained that "Maryland has not sought to
prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it
may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up
their price."''4 Maryland was "a purchaser, in effect," which had "re-
strict[ed] its trade to its own citizens. '41 As stated by the Court:
"Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a
State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others." 42
The Court firmed up the market-participant rule in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake.43 For fifty years, South Dakota had operated a cement plant
and sold its cement to both in-state and out-of-state buyers. In 1974,
however, a shortage required the rejection of some cement orders, and
South Dakota chose to limit its sales to South Dakotans. A former
Wyoming buyer challenged this preference for resident purchasers. 44
Again, a closely divided Court rejected the commerce clause attack.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion conceded the possibility "that the
exemption for marketplace participation... admits of exceptions,1 45
but rejected the plea to invalidate South Dakota's discriminatory pol-
37. 426 U.S. at 796-97.
38. 426 U.S. at 801.
39. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 391 F. Supp. 46, 62 (D. Md. 1975), revd., 426 U.S.
794 (1976).
40. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976).
41. 426 U.s. at 808.
42. 426 U.S. at 810. Justice Stevens joined Justice Powell's opinion, but wrote a separate
concurrence emphasizing that Maryland had "created" the commerce in hulks it supposedly was
burdening. 426 U.S. at 814, 815. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dis-
sented on the ground that the majority had acted "mechanically," 426 U.S. at 828, in choosing to
"forgo all Commerce Clause analysis merely because the State is acting in a proprietary purchas-
ing capacity," 426 U.S. at 823.
43. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). See generally Case Note, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 655 (1984) ("the
Court in Reeves made its first effort to articulate an analytical basis for the market participation
exemption").
44. 447 U.S. at 430-33.
45. 447 U.S. at 440.
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icy.46 The Court explained that the market-participant rule rested on
the role that each state must play "as guardian and trustee for its peo-
ple" 47 and on the "long recognized right" of private traders to choose
their own trading partners. 48 In addition, the Court emphasized the
"foresight, risk and industry" of South Dakota in undertaking the en-
terprise, 49 and the danger that disrupting South Dakota's program
would pose to state "experimentation in things social and
economic." '50
The market-participant rule surfaced again in White v. Massachu-
setts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.51 At issue in White was
an executive order requiring each firm working on public construction
projects paid for by the City of Boston to ensure that Boston residents
made up at least half of the firm's work force.5 2 Responding to the
predictable dormant commerce clause attack, then-Justice Rehnquist
wrote for a seven-Justice majority:
Alexandria Scrap and Reeves ... stand for the proposition that when a
state or local government enters the market as a participant it is not
subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause. As we said in Reeves,
in this kind of case there is "a single inquiry: whether the challenged
'program constituted direct state participation in the market.'"... We
reaffirm that principle now.53
The Court went on to hold that Boston's hiring rule constituted "mar-
ket participation," even though it "impose[d] restrictions that reach
beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts
business."'54
46. 447 U.S. at 440-47.
47. 447 U.S. at 438 (quoting Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903)).
48. 447 U.S. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
49. 447 U.S. at 446.
50. 447 U.S. at 441 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)). Joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens, Justice Powell filed a dis-
sent, urging that the principle of Alexandria Scrap properly reached no further than to shield
"traditional governmental functions." 447 U.S. at 449. See generally infra text accompanying
notes 77-89.
51. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
52. 460 U.S. at 205-06. The Court held that the order was authorized by Congress, and thus
constitutionally unassailable, to the extent it applied to city projects funded in whole or part with
federal monies. 460 U.S. at 212-13. It also found that the case did not present the issue whether
the order was constitutional as applied to projects funded in part with private money. 460 U.S.
at 208-09. Thus, the only market-participant issue presented by the case concerned the constitu-
tionality of the order as applied "to projects funded wholly with city funds." 460 U.S. at 209.
53. 460 U.S. at 208 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980)).
54. 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justice White, accepted the
validity of the market-participant/market-regulator distinction, but argued that Boston's "at-
tempt to govern private economic relationships ... is the essence of regulation." 460 U.S. at 218-
19. See generally The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 15, at 70-71 (White "vigorously
reaffirmed" the market-participant rule, and the Court "unanimously supported" the doctrine).
[Vol. 88:395
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In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,55 the
Court for the first time refused to apply the market-participant rule to
validate a preference for state residents effectuated through state pro-
prietary action. That case involved Alaska's sale of state-owned tim-
ber, which - due to the economics of shipping - was destined mainly
for Japanese markets.56 As a condition of sale, Alaska required buyers
to have the timber processed in Alaska prior to shipment outside the
state.57 Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice White concluded
that important "elements that were not present in Reeves" rendered
this requirement invalid - namely, the presence of "foreign com-
merce, a natural resource, and restrictions on resale."' 58 The plurality
rejected the argument that, under White, the market-participant rule
broadly validates state-imposed contractual conditions, noting that
"the doctrine is not carte blanche to impose any conditions that the
State has the economic power to dictate .... 59
In its most recent market-participant case, the Court again de-
clined to apply the rule. At issue in New Energy Co. v. Limbach 60 was
an Ohio statute designed to encourage production and use of gasohol,
a motor vehicle fuel made by mixing gasoline and a grain derivative,
ethanol. 61 Ohio provided a tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold
against the fuel tax otherwise payable on gasoline and gasohol sales.
Ohio, however, refused to give any credit for ethanol produced in
states, including Indiana, that did not afford a similar tax credit for
Ohio-produced ethanol. As a result, the program favored Ohio produ-
cers over producers from Indiana.62 In response to an Indiana pro-
ducer's commerce clause challenge, Ohio invoked the market-
participant rule. It argued in particular that Ohio's discriminatory tax
credit was functionally identical to the discriminatory state subsidy
upheld in Alexandria Scrap.63 A unanimous Supreme Court dis-
agreed. It distinguished Alexandria Scrap on the ground that taxation
55. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
56. 467 U.S. at 85 & n.4.
57. 467 U.S. at 84.
58. 467 U.S. at 96.
59. 467 U.S. at 97. Justice Marshall did not participate in Wunnicke, and Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell refused to consider the market-participant issue because the lower
court had not addressed it. 467 U.S. at 101. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor,
however, dissented from the majority's commerce clause analysis and, relying on White, argued
that Alaska's "contractual term" was unobjectionable under the market-participant rule. 467
U.S. at 101-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988).
61. 108 S. Ct. at 1806.
62. 108 S. Ct. at 1806-07.
63. 108 S. Ct. at 1809.
December 1989]
Michigan Law Review
is "a primeval government activity" 64 and that the Ohio tax credit -
unlike Maryland's action to "bid up" the price of abandoned cars65 -
"cannot plausibly be analogized to the activity of a private
purchaser. ' '66
C. The Implications of the Supreme Court's Decisions
This series of Supreme Court decisions gives rise to two important
points. First, the market-participant rule has proven less inflexible
than some initially feared. 67 Just because the challenged in-state pref-
erence is connected with the state's purchase or sale of goods or serv-
ices does not mean it will automatically escape dormant commerce
clause scrutiny. The plurality opinion in Wunnicke reveals that
much,68 as does the Court's close examination of possible "exceptions"
to the rule in Reeves. 69 Indeed, what has happened in the market-
participant field reflects a sort of role reversal from ordinary dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence. Just as state laws requiring private
interests to discriminate against out-of-staters are subject to a "virtu-
ally per se rule of invalidity," 70 the market-participant cases may be
seen as establishing a "virtually per se rule" of validity for state dis-
crimination in the marketplace. A virtually per se rule, however, need
not operate all of the time - just as the rule set forth in City of Phila-
delphia has yielded on occasion.71 It follows that, even if a state looks
64. 108 S. Ct. at 1809.
65. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976).
66. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. at 1809.
67. See Tarlock, supra note 15, at 133 (asserting that Reeves recognized "few, if any, qualifi-
cations" to the market-participant rule); Boston College Note, supra note 15, at 928 (criticizing
the "broad exclusion" created by Alexandria Scrap); Casenote, Constitutional Law - Concrete
Development Chips Away at Commerce Clause Analysis, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 629, 629, 638
(1981) [hereinafter Creighton Casenote] ("Reeves decision has provided the basis" for "far-
fetched ... events to occur"); see also Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 15, at 617-18 (expressing
concern about application of Reeves to distribution of state-owned natural resources); Recent
Decision, 13 GA. L. REV. 1086, 1096 (1979) (challenging "per se rule" as "unfounded and un-
wise"); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1597 (citing "broad language in Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves").
68. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); see supra text accom-
panying notes 55-59.
69. 447 U.S. at 442-46; see also White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983); cf Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 (1978) ("We do not agree
that the fact that a State owns a resource, of itself, completely removes a law concerning that
resource from the prohibitions of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause."); Anson & Schenk-
kan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEXAS L. REV.
71, 87 (1980) (In Hicklin, "very strong dicta indicated that, Alexandria Scrap notwithstanding,
actual ownership would not automatically validate state embargoes or preferences against com-
merce clause attack.").
70. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
71. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458
U.S. 941, 956-57 (1982); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935) (quar-
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quite like a buyer or seller choosing trading partners, the Court has
left itself room not to treat the state as such. The Court may accom-
plish this result by recognizing an "exception" to the "general rule"72
or by characterizing the state as a "market regulator" notwithstanding
its superficial appearance as a "market participant. ' 73 Both roads lead
to the same place. The key point is that they remain open.
Second, members of the Court have disagreed, and will continue to
disagree, about when these roads should be traveled. Justice Powell,
for example, wrote Alexandria Scrap, but dissented in Reeves. Justice
Marshall, on the other hand, provided the decisive vote for applying
the market-participant rule in Reeves even though he had joined the
dissent in Alexandria Scrap. Justice Brennan, who dissented in every
other case applying the market-participant rule, and Justice Stevens,
who refused to sign on with the majority in Reeves, joined the majority
without qualification in White. Justice Blackmun, on the other hand,
strongly dissented in White, even though he was with the majority in
both Reeves and Alexandria Scrap.
There is nothing inherently inconsistent in this voting pattern.
Reasonable persons may disagree about whether Alexandria Scrap is a
stronger case for judicial intervention than Reeves and whether Reeves
is a stronger case than White. Even so, this erratic pattern suggests an
ad hoc approach to the cases, directed by no overarching theory of the
market-participant rule. It behooves the Court - and those who
study it - to explore whether such a theory is identifiable.74
antine laws constitutional). See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. RaV. 5,
62 (1978) (emphasizing that Court's recognition of virtually per se rule leaves room for judicial
flexibility).
72. See Reeve§, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980); Harp. Pub. Poly. Comment, supra
note 15, at 369 (Court in Reeves "admitted that there are exceptions"); Wayne Casenote, supra
note 15, at 1595.
73. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 US. 82, 93-99 (1984); see, eg.,
Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986)
(characterizing state contract debarment scheme as market regulation, rather than participation);
New Orleans S.S. Assoc. v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d 1018, 1021
(5th Cir. 1989) (stating that challenged user fees "wear the colors of both market regulation and
market participation"); Transport Limousine v. Port Auth., 571 F. Supp. 576, 581 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) ("line between 'market participant' and 'market regulator' is not always bright"); Geo.
Wash. Note, supra note 15, at 619 ("By recognizing that the exemption is not universally applica-
ble, the Reeves court demonstrated the ultimate need to balance state and national inter-
ests .... "); Houston Note, supra note 15, at 554 n.157 ("[Sltate ownership of the resource
involved may not be dispositive if the court chooses to label the state's activity as regulatory
based upon the market affected."); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1597 (noting that the Court
may "find that the activity in question is not proprietary activity, and therefore not protected by
Alexandria Scrap and Reeves").
74. See, eg., Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 88 ("the doctrine plalnly needs
development").
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II. UNTANGLING THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT RULE - PART
ONE: AN EVALUATION AND REJECTION OF OTHERS'
APPROACHES
A logical starting point for exploring the roots of the market-par-
ticipant rule is to consider what justifications do not support it. Keen
observers have proposed refinements of and rationales for the rule that
I find of marginal relevance. This Part considers - and rejects -
their suggestions.
A. Justice Powell and the Traditional-Functions Model
The list of critics of the market-participant rule includes some
Supreme Court Justices. Justice Brennan has said the rule suffers
from an "inherent weakness," but he has offered no meaningful expla-
nation why.75 In contrast, Justice Powell has commented at length on
the market-participant doctrine, expressing a vision of it quite unlike
the one that has prevailed with a majority of the Court. 76 In his
Reeves dissent, Justice Powell in fact rejected the "market participant"
rule, arguing instead that the Court should exempt from commerce
clause scrutiny in-state distributions of resources only when they
amount to "integral government operations in an area of traditional
governmental functions. '77
Justice Powell's effort in Reeves to refocus analysis from market
participation to "traditional governmental functions" was and is per-
plexing.78 It was Justice Powell, after all, who wrote for the majority
in Alexandria Scrap and justified that decision by characterizing the
state as a "purchaser" that was "participating in the market."' 79 In
75. 467 U.S. at 101 (Brennan, J. concurring).
76. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447-54 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. 447 U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. See, eg., Case Note, supra note 43, at 656 n.48 ("it is difficult.., to reconcile [Justice
Powell's Reeves] approach with the reasoning in Alexandria Scrap"); see also Comment, State
Immunity from the Dormant Commerce Clause: Extension of the Market-Participant Doctrine
from State Purchase and Sale of Goods and Services to Natural Resources, 25 NAT. REs. J. 515,
525 & n.120 (1985) [hereinafter Nat. Res Comment].
79. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808, 810 (1976); see also Anson &
Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 86 n.69 (citing "the broad language of [Alexandria Scrap] that
carves out an exception from dormant commerce clause review for state actions when the state
enters the market as a participant"); Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Com-
merce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 S. Cr. REV. 51, 76; Varat, supra note
21, at 504 (reading Alexandria Scrap as promulgating "the view that the commerce clause does
not limit state proprietary decisions in the market"); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 58, 59 (1976); Note, White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.:
State or Local Governments Acting as Market Participants Are Not Subject to Commerce Clause
Restraints, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 219-20 (1984) [hereinafter Contemporary Law Note]; Note,
Proprietary Powers: A New Policy Tool for the States?, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 733 (1977)
[hereinafter Miami Note]; Note, Solving New Jersey's Solid Waste Problem Constitutionally - or
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addition, the Court decided Alexandria Scrap on the same day it rec-
ognized in National League of Cities v. Usery 80 the "traditional gov-
ernmental functions" limitation on Congress' commerce clause power
to regulate state activity.81 If the Court saw the same or a similar
principle as central to Alexandria Scrap, it surely would have relied
significantly on National League of Cities and explored whether Mary-
land's subsidy program constituted "traditional" state action.82 In-
stead, the Court relied on the starkly contrasting rationale that
Maryland's subsidy program was unassailable because Maryland had
"entered into the market itself."'8 3
The majority in Reeves, of course, rejected Justice Powell's revi-
sionist reading of Alexandria Scrap.84 Moreover, an entirely different
coalition of the Justices later overruled National League of Cities in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 5 thus repudiat-
ing the doctrinal underpinnings of Justice Powell's tradition-bound
analysis.8 6 There existed from the outset, however, a more basic prob-
lem with Justice Powell's "traditional governmental functions" ap-
proach to the market-participant rule. A hypothetical case shows
why.
Assume that South Dakota corn farmers recently have endured a
rash of trouble from leaf-eating gnats and locusts. South Dakota de-
cides to address this problem by offering these frustrated farmers cash
subsidies. Given Justice Powell's validation of the in-state subsidy
program challenged in Alexandria Scrap, it seems clear he would agree
that South Dakota could confine these cash'payments to South Dakota
farmers. Suppose, however, that South Dakota chooses not to hand
out cash but rather to distribute seed for a strain of bug-resistant corn.
- Filling the Great Silences with Garbage, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 755 (1979) [hereinafter
Rutgers Note].
80. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
81. 426 U.S. at 852.
82. Cf Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 452 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 806.
84. See 447 U.S. at 435-36 nn.7-8.
85. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
86. The Court's care in Reeves to reject the National League of Cities analysis puts to rest any
suggestion, see Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 260-61 (3d Cir.
1989) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting), that the Court either implicitly or otherwise repudiated the
market-participant doctrine when it overruled National League of Cities in Garcia. Accord Ever-
green Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D. Or. 1986), affd.,
820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987). This conclusion is made especially clear by the Court's post-
Garcia reiteration of the rule. See Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v.
Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). In-
deed, as shown below, the Court's decision in Garcia lends support to the market-participant
rule. See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
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No principled basis for distinguishing the two cases appears, for if
South Dakota may limit a cash subsidy to needy local farmers, surely
it should be able to restrict a seed subsidy in the same way.8 7 Now
suppose that South Dakota chooses to charge its farmers for the corn
seed but still distributes that seed only locally because of limited sup-
plies. No basis for distinguishing the second and third programs
seems available, for both schemes flatly favor local farmers over non-
local farmers and do so with respect to precisely the same resource.
Indeed, the third case appears to present a less favorable - and there-
fore less discriminatory - protection to in-state farmers because it is a
protection for which they must pay.
The third program, like the first two, therefore seems constitution-
ally unassailable. Yet if South Dakota may limit paid-for distributions
of state-supplied corn seed to South Dakota farmers, then why should
it not be able in the same way to limit paid-for distributions of state-
supplied cement? No evident principle distinguishes farmers from
contractors. And, even if some principle might distinguish the two
cases, it surely is not one based on the "traditional" or "integral" na-
ture of the program.8 8 These considerations - together with a salu-
tary reluctance to stifle novel approaches to state problem-solving 89 -
properly led the Court to rebuff Justice Powell's tradition-based effort
to reformulate the market-participant rule.
B. T2he Commentators' Approaches to the Market-Participant Rule
Observers off the bench also have sought to unearth the roots of
the market-participant doctrine. The literature reveals four main at-
tempts: the first by Professor Varat,90 the second by Professor Tribe,91
the third by Professor Regan,92 and the fourth by Professor Gergen. 93
87. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989) ("If the State
may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and.., implement that by the
allocation of public funds,' surely it may do so through the allocation of other public resources,
such as hospitals and medical staff" (citation omitted).); Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at
72 ("[d]isposition of resources in kind is hard to distinguish from cash expenditures").
88. Nor is there a basis for distinguishing the cases on the ground that in the cement case,
but not the corn case, the state is "burdening" interstate commerce. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 451-53 (1980) (Powell, 3., dissenting). Rather, in both cases the "burden" is the
same: it is more difficult for out-of-state businesses than in-state businesses to secure a scarce and
valuable product. (It is noteworthy in this regard that Justice Powell's Reeves analysis did not
purport to rest on South Dakota's pre-preference servicing of out-of-state buyers. For an argu-
ment that this fact should make no difference in any event, see infra text accompanying notes
322-26.)
89. See infra text accompanying notes 194-217.
90. Varat, supra note 21.
91. L. TRIBe, CONSTrrUTIONAL CHOICES 144-46 (1985).
92. Regan, supra note 7.
93. Gergen, supra note 15.
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While the approaches of these observers are provocative, in the end
each fails to identify fully the values underlying the market-participant
rule.
My objection to Professor Varat's analysis is the most straightfor-
ward. His article is without question loaded with useful insights. 94
The core proposition, however, is that there is "a presumptive justifi-
cation" 95 for the Court's market-participant decisions - namely, that
state residents may as a rule channel state resources to themselves be-
cause they constitute "the group responsible for creating the state's
benefits."' 96 This consideration in fact does provide a central justifica-
tion for the market-participant rule.97 The difficulty is that Professor
Varat suggests that this consideration essentially stands alone in justi-
fying the rule.98 In my view, this single-pronged explanation of the
market-participant doctrine is defective because it is substantially in-
complete. In effect, all of Part III of this article seeks to demonstrate
why. 99
My objections to the work of Professors Tribe, Regan, and Gergen
94. Indeed, even a cursory review of the footnotes that follow will reveal the broad influence
of Professor Varat's work on this article.
95. Varat, supra note 21, at 523. Notably, important works by other commentators also
sound this theme. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69 at 89-91; Wells & Hellerstein, supra
note 15, at 1133.
96. Varat, supra note 21, at 529.
97. See infra notes 170-93 and accompanying text.
98. To be sure, Professor Varat argues that other countervailing considerations - such as an
abundance of, or special need for, the state resource - may cut against application of the mar-
ket-participant rule in particular cases. See Varat, supra note 21, at 531-40. He seems, however,
to fix pointedly on this "Lockean labor-desert theory" justification for the rule, id. at 523, while
displaying a marked hostility to supplementary justifications, see, eg., id. at 505-07.
99. Properly mentioned in connection with Professor Varat's work is the similarly pioneering
effort of Thomas M. Anson and P.M. Schenkkan. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69.
These observers offer an explanation for the market-participant rule akin to that offered by Pro-
fessor Varat, but they part company with him by finding important support for the rule in the
representation-reinforcement analysis long championed by Professor John Hart Ely. See gener-
ally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). In this
vein, they write: "Because... outsiders have no formal political role in the state,... state
regulatory action is less subject to the political check of those it affects than is state proprietary
activity." Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 90. This analysis is unconvincing. Discrimina-
tory marketplace activity, after all, adversely affects nonvoting nonresidents as surely as does
discriminatory state regulation. Just ask the would-be Wyoming buyer turned away by the South
Dakota cement plant. See, e.g., Harp. J. Leg. Comment, supra note 15, at 595 ("it cannot be
seriously contended that discriminatory state legislation taking the form of participation does not
have an impact on interstate commerce"). Indeed, Anson and Schenkkan recognize as much.
As a result, they seek to augment their representation-reinforcement analysis by asserting that
state marketplace actions constitute "a return of capital" to state residents, which thus "primar-
ily affect[s]" those able to participate in local political processes. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note
69, at 89-90 (emphasis added). This refinement of their thesis, however, reveals that the Anson
and Schenkkan representation-reinforcement rationale has no independent significance. Rather,
the pivotal point becomes the heightened interest of state residents freely to choose the use of
their own property - the same interest focused on by Professor Varat.
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go beyond claims of omission. The ensuing discussion suggests that
their analyses suffer from errors of commission as well.
1. Professor Tribe and "Creating Commerce"
Professor Tribe asserts that the market-participant cases reflect a
simple, unifying theme: "The principle that necessarily underlies the
market participant-market regulator distinction is that, when the state
is creating commerce that would not otherwise exist, it has greater
freedom to shape that commerce than when it is intruding into a previ-
ously existing private market." 10 This claimed synthesis is problem-
atic because it renders the market-participant rule both too narrow
and too broad.
The synthesis is underinclusive because the very Supreme Court
cases from which Professor Tribe purports to derive his "creating
commerce" principle involved state programs that did "intrud[e] into
a previously existing market." Most importantly, the record in Alex-
andria Scrap suggested that Maryland's actions altered dramatically
an already-existing market by diverting to Maryland hulks that, ab-
sent a subsidy program, would have wound up in Virginia. 101 At the
least, the Court's majority accepted this factual premise in holding
that Maryland's program nonetheless was protected by the market-
participant rule.10 2 In a similar vein, Professor Tribe argues that
Reeves involved "commerce creation" because "[i]n Reeves lack of
supply blocked purchases of cement by state residents [and] the state
lessened the obstacle by providing additional supply. ' 10 3 That is true,
but it is also true that by "lessen[ing] the obstacle," South Dakota did
"intrud[e] into a previously existing market." Prior to construction of
the South Dakota cement plant, after all, "producers outside the State
were '. . . supplying all the cement used in' South Dakota,"10 4 and
receiving "substantial profits ... in the prevailing market."' 05 Obvi-
ously, these sellers were displaced when the South Dakota plant began
filling orders. The state thus "created commerce" only in the loose
100. L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 146 (emphasis in original).
101. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 824-26 n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting, for example, the complaint's allegation that the program deprived out-of-
state processors of "scrap which normally moved in interstate commerce").
102. As stated by the majority, "the record contains no details," so that the issue posed if
Maryland had in fact "created, in whole or substantial part," the commerce in hulks was "not
clearly presented." Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809 n.18; see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 446 n.18 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 146.
104. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 431 n.1.
105. 447 U.S. at 431 n.1.
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sense that it satisfied more buyers' needs at lower prices by generating
an alternative and additional source of supply. At the least, it is not
self-evident why such state conduct involves "creating commerce,"
but not "intruding into a previously existing market."
The "creating commerce" litmus is also overinclusive because it
clashes with settled principles of the Court's commerce-clause juris-
prudence. In his analysis of Reeves, for example, Professor Tribe indi-
cates that a state "creates commerce" - and thus may "shape that
commerce" - when it acts to supplement supply.10 6 A state, how-
ever, could supplement supply in many ways. It might, for example,
create additional supplies of milk by requiring that buyers pay a state-
specified minimum price, so as to generate desirable price stability and
the resulting market entry of more milk producers.107 Under existing
doctrine, however, the resulting "creation" of "commerce" would not
permit the state to force milk producers to hold back from interstate
markets those additional supplies produced as a consequence of the
state's action.' 08 Nor could Professor Tribe parry this criticism by
responding that his "commerce creation" test applies only to cases in
which the state spends its own funds. A state, for example, creates
commerce when it spends its money to build a new road facilitating
exchanges with an erstwhile remote and unreachable locality. Under
settled commerce clause principles, however, the state could not for
this reason exclude nonresident traders from the road. 10 9
There are other problems with Professor Tribe's analysis. Why,
for example, does the "creation" of "commerce" necessarily raise a
sufficiently powerful equity to justify state discrimination against inter-
state commerce? We might concede that Alexandria Scrap, Reeves,
and White all involved, in a loose sense, state "creation" of commerce.
But we might quickly add, "So what?" Does any constitutional au-
thority or norm suggest that, because a state creates commerce, it may
do so in a way that violates the "principle of nondiscrimination" un-
derlying the dormant commerce clause?" 0 Professor Tribe's own
analysis hints that he might find authority for his theory in Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System." 1
106. See supra text accompanying notes 100 & 103.
107. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
108. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
109. See infra note 328.
110. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) ("principal objects of
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce");
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
111. 472 U.S. 159 (1985). I say "hints" because Professor Tribe offered his observations on
the market-participant rule prior to issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Northeast
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In Northeast Bancorp, the Court upheld a regionally discriminatory
interstate banking statute against commerce clause attack, arguably
because the statute facilitated some interstate commerce in banking
even though Congress otherwise had allowed none at all.112 It is not
easy to squeeze this half-a-loaf rationale from the Court's opinion in
Northeast Bancorp. 113 Even accepting that rationale, however, it does
not carry over to the state's "creation" of commerce - like that gen-
erated by the programs challenged in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves -
that is entirely or essentially intrastate. The drafters of the commerce
clause did not seek to stimulate commerce for its own sake. Rather,
they sought to safeguard and promote "[c]ommerce . . among the
several States." 114 If the choice is between maintenance of existing
commerce flowing across state borders and the "creation" of addi-
tional commerce purposefully restricted to local residents, the dor-
mant commerce clause's hostility to "a multiplication of preferential
trade areas"115 might well favor the nondiscriminatory status quo.
Finally, while it is a fair enterprise to search the Court's market-
participant cases for a unifying theme, it is a dubious business to distill
a theme that the Court itself has eschewed." 6 In Alexandria Scrap,
Justice Stevens sought to wrap the market-participant rule in the same
Bancorp. Nonetheless, Professor Tribe clearly viewed the market-participant rule and the result
he anticipated in Northeast Bancorp as properly resting on the same "commerce creation" princi-
ple. L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 146; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-33, at 527 n.39 (describ-
ing earlier work as "an anticipatory defense of the Northeast Bancorp decision... by analogy to
the 'market participant' theory"). It thus seems logical to believe that, given the Court's valida-
tion of the laws challenged in Northeast Bancorp, Professor Tribe would view that decision as
helping to support and explain the market-participant doctrine.
112.' Professor Tribe had earlier urged that an analysis emphasizing this fact was proper in
meeting the commerce clause challenge to the regional banking plan. See L, TRIBE, supra note
91, at 138-48. Although the Court reached the result advocated by Professor Tribe, it did not
track his reasoning. Rather, the Court found that the regional discrimination implemented by
the plan was authorized by federal statute. 472 U.S. at 168-73. The Court then applied the
familiar rule that "[w]hen Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are
invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause." 472 U.S. at 174. Even so, it
is conceivable that the Court was influenced to some extent by the commerce-creation dynamic
of the case. See 472 U.S. at 173 (noting that Connecticut "proposed 'an experiment in regional
banking' as a first step toward full interstate banking").
113. See supra note 112.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
115. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)).
116. Of course, there is nothing wrong with a legal realist's seeking to prove that the Court is
doing something different from what it is saying. Professor Tribe's analysis, however, does not
seem to be offered in this spirit. Rather, he seeks to identify a rationale to be applied by lower
courts encountering commerce clause issues in the future, including issues concerning state inter-
state banking laws. See L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 146. The lower courts, however, may not
properly employ a line of reasoning that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected.
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"creating commerce" cloak Professor Tribe would have it wear.' 17 In
his concurring opinion, joined by no other member of the Court, Jus-
tice Stevens justified approval of the discriminatory Maryland pro-
gram on the ground that "the commerce which Maryland has
'burdened' is commerce which would not exist if Maryland had not
decided to subsidize a portion of the automobile scrap-processing busi-
ness." 118 Stated another way, the case was one in which "Maryland
created a market," which "owe[d] its existence to [the] state subsidy
program." 119 The full Court, however, rejected this line of analysis for
the telling reason that Maryland had disrupted the out-of-state hulk
market.120 To be sure, Justice Powell did not find Justice Stevens'
"commerce creation" analysis wholly without relevance for future
cases.121 But the Court's specific refusal to apply a "commerce crea-
tion" rationale in Alexandria Scrap negates any claim that the ration-
ale qualifies as the key "theme" or "principle" underlying the Court's
market-participant decisions.12 2 Any doubt in this regard was dis-
pelled by Reeves, which tersely scuttled the Wyoming buyer's attempt
to argue that commerce-creation was the controlling principle guiding
application of the market-participant rule.123 It is simply not open to
argue that "commerce creation" explains the Court's market-partici-
pant decisions when the Court itself has said just the opposite.
This is not to say that Professor Tribe's observations have no
value. If his central mission is to recapture in more 'felicitous terms
Professor Varat's argument that state resideits have a special claim to
state benefits, his point is sound, though his phraseology is questiona-
ble.124 One also senses - as did Justice Stevens and the majority in
117. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 814-17 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
118. 426 U.S. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. 426 U.S. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 79, at 62 n.27 (rejecting Justice Stevens'
factual assumption that Maryland created the burdened commerce in hulks); Boston College
Note, supra note 15, at 927 (noting that Justice Stevens' claim of commerce creation "has abso-
lutely no support in the record"); Note, Taxes and Bounties Burdening Interstate Commerce:
Distinguishing Boston Stock Exchange from Alexandria Scrap, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 979,
995 n.100 (1977). See generally supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
121. 426 U.S. at 809 n.18.
122. Boston College Note, supra note 15, at 927 ("no support can be found for Justice Ste-
vens' [commerce creation] position in the broad language employed by the majority, which seem-
ingly excludes all state purchasing from commerce clause review").
123. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446 n.18 (1980); see also County Commrs. v. Ste-
vens, 299 Md. 203, 217, 473 A.2d 12, 19 (1984) (rejecting commerce-creation theory in light of
Alexandria Scrap and Reeves).
124. Notably, Professor Tribe echoes Professor Varat's emphasis of the "fairness in allowing
a community to retain the public benefits created by its own public investment." L. TRIBE, supra
note 91, at 145. Professor Tribe then proceeds, however, to articulate and defend his own "crea-
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Alexandria Scrap 125 - that state activity may tread less on the values
of a "national 'common market'"126 when that activity does not in
any way disrupt already-existing commercial enterprises operating in
other states. Finally, Professor Tribe's emphasis is well-placed to the
extent that it reflects concern about safeguarding federalistic experi-
ments to cure market failures. 127 To say these things, however, is a far
cry from explaining all applications of the market-participant rule by
asserting that a state "should be able to enjoy largely unfettered free-
dom in creating the contours" of a "market" it "creates." 12 If noth-
ing else, this attempted synthesis would profit from refinement.
2. Professor Regan and "Coercion"
Professor Regan, like Professor Tribe, has sought to distill a unify-
ing principle that explains the Court's market-participant decisions.
In essence, he contends that the market-participant rule is defensible
because marketplace programs typically involve state "spending," and
spending programs pose less of a threat than tariffs and discriminatory
regulations to the free-market values enshrined in the dormant com-
merce clause. 129 In support of this claim, Professor Regan offers sev-
eral reasons, including that spending programs are "less likely to
proliferate" because by definition they are "relatively expensive."' 30
Professor Regan is on target with these basic points. As shown below,
market-participant programs do pose less of a threat to commerce
clause values than tariffs and regulations, and that fact is attributable
largely to the inherent expensiveness of market-participant pro-
grams. 131 There is a flaw, however, in another reason offered by Pro-
fessor Regan in urging that spending programs are less disruptive of
commerce clause values - a reason on which he seems to lay special
emphasis.
Professor Regan asserts: "For the most part, state spending pro-
grams are less coercive than regulatory programs or taxes with similar
purposes.... Because spending programs are less coercive, they seem
to interfere less, or less objectionably, with the ordinary workings of
tion of commerce" rationale as a "broader theme that underlies each case." Id. (emphasis
added).
125. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809 n.18 (1976) (majority opinion);
426 U.S. at 814-17 (Stevens, J., concurring).
126. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
127. See also Gergen, supra note 15, at 1141.
128. L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 146.
129. Regan, supra note 7, at 1193-94.
130. Id. at 1194.
131. See infra notes 223-45 and accompanying text.
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the market economy."'1 32 It is, however, difficult to see why state
spending programs are "less coercive" than discriminatory regulations
or tariffs in any meaningful respect. And even if spending programs
are in some sense "less coercive," it is difficult to see why that means
they "interfere less" with the free-market values underlying the dor-
mant commerce clause.
The reason why is a practical one: in the real world, discrimina-
tory spending programs will have effects on out-of-state competitors
that are just as draconian - and therefore just as exclusionary - as
discriminatory tariffs and regulations. The economic effect of a nickel-
per-gallon tariff on out-of-state milk, for example, should be little or
no different than the effect of a nickel-per-gallon subsidy for in-state
milk. In the former case the out-of state producer will raise prices; in
the latter the in-state producer will lower them. The "squeeze" on the
out-of-state seller in both cases is the same; because of the state's law,
he will be undersold.133
A case like White further illustrates just how "coercive" a state
spending program can be. In that case, Boston plainly forced contrac-
tors to hire Boston workers through the threat of not opening its pock-
etbook. It might be said in response that the contractors were not
"coerced"; they freely could have chosen not to do business with Bos-
ton. The same is true, however, of out-of-state firms subjected to bur-
densome regulations and tariffs; they too can freely avoid such
unpleasantness by not doing business in the state.
For these reasons, Professor Regan's no-coercion reasoning carries
little, if any, persuasive force. This analytic misstep, moreover, may
lead Professor Regan to put undue emphasis on the notion that state
spending and marketplace programs pose limited dangers to com-
merce clause values. To be sure, his "reduced danger" line of reason-
ing carries weight in explaining the market-participant rule. 134 As
demonstrated below, however, it neither stands alone nor serves as the
dominant consideration in applying the market-participant principle.
132. Regan, supra note 7, at 1194 (emphasis added).
133. See, eg., Gergen, supra note 15, at 1134-35 ("the effects of subsidies are generally the
same as those of tariffs" with respect to out-of-state competitors); Varat, supra note 21, at 492
(noting that subsidies "may ... reduce out-of-state competitive advantages to the same degree"
as "state tax and regulatory schemes"); Miami Note, supra note 79, at 734-35; see also United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) ("The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the
power to coerce or destroy.... This is coercion by economic pressure."); cf New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988).
134. See infra notes 223-45 and accompanying text.
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3. Professor Gergen and "Equal Access"
Professors V.arat, Tribe, and Regan seek to identify principles that
both portend sound future results and jibe in large measure with the
existing market-participant decisions. Other commentators, in con-
trast, have sought to scrap the existing precedents and to reconstruct
from scratch dramatically new approaches to market-participant is-
sues. The main effort in this regard has come from Professor Gergen,
who argues "for per se rules prohibiting many impure subsidies, such
as buy-, hire- and sell-local laws,.., but allowing pure subsidies, such
as cash grants and tax breaks." 135 Focusing on "efficiency" ' 136 and
"utility maximization," 137 Professor Gergen seeks to erect a dichot-
omy between programs through which a state "favor[s] its own in the
allocation of goods it creates" (which a state may do) and programs
through which a state denies "equal access to resources in the market"
(which a state may not do). 138 Although Professor Gergen's analysis
is useful in many details, his proposed dichotomy does not provide a
suitable alternative to the existing market-participant rule.
Professor Gergen's focus on economic efficiency in construing the
commerce clause is itself, to say the least, controversial. Indeed, the
Court has emphasized, in the specific context of applying the dormant
commerce clause, that the "Constitution does not require the States to
subscribe to any particular economic theory."' 39 The difficulties with
Professor Gergen's approach do not stop here. 14° Most importantly,
135. Gergen, supra note 15, at 1134. This pattern of results (with the probable exception of
"cash grants") is the precise opposite of the pattern now marking the Supreme Court's decisions.
See supra notes 36-66 and infra notes 292-485 and accompanying text.
136, Gergen, supra note 15, at 1100 & 1107.
137. Id. at 1107.
138. Id. at 1106.
139. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987); see also Hellerstein, supra
note 79, at 73 ("The possibility that the regulation may be economically inefficient ordinarily
gives rise to no substantial constitutional objection. The Constitution did not enact Adam
Smith's Wealth ofNations."); Tarlock, supra note 15, at 134 ("[Ihe Commerce Clause grants
Congress the power to regulate trade, but the promotion of competition is only one of the regula-
tory options that Congress can and does choose.... The Constitution does not mandate cco-
nomic efficiency."); Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 347, 370 (1985) (quoting Hellerstein with approval); cf Anson & Schenkkan,
supra note 69, at 78 n.31 ("The assumption that the commerce clause embodies a free-trade value
... is erroneous. The commerce clause, by granting Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, can as fairly be said to contemplate a regulated market as a free one."); Eule, Laying
the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 434 (1982) (arguing that "[t]he com-
merce clause... cannot be said to establish and protect free trade or a national marketplace as a
fundamental constitutional value").
140. For example, Professor Gergen's willingness to abandon his own economic approach -
in particular, by endorsing subsidies even "though they . . . encourage inefficient uses of re-
sources," Gergen, supra note 15, at 1134-35 - suggests the inherent limits of his proposed
"test." Even more problematically, Professor Gergen supplements his efficiency-based approach
by emphasizing "tradition," thus exposing his analysis to the same criticisms that led the Court
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the utility-based decisional categories proposed by Professor Gergen
themselves seem of limited utility for decisionmakers confronting real
cases. Professor Gergen, for example, never satisfactorily explains
why a state's preferential treatment of residents in supplying state-pro-
duced medical services constitutes "favor[ing] its own citizens in the
allocation of goods it creates," while a preference for residents in sup-
plying state-made cement does not.141 He urges that "[n]ot only is
cement capable of provision through the market, but historically it has
been so produced." 142 In the same breath, however, Professor Gergen
concedes that states may limit state-owned housing to state residents
- even though housing also has long been "provi[ded] through the
market."143
One senses in reading Professor Gergen that he is moved in large
measure by a desire "to prevent state ownership of commercial enter-
prises from undermining our common market." 144 As he puts it:
United States scholars, reared in our pervasively private market, too eas-
ily discount the possibility that publicly owned enterprises may displace
private ones and that allowing a state to favor its citizens in its commer-
cial operations could balkanize the national market. Would we really
permit a socialist government in Vermont to defeat free trade by collec-
tivizing its retail establishments, factories, and farms?145
To this basic concern, four preliminary responses are available.1 4
6
First, Professor Gergen overstates his case. We live in a "perva-
to reject the innovation-stifling approach of Justice Powell. See supra note 89 and accompanying
text.
141. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1142.
142. Id.
143. Id. See generally infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text (further discussing adverse-
reliance argument).
144. Gergen, supra note 15, at 1142.
145. Id. at 1142-43. Others have expressed similar concerns. See Blumoff, supra note 15, at
111 & n.270 (viewing emergence of "a kind of state socialism" as "not as farfetched as it might
appear"); Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the
Welfare State, 40 WAsH. L. REv. 10, 60 (1965) (fearing "incentive for states to socialize natural
resources"); Creighton Casenote, supra note 67, at 638 ("inducements for socialized industry are
obvious"); Note, South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke: The Commerce Clause
and the Market Participant Doctrine, 15 ENvTL. L. REV. 593, 613 (1985) [hereinafter Envtl. L
Rev. Note] ("What would prevent all states from setting up their own state-run industries to
protect their own economies, and isolate those industries from the interstate market?"); Harv. J
Leg. Comment, supra note 15, at 586 ("if all state actions characterized as market participation
are taken out of the strictures of the Commerce Clause, then only time prevents the states from
structuring many, if not most, discriminatory actions in the form of market participation");
Harv. Pub. Poly. Comment, supra note 15, at 380; cf Note, The Constitution and State Control of
Natural Resources, 64 HARv. L. REv. 642, 649 (1951) [hereinafter Note, State Control of Natural
Resources] (asserting that it is "well established that there is virtually no limitation on the state's
right to engage in business in competition with, or to the exclusion of, private organizations").
146. I say "preliminary" because much of the discussion below echoes and builds on the
points briefly made here.
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sively private market" precisely because American sensibilities eschew
state-managed economies. To most of us who are looking, the collec-
tivization of Vermont simply does not loom close on the horizon.147
Second, even if Vermont did collectivize its economy in an isolationist
way, it is far from clear that the market-participant rule would shield
such dramatic state action from dormant commerce clause attack.
The rule to date has operated to protect resident preferences in dis-
crete programs; a massive governmental effort to absorb the private
sector, coupled with the widespread exclusion of nonresident traders,
would present a very different problem. 148 Third, regardless of the
market-participant rule, the commerce clause should prove equal to
the challenge of countering extreme isolationism in individual states.
This is so because the clause arms Congress with power. Even if the
Court declined to invalidate Vermont's collectivization effort, Con-
gress unquestionably would be alerted to, and equipped to respond to,
the task. Indeed, the central justification for judicial use of the Com-
merce Clause is that Congress has too little time and too few resources
to give attention to "low visibility" state programs that have protec-
tionist purposes or effects. 149 This "low-visibility" justification for pre-
ferring judicial action to congressional action, however, hardly would
apply to Vermont's hypothetical collectivization effort or to similarly
sweeping protectionist incursions by states into historically private
enterprises.
Finally, the pro-national values of the commerce clause do not
stand alone. The Framers' endorsement of a system of federalism en-
visioned experimentation - including economic experimentation -
in individual states. 150 Even assuming the Framers would not have
countenanced the collectivization of Vermont, they surely invited
more limited departures from orthodoxy in state choices about distrib-
147. For similar views, see Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 93 (citing "popular antipa-
thy to state experiments with apparent socialism"), and Varat, supra note 21, at 530 n.175 ("As
for the incentive to socialism that the distinction creates, it seems unlikely in our society that the
desire to be protectionist often will outweigh the disincentives.").
148. See infra notes 223-42 and accompanying text (arguing that degree of interference with
free commerce values is one proper consideration in applying the market-participant rule); cf
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 n.8 (1989) (suggesting that a state
ban on the use of public facilities to perform abortions would be more suspect "if a particular
State had socialized medicine").
149. Tarlock, supra note 15, at 134; see also, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-1; Varat, supra
note 21, at 488 n.4; Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV.
563, 569 (1983) (noting Congress' inability to deal with "myriad local laws and practices that
penetrate state borders").
150. See Varat, supra note 21, at 522 ("[D]iversity [inherent in the federal system] inevitably
distorts business location and resource allocation decisions from what they would be in a true
free-trade area. The Framers thus compromised to some degree the national free-trade objectives
of the commerce clause in the interest of state power.").
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uting state resources. Given this constitutional plan, one cannot
lightly infer a design to limit state freedom to experiment with novel
distributional programs through judicial pronouncement. 151
In fairness to Professor Gergen, he acknowledges the constitu-
tional complexity of these cases1 52 and offers many useful insights
about market-participant issues.1 53 In the end, however, he does not
offer good enough reasons to justify the extreme reworking of doctrine
he proposes. 154
4. A Closing Note on Others' Approaches
This critique of existing commentaries should not obscure the val-
uable contributions their creators have made. Indeed, the broad
themes - and specific analysis - developed in the next two Parts of
this article draw heavily on the insights of these other analysts. Pro-
fessor Varat, for example, well emphasizes the fairness of letting state
residents spend state money on themselves. At least implicit in Profes-
sor Tribe's "commerce creation" theory is the thought that the states
must have room to experiment with innovative distributional pro-
grams. There lies in the work of both Professor Regan and Professor
Gergen a salutary sensitivity about safeguarding programs that under-
cut in only a limited way the core values of the dormant commerce
clause. And even Justice Powell's tradition-steeped analysis bears
some kinship to the focus on formal considerations advocated below.
In short, when taken cumulatively, the contributions of these ob-
servers offer support for the multi-factor analytical framework dis-
tilled in Part IV of this article. I turn now, in Part III, to detailing the
underpinnings of that framework.
III. UNTANGLING THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT RULE - PART
Two: FINDING AND FORMULATING THE ROOTS
OF THE RULE
The market-participant rule does not spring from a single source.
Rather, like many rules, it is the product of "a congeries of pur-
poses." 155 Indeed, five key justifications underlie the market-partici-
151. See id. at 530 n.175.
152. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1106, 1153 (recognizing that his proposed "goods it cre-
ated"/"resources in the market" dichotomy is "clouded" and requires "considerable
refinement").
153. Indeed, despite differences in basic approach, the frequent citation to Professor Gergen's
work in this article reveals that in many particulars I concur in his observations.
154. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
155. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Midcentury, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 470 (1954).
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pant rule. First, as a general matter, it is fair and consistent with
broadly shared conceptions of property to let state governments favor
state residents when selecting the recipients of the state's own lar-
gess. 156 Second, the values of federalism suggest a special need to
avoid interference with state autonomy in this area. 15 7 Third, market-
place preferences for local concerns in general pose less of a danger to
commerce clause values than do those discriminatory regulations and
taxes that engendered recognition of the dormant commerce clause
principle. 158 Fourth, formal considerations - emanating from consti-
tutional text and history - suggest that states should have a freer
hand when dealing in the market than when regulating others' efforts
at free trade.159 And fifth, institutional considerations counsel height-
ened caution in applying the dormant commerce clause to market-par-
ticipant cases. 160
Before developing these themes, two preliminary points merit men-
tion. First, some of these justifications support judicial noninterven-
tion in evaluating in-state preferences going beyond state selection of
trading partners. The fairness of facilitating state control over its own
largess, for example, helps justify resident preferences in operating
state welfare programs1 61 and municipal schools.1 62 That fact, how-
ever, does not mean that the market-participant principle is miscon-
ceived and too narrowly drawn, as Professor Varat in particular
suggests. 163 If, as argued below, there are additional reasons for judi-
cial restraint in marketplace cases that focus directly on the market-
place character of the state activity, then settled interpretive canons
properly led the Court to lay down a "market-participant" rule, rather
than some more expansive adjudicative principle. As the Court has
noted on numerous occasions, it "will not 'formulate a rule of consti-
tutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.' "164
156. See infra notes 170-93 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 194-217 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 218-44 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 245-64 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 265-77 and accompanying text.
161. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
162. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983) (noting "substantial state interest in
assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents").
163. Varat, supra note 21, at 571 (advocating "a theory of state 'citizenship' in the broadest
sense" as "the appropriate starting point"); id. at 552 (suggesting that the "only unfortunate
thing about Reeves is that, although the elements of the principle were adverted to in the Court's
opinion, they were displaced from their rightful place of honor by the ill-conceived proprietary
exception doctrine"); id. at 493 (criticizing Supreme Court's "partial doctrines").
164. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liver-
pool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commrs., 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
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Second, it merits mention that these five rationales do not stand
alone in justifying the market-participant doctrine. The Court in
Reeves suggested a further rationale:
[S]tate proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the
same restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhanded-
ness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should similarly
share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent
limits of the Commerce Clause.1 65
This rationale is not free from difficulties, 166 although it draws at least
some support from the fairness-based notion that similar burdens
should beget similar benefits. 167 Moreover, whatever weight this ra-
tionale had when first articulated has been enhanced by the Court's
post-Reeves holding that state purchases, no less private purchases, are
subject to Robinson-Patman Act restrictions so long as the "[s]tate has
chosen to compete in the private retail market."' 168 Even so, the indis-
putable differences between firms and states, 169 together with the in-
herent amorphousness of the evenhandedness justification, renders it
of limited significance. More central to explaining the market-partici-
pant rule are the five central rationales identified above. I turn now to
explaining why.
A. Sowing and Reaping - The Fairness of Directing State Benefits
to State Residents
There exists a basic distinction between state regulation or taxation
165. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 429 (1980).
166. Professor Varat is unpersuaded by it, see Varat, supra note 21, at 506-07, as is Professor
Tribe, see L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 145; see also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 15,
at 72-73 n.26.
167. Notably, the court of appeals in Reeves relied heavily on this rationale. See Reeves, Inc.
v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir. 1978) (state as proprietor "possessed the rights of and is
subject to the regulatory restrictions on any private business making marketing decisions"). Par-
ticularly unpersuasive is the suggestion that this argument must fail because its acceptance means
that states - so long as they trade in the market - may do such things as discriminate against
racial minorities. See, ag., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNsTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 326 (1986); cf Varat, supra note 21, at 495 (noting that such "invidious" discrimi-
nation is "certainly" impermissible, including in the marketplace). The easy answer to this
argument was stated well by Justice Douglas in another context: "[T]he right of people to be free
of state action that discriminates against them because of race 'occupies a more protected posi-
tion in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across
state lines.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas J.,
concurring) (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)); see also Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948) (invalidating on equal protection grounds state
exclusion of resident legal aliens from fishing privileges notwithstanding defense that state dis-
criminated based on its ownership of fish as trustee for its residents; distinguishing Geer v. Con-
necticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), as a case "where only the commerce clause was involved").
168. Jefferson County Pharmacy Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 154 (1983).
169. See Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 261-62 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
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and state trading in the marketplace. When a state government regu-
lates or taxes, it turns over nothing that belongs to it; rather, it com-
pels private action through the exercise of raw governmental power. 170
In contrast, when a state government buys or sells, it is controlling and
distributing its own resources. This distinction gives rise to the first
and most basic rationale for the market-participant rule.
To see why, it is useful to recall that states are people - people
who have banded together. 171 One collective activity in which a
state's citizens may engage is the accumulation of property. The prop-
erty they accumulate is their own, and the state government handles
that property on their behalf.172 Against this backdrop, it seems sensi-
ble that when a state government distributes state resources, it may -
on behalf of all its citizens - pick and choose among proper recipi-
ents. An essential feature of having property is, after all, the right to
exclude others;1 73 and if individuals may exclude others from their
property, so too may groups of individuals who own property
jointly.1 74 There is no apparent reason why this logic should not apply
to a group of individuals that calls itself a state.175 Indeed, the
Supreme Court often has recognized governmental claims to limit ac-
cess to government property, even when access is sought by full-
fledged members of the political community.1 76
170. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977) ("Constitutional concerns are greatest when
the State attempts to impose its will by force of law."); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989) (quoting Maher); cf Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitu-
tion, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1689 (1984) (the use of "raw political power" to benefit favored
groups is a recurring constitutional concern).
171. See, eg., Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 89 ("the state remains nothing more
than a set of relationships between individual persons, created by individual persons"); Varat,
supra note 21, at 520; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("[l]egislators represent
people, not trees or acres").
172. See, eg., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (referring to state as a "trustee" of
its people); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903) (same).
173. Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Kaisar Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80
(1979); see Varat, supra note 21, at 494 (noting "traditional assumptions" that property owner-
ship entails "range of choice ... including choices about whom to admit and whom to exclude");
cf Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) ("Under our form of government the use of
property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.").
174. See I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (P. Bradley ed., Vintage
Books 1945) ("The most natural privilege ofman, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of
combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and acting in common with them.").
175. See, eg., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (charac-
terizing state residents as "tenants in common of [public] property").
176. See, eg., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989) (uphold-
ing a state ban on the use of public facilities to perform abortions; citing earlier decisions that "all
support the view that the State need not commit any resources to facilitating abortions"); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1327 (1988) (rejecting free exer-
cise clause challenge to federal government's building of road destroying sacred Native American
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This property-based right to exclude others carries special force
when a state's representatives prefer its own residents over the resi-
dents of other jurisdictions. Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Fed-
eralist Number 32, conceded the "justness" of letting "individual
States . . . raise their own revenues for the supply of their own
wants."177 Professor Varat, more recently, has explained why basic
fairness supports this form of self-preference: "Like other groups free
to combine their members' efforts to produce collective benefits to be
shared among the group, political communities, including states, have
a prima facie justification for limiting distribution of their public goods
to those who combined to provide them."1 78 In short, as a matter of
both equity and accepted notions of the nature of property, the citi-
zens of a state may reap where they have sown.179
site, and noting, "Whatever rights the Indians have to the use of the area, however, those rights
do not divest the Government to its right to use what is, after all, its land"); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 223 (1984) (remanding for further
consideration of privileges-and-immunities challenge to municipal hiring preference; noting that
judicial restraint "is particularly appropriate when a government body is merely setting condi-
tions on the expenditure of funds it controls"); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973)
("[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and
quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid");
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (rejecting free-assembly argument for right to gather
on jailhouse grounds; asserting that "[tihe State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated");
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) (noting in invalidating state law requiring private
discrimination in employment that "the act does not pertain to the regulation and distribution of
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people of the State, the enjoy-
ment of which may be limited to its citizens as against both aliens and citizens of other States");
see also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129-30
(1981) (quoting Adderley in rejecting first amendment claim of right to deposit unstamped mate-
rial in mailboxes reserved for use by Postal Service); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)
(quoting Adderley in rejecting free-speech challenge to exclusion of political speakers from mili-
tary compound); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 430 (Cardozo, J.) ("[the
state, in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys, may legitimately consult the
welfare of its own citizens, rather than that of aliens"), affd., 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), at 199 (emphasis added).
178. Varat, supra note 21, at 523.
179. Accord, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-35, at 539 (There "appear to be some goods and
services that a state's citizens, having created or preserved for themselves, are entitled to keep for
themselves."); Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 89 ("When a state distributes resources
owned in its capacity as a political 'trust' or 'corporation,' its disposition of those resources is in
effect a return of capital to some of the resources' true individual owners."); Linde, supra note
145, at 61 ("the most obvious sources" for justifying discrimination against nonresidents include
"the taxes that may be contributed to state programs by residents and not by nonresidents");
Rodgers, The Limits on State Activity in the Interstate Water Market, 21 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 357, 364 (1986) (market-participant rule applies if state "expends its revenues"); Wells &
Hellerstein, supra note 15, at 1131 ("the underlying principle may be that the states enjoy consid-
erably more freedom from commerce clause restraints when dealing with their own resources
than they do when dealing with the resources of others"); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra
note 15, at 73-74; Houston Note, supra note 15, at 536 n.22; U Pa. Comment, supra note 15, at
1321 (recognizing propriety of state power "to reserve to state residents public goods paid for or
created by state residents"); Note, Municipal Employee Residency Requirements and Equal Pro-
tection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684, 1697 (1975) [hereinafter Yale Note] (citing the "idea that the re-
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This theme of fairness runs through the Court's market-participant
decisions. In Reeves, for example, the Court reasoned that the state
government should be able to serve "as trustee... for its people,"' 180
"channel state benefits to residents of the state supplying them," 181
and "limit[] benefits generated by a state program to those who fund
the state treasury." 182 Again in White, the Court carefully limited its
market-participant holding to those projects on which "the city ex-
pended its own funds." 183 The Court also has recognized the propri-
ety of letting state residents control their own resources in restricting
the application of the privileges and immunities clause. In such cases,
the Court has emphasized, state ownership of the desired resource will
be "often the crucial factor ... considered in evaluating whether the
statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the Clause."18 4
sources of a municipality belong to its residents and that residents legitimately are preferred in
the distribution of such resources"). But cf id. at 1698 (questioning whether so-called "public
coffer" objective is constitutionally legitimate).
180. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175,
191 (1915) (itself quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903))).
181. 447 U.S. at 443 n.16.
182. 447 U.S. at 442.
183. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,' 214 (1983).
Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that its holding turned on the fact that the action in
question related to "contracts involving only city funds." 460 U.S. at 211; see also Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982) (noting in applying the commerce clause to
Nebraska's in-state water preference that state conservation efforts may give water "some indicia
of a good publicly produced").,
184. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529 (1978) (emphasis added); accord United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1984); see also Douglas v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929) (justifying preference for residents' access
to local courts on ground that "broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts
concerned"); Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (W.D. Wash.) (three-judge court)
(nonresident tuition differential proper because of disparate contributions made to the university
in other forms by in-state and out-of-state students and parents), affd. mem., 414 U.S. 1057
(1973). Lower courts also have recognized this "sow-and-reap" aspect of the market-participant
rule. Eg., Tenneco, Inc. v. Sutton, 530 F. Supp. 411, 441 (M.D. La. 1981) (market-participant
rule protects "a state program supported by funds from the state treasury"; but this principle is
inapplicable to Louisiana natural-gas restrictions because "no state funds or state owned re-
sources are involved"); County. Commrs. v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 221, 473 A.2d 12, 21 (1984)
(limiting landfill use to county residents ensures that "service provided there will be reserved for
those who have paid to construct and operate the facility"); see also, e.g., State v. Antioch, 694
P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1985) (upholding construction hiring preference against privileges and immu-
nities clause challenge; emphasizing "the fact that the Wyoming Preference Act confines its dis-
criminatory effects to projects constructed from public funds"); Antioch, 694 P.2d at 65 (Thomas,
C.J., concurring) (action unobjectionable where state "provides in essence that to the extent pos-
sible public works contracts benefit the citizens of the state whose contributions to the public
treasury fund those projects"); cf Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909,
914-15, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979) (finding a "State's interest in allocating its funds to their benefi-
cial owners, its citizens[,]" insufficient to overcome privileges and immunities clause attack on in-
state contractor preference, in part because "most of the project's funds emanated from Federal
sources"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980). But cf Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498
n.4 (D.N.J. J972) (disavowing "public coffer" theory offered to justify residency requirement for
public servants).
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This sow-and-reap rationale is not without difficulties. Most im-
portant, nonresidents often pay the state taxes that create the state's
property. This is especially true of those nonresidents likely to have
an interest in trading with the state: nonresidents who live nearby, are
temporarily located in the state, are highly mobile, or arecorporations
operating in multiple jurisdictions. Because these nonresidents have
helped seed the fields producing the state's largess, the real unfairness
may lie in excluding them from the harvest. At least five reasons,
however, suggest that this challenge to the sow-and-reap rationale is
unpersuasive.
First, nonresidents must take the bitter with the sweet. By choos-
ing not to reside in the state, the nonresident receives some - even if
not complete - immunity from state taxation.185 It therefore is rea-
sonable for the nonresident to bear greater burdens when state benefits
are doled out.18 6 Second, the burdensomeness of excluding nonresi-
dents from state benefits is mitigated by constitutional rules that re-
quire states freely to award full resident status to all who seek it. 187 A
rule permitting resident preferences is less objectionable when resi-
dence itself may readily be obtained. Third, any unfairness of a rule
discriminating against nonresidents in disbursing state property is re-
duced by the rule's symmetrical effect. A person may not enjoy cer-
tain trading relationships with a state because she has chosen not to
reside there. At the same time, she may benefit because of her own
state's ability to exclude nonresidents from exchanges that may be of
value to her. Fourth, regardless of who pays state taxes, it is always
possible for states to redistribute resulting resources through non-mar-
ketplace programs that channel benefits solely to state residents.188
Fairness may suggest that states should not forfeit this power to favor
their own solely because their particular needs require adoption of
market-participant programs.
Finally, a line must be drawn somewhere. Surely, the plea for fair-
ness to nonresident taxpayers does not mean a state must treat all non-
residents just like its own citizens.18 9 Most nonresidents pay no state
185. See Varat, supra note 21, at 527-28.
186. E.g., Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 77 ("[Florbidding the States from preferring 'their
own in the distribution of their resources would introduce into the federal system an unsettling
asymmetry between the respective obligations the resident and nonresident owe to the State and
the benefits they enjoy there.").
187. See, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941); Varat, supra note 21, at 519.
188. See Regan, supra note 7, at 1193 ("there is no doubt that a state can favor its own
citizens in certain contexts," such as in the dispersal of welfare benefits or in the direct payment
of oil royalties).
189. See Varat, supra note 21, at 529 ("that some nonresidents may pay taxes is no reason to
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taxes, and among even those who do, few will pay as much as the vast
majority of state residents. 190 Thus, efforts fairly to include nonresi-
dents in state marketplace programs will pose formidable administra-
tive difficulties. 191 In these circumstances, a sound, if imperfect, place
for linedrawing is between nonresidents and residents. Such a line not
only has the virtue of simplicity;19 2 it recognizes that state residents
are "those ... whom the State was created to serve." 193
B. The Values of Federalism and the Market-Participant Rule
The sow-and-reap rationale suggests that the market-participant
rule is proper because it is fair. In addition, the rule finds support in
the values of federalism. The Court in Reeves relied squarely on "con-
siderations of state sovereignty" in justifying the rule.194 Commenta-
tors have echoed the theme that the market-participant rule responds
require the state to treat all nonresidents on a par with residents") (emphasis in original); see also
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1948) ("The State is not without power... to charge
non-residents a differential which would merely compensate the State for... any conservation
expenditures from taxes which only residents pay.").
190. E.g., Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. Wash.) (three-judge court) (up-
holding one-year waiting period for students seeking reduced in-state tuition because of reasona-
bleness of "charging [more to] those who have not theretofore contributed tax dollars to the
State"), affd. mem, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 240 (D. Minn.
1970) (three-judge court) (upholding one-year residence requirement for reduced in-state tuition
on the ground that it reasonably "achieve[s] partial cost equalization between those who have
and those who have not recently contributed to the State's economy through employment, tax
payments and expenditures therein"), affd. mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971); see also Anson & Schenk-
kan, supra note 69, at 90 ("Even though the state's action may have a distributional impact on
those outside the state, the primary distributional effects, both benefits and burdens, fall on the
individual owners of the resources."); Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 396 (1979) ("[A]lthough
most, if not all, nonresident students no doubt pay some taxes to the state during their years at
the state school, and many non-resident students' parents may have occasion to pay some taxes
to the state as well, resident students and their parents typically pay more.").
191. See, eg., Varat, supra note 21, at 553 ("recapturing the full cost of educating nonresi-
dents, but no more, would be an administratively difficult task").
192. See, eg., Gergen, supra note 15, at 1115 (noting "[t]he tremendous complexities in-
volved in assessing the reasonableness of state taxes and fees"); Varat, supra note 21, at 529
(noting that courts "have been unreceptive to this sort of individual accounting"); see also Sim-
son, supra note 190, at 396 ("although the assumption that resident students' contributions to the
state treasury differ dramatically from those of nonresident students obviously is imperfect, the
classification that it helps explain is as precise as possible").
193. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980); see also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ("It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted
power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the
power in their interest ...."); Simson, supra note 190, at 387 ("[T]he framers could not have
intended to incapacitate states totally from disadvantaging nonresidents because the effect would
have been to destroy the integrity of one of the basic units of the federal system that they envi-
sioned - the state."); Varat, supra note 21, at 490 ("[F]ulfillment of the fundamental obligation
of state government - to care for the state's own residents - depends, to some ill-defined de-
gree, on the ability to withhold from others what a state chooses to provide its own.").
194. 447 U.S. at 438.
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to concerns about state autonomy. 195
The values of federalism are of keen constitutional importance.1 96
As others have observed, the easiest way to nationalize the American
people would have been to do away with state governments alto-
gether.197 However, "[n]o political dreamer was ever wild enough to
think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of
compounding the American people into one common mass."' 198 Rea-
sons of function, as well as long-established loyalties, precluded such
radical surgery. 199 Meaningful local governance fosters experimenta-
tion and responsiveness to distinctive local conditions,2°° facilitates
choice by fostering diversity,20' and may increase both liberty and par-
ticipatory democracy by keeping government near at hand.20 2 More
subtly, the allowance of substantial local control may promote the
healthiest brand of nationalism by fostering pursuit of different tradi-
tions in a spirit of shared toleration. 20 3
To recite the creed of states' rights, however, is not to explain why
judicial interference with state distributional programs is particularly
offensive to the values of federalism. The question remains: Why
should the dormant commerce clause command closer scrutiny of
state regulatory programs than of state marketplace programs?
The simplest answer is that state resources are the state's "own" in
a way that the state's regulatory powers are not. It is, in other words,
a greater intrusion on state autonomy to restrict a state's use of its own
tangible resources than to cabin its otherwise limitless power to coerce
through government fiat.204 The Supreme Court's eleventh amend-
195. See, eg., Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 77.
196. E.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 177, No. 45 (Madison), at 310 ("the States will
retain under the proposed Constitution a very extensive portion of active sovereignty").
197. See Varat, supra note 21, at 519-20.
198. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 403 (1819).
199. See, eg., Varat, supra note 21, at 516 ("state loyalties and fear of centralized authority
compelled the retention of the states as separate political communities" (citing THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 17, 31, 32, 34 (Hamilton), 45, 46 (Madison)).
200. See, eg., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (citing "principle that the States
should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures");
L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-35, at 542-43; Varat, supra note 21, at 520 ("ability to experiment in a
local setting is a frequently cited advantage of our federal structure").
201. See, eg., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 77 (1982) (O'Conner, J., concurring) ("Just as
our federal system permits the States to experiment with different social and economic programs,
it allows the individual to settle in the State offering those programs best tailored to his or her
tastes.") (citation omitted).
202. See, eg., G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 71.
203. Cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("the National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways"); Varat, supra note 21, at 531 n.176.
204. See, eg., Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 76 (citing "heightened federalism con-
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ment jurisprudence lends some support to this rationale. Thus, con-
cerns of state sovereignty do not bar a federal court from directing
state officials to alter state policy through the issuance of injunctions;
they do, however, bar such a court from directly interfering with the
state's resources through the imposition of money-damage awards. 2°5
Instrumental considerations provide even stronger support for the
general entitlement of a state to exclude nonresidents when it distrib-
utes state resources. We have already seen that states may act in many
ways that restrict state benefits to state residents. 20 6 If states may limit
the distribution of state resources to state residents through some
channels (such as by building and operating schools) 20 7 but not
through others (such as by building and operating cement plants),208
then we should expect states to favor the former type of activity over
the latter.20 9 This result, however, would be undesirable, for it would
induce state governments to spend state money on state programs not
producing the greatest benefit for those who reside in the state. It thus
would, as the Court explained in Reeves, "threaten the future fashion-
ing of effective and creative programs for solving local problems and
distributing government largesse. ' '210
A majority of the Court sounded this same theme nearly a decade
after adopting the market-participant rule in a case not involving that
rule at all. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,211
the issue was whether the Court should invalidate under the tenth
cerns" when "a state discriminates in the disposition of state-owned resources," rather than im-
poses "preferences on privately owned resources"); Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 75 (The states'
ability to "favor resident individuals and businesses in the distribution of state resources [is] ... a
logical corollary of the basic assumptions underlying our federal system.... [lit is difficult to
imagine [commerce clause] limitations extending so far as to bar the States from making any
distinctions between in-state and out-of-state interests in distributing state resources without de-
stroying the essential fabric of our constitutional plan."); Varat, supra note 21, at 541 & n.193
("collection of state revenues to serve state residents is at the core of the purposes of state polit-
ical organization"; noting that "fiscal autonomy interests of the state" justify resident preferences
even when "free rider" problems are not present).
205. Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) with Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); see also Blumoff, supra note 15, at 83 (noting sovereign immunity rationale "that when
funds are paid for private damages, government activities that enhance the general welfare are
necessarily diminished"); Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 15, at 1098 (noting, in discussing the
eleventh amendment, that a "state's autonomy from the federal government depends significantly
on its financial independence").
206. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
208. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
209. See Varat, supra note 21, at 541 ("monetary resources are finite; making funds available
for one purpose, or for one group, makes them unavailable for use by another").
210. 447 U.S. at 441; see also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 15, at 73 (the Court
was influenced in White by "a belief that the dormant commerce clause should not stifle worthy
local initiatives").
211. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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amendment federal minimum-wage legislation as applied to state
workers employed in carrying out traditional governmental func-
tions.212 In rejecting a tradition-based tenth amendment approach,
the Court cited "the role of federalism," focusing in particular on the
need for states to be "equally free" to undertake orthodox and unor-
thodox programs.213 As stated by the Court:
Any rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or
"necessary" nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an
unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies.
it favors and which ones it dislikes.... States cannot serve as laborato-
ries for social and economic experiment.... if they must pay an added
price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up
functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private
hands.214
This same federalist reasoning serves to explain and to validate the
market-participant rule. If the state must pay the "added price" of
including nonresidents when it directs resources into the marketplace,
the state will be encouraged to adopt non-marketplace programs not
producing the greatest benefit for state residents.215 Indeed, a state
may prefer suboptimal residents-only programs even when the inclu-
sion of out-of-staters in the proposed program does not "bump" state
residents or cost the state additional money. 216 Such a result, as the
Court reasoned in Garcia, is incompatible with two key goals of our
212. 469 U.S. at 530-31.
213. 469 U.S. at 546.
214. 469 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added). In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Jus-
tice Harlan sounded the same tocsin in dissenting from the Court's invalidation of a one-year
residency requirement for eligibility for state welfare benefits. The Court's holding, he observed,
would create "the unfortunate consequence of discouraging... generous welfare programs in
particular areas on an experimental basis, because of fears that the program would cause an
influx of persons seeking higher welfare payments." 394 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
other words, even if state legislators saw increased public assistance as the optimal way to help
state residents, they would eschew such. "fresh solutions" out of fear of having to share such
benefits with erstwhile outsiders. 394 U.S. at 674-75 (Harlan, J., dissenting). (Notably, the ma-
jority in Shapiro did not question this observation. Rather, it accepted this risk in the particular
context of invalidating the challenged durational residency requirement because the claimed enti-
tlement to welfare benefits involved "the very means to subsist," 394 U.S. at 627, and "the funda-
mental right of interstate movement" of individuals, 394 U.S. at 638. These factors, of course,
are not present in -market-participant cases.) See also Gergen, supra note 15, at 1112 ("[florced
sharing of state-created goods may prevent the people of a state from maximizing their value");
cf Jefferson v..Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 551 (1972) (refusing, in response to equal protection
challenge to welfare program producing discriminatory effects, "to second guess state officials
charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients"; quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
215. See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1989) (local residents are"'unlikely to pay for local government services if they must bear the
cost but the entire nation may receive the benefit").
216. See Varat, supra note 21, at 553-54 ("If a state must choose between no public schools
or serving all nonresidents who demand admission, are able to pay, and are otherwise equal to
the residents the state wishes to educate, it may hesitate before choosing the second option. A
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constitutional federalism: the encouragement of novel state experi-
ments and the fostering of governmental responsiveness to distinctive
local needs. 2 17
C. The Reduced Risk of Interference with Commerce Clause Values
We have seen that permitting resident preferences in the distribu-
tion of state resources comports with both fairness and effective feder-
alism. These considerations serve to counterbalance in state-as-trader
cases the commerce clause's pro-national policy, a policy that has been
vindicated repeatedly in cases involving discriminatory state regula-
tions and taxes.2 18 Wholly apart from these countervailing considera-
tions, however, state programs preferring state residents in the
distribution of state resources may threaten the underlying commerce
clause goal of free trade in a unified nation to a lesser extent than do
preferential regulatory or taxing programs. For reasons detailed be-
low, state spending and marketplace preferences in fact do threaten
commerce clause values to a reduced degree. Moreover, this line of
reasoning explains in large measure the Court's partial grounding of
the market-participant rule in "'the long recognized right of [the]
trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal.' "219
Critics have faulted the Court for embracing this "free trader" ra-
tionale.220 Professor Tribe, for example, has written:
[T]here are obvious tensions between the image of the state as just an-
other economic actor, responding to the same pressures as private enter-
prises, and the image of the state intervening in the market, propelled by
the power to tax, in order to promote the interests of its citizens. These
state might not wish to create a vast public educational establishment despite the ability to
charge nonresidents more.").
217. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-35, at 539-40 ("If a state ... were forced to act
evenhandedly in distributing its state-created 'goodies,' perhaps it would simply give up the effort
to conserve or create them.").
218. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
219. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). Notably, some observers have suggested that this line of reason-
ing should limit the market-participant rule to the narrow band of cases in which the state acts
just like a typical private business. In New Orleans S.S. Assoc. v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor &
Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1989), for example, the court suggested that "the
assumption of the market participant exception" is "that the [state] will charge what the market
would allow." Nothing could be further from the truth. In Reeves, for example, South Dakota
clearly forewent the higher prices that increased demand for its cement from other states would
have brought. The very point of the market-participant rule is to let states exclude out-of-state
buyers and sellers from its dealings, even though such exclusions will produce prices other than
"what the market would allow."
220. See, eg., Varat, supra note 21, at 506.
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are in fact inconsistent alternative defenses. 22 1
This criticism is not sound. The "free trader" rationale involves more
than visualizing "the state as just another economic actor," and if
properly understood, is fully consistent with the fairness and federal-
ism rationales also underlying the market-participant rule.
How, then, is the free-trader rationale properly understood? The
rationale has two aspects, which we may label the "functional" and
the "formal." The remainder of this section examines the "func-
tional" side of this rationale, which focuses on the reduced risk to
commerce clause values in market-participant cases. Section III.D
then explores the rationale's "formal" dimension, which focuses on
the impact of the language and legislative history of the commerce
clause.
The creation of a national free market is widely accepted as a ma-
jor purpose of the commerce clause.222 The economic justifications for
free markets are well-known. Free markets channel work to those
who produce most efficiently, and they encourage further efficiency by
increasing the number of actual and potential competitors of all pro-
ducers. 223 Free markets induce specialization and innovation by ex-
panding the range of available buyers.224 Free markets allow
resources to move into the hands where they are most valued, thus
maximizing the overall wealth of the trading unit.22 5 If the free choice
of trading partners creates efficiencies and maximizes the national
wealth, then why should not states - like anybody else - be permit-
ted to deal with whomever they wish?
Critics of the market-participant rule have answered this question
221. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 432; accord Note, supra note 9, at 712 (citing the "paradox"
of the Court's market-participant justifications because "precisely to the extent that the state is
acting as guardian of its people, it is acting like a political entity and not like a private market
force"); Harm. Pub. Poly. Comment, supra note 15, at 369 n.26; Houston Note, supra note 15, at
555 (citing "inconsistency" in the Court's rationale); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1586
(arguing that the Court in Reeves "relied on two conflicting notions"); see also Recent Case, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1360 (1967) (viewing the analogy of the state to private trader as
"strained"); cf Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 76 (noting that the right of a state to control its own
funds and its right to deal in the marketplace as it wishes are "related but analytically distinct
principles").
222. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. This view is not universally held, how-
ever. See, eg., Eule, supra note 139.
223. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1108, 1109 n.65 (noting, among other things, "economies
of scale made possible by the enlargement of markets" and "the stimulus of increased competi-
tion .. "); see also Bane, Interstate Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 121, 126 (1940); Blumoff, supra
note 15, at 100; Melder, The Economics of Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 127, 142-43 (1940).
224. See, eg., Comment, In-State Preferences in Public Contracting: States' Rights Versus
Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 205, 210 (1978) (asserting that free national trade
has the effect of increasing "specialization").
225. See, eg., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2
(1979).
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by observing that states do not act like the ordinary Joe.226 It is the
ordinary Joe's "self-love" that leads to efficient production through
unregulated trading.2 27 A state, however, "frequently will respond to
market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic con-
cerns. '228 This motivation, it is said, means that when states adopt
resident preference programs, free-market goals may be frustrated.
When a state adopts an in-state buying program, for example, the
most efficient producers often will go unrewarded.
For the state-as-trader rationale to carry persuasive force, how-
ever, we need not conclude that states act just like private traders.
Rather, it is necessary to show only that discriminatory actions by
states in the marketplace pose less of a risk than discriminatory regula-
tions and taxes to the values underlying the dormant commerce
clause. For at least three reasons, the free-trader rationale has a mean-
ingful functional content when measured against this standard.
First, when state regulations or tariffs effectively prohibit interstate
trade, the state's disruption of the "national common market" is plain
and powerful. Private traders who wish to maximize gains through
trades cannot do So. 2 2 9 On the other hand, when South Dakota elects
to sell its cement to in-state Buyer A over out-of-state Buyer B, it is not
at all clear that the goal of "gains through trades" has been subverted.
Rather, the citizens of South Dakota have elected to sell their cement
to in-state Buyer A precisely because in their self-interested view they
will get more in return than if they sell to out-of-state Buyer B. They
will not get the higher price that Buyer B offers, but they will "buy"
other benefits they value more highly: contributions to the public till
through otherwise jeopardized future tax payments, helpful ripple ef-
fects through the local economy, and perhaps even intangible gains
like a preserved sense of local vitality.230 Such a trading choice by the
226. See, eg., Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 89 ("the state responds to incentives
and maximizes values that no private economic actor would respond to or value"); Varat, supra
note 21, at 506; Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 15, at 1129; Note, supra note 9, at 713 n.95
(state's "political decision [to favor state residents in procuring services] transforms whatever
'private entity' features it has"); Note, Home-State Preferences in Public Contracting: A Study in
Economic Balkanization, 58 IowA L. REv. 576, 585 (1973) [hereinafter Iowa Note] (states that
exercise preferences for residents in purchasing act on "irrational economic considerations of
local politics"); Harv. Pub. Poly. Comment, supra note 15, at 378 (characterizing Alexandria
Scrap and Reeves as involving "economically irrational decisions" not based on "minimum cost/
maximum profit" goals); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1591.
227. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 21-22 (8th ed. 1796)
228. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 450 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
229. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
230. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1107 n.51 ("efficiency might best be defined as the max-
imization of not only material wealth but all human satisfactions").
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state is not unlike choices made by private concerns operating in the
free market. It might well be, for example, that a local bank lending
money in a time of shortage would prefer a local firm to a nonlocal
borrower willing to pay more interest. Why? Because a refusal to deal
with the local firm might cause it to fail, thus costing the bank a major
customer for years into the future. Turning away the local firm might
also put local people out of work, thereby threatening the bank's abil-
ity to collect loans it has made to other customers. The bank's deci-
sion to make the lower-interest loan in these circumstances is rational
because the bank's funds, according to the bank's own self-interested
judgment, have found "their highest valued, most productive uses. '231
So it is, one can argue, with South Dakota's cement. The cement
moves to its optimal use in the eyes of its joint owners, the citizens of
South Dakota. To them, when the cement is transferred to South Da-
kota residents, the greatest gain through trade has been achieved.232
This brief discussion surely is not an authoritative treatment of the
economics of state-made trades. It suffices, however, to make the sali-
ent point: something different - and less threatening to social wealth-
building - may well be happening when a state favors residents in
trading its resources, as opposed to when a state simply bans or slaps a
tariff on private consensual exchanges. One might argue the opposite
position, but at least it is "open to question how well equipped courts
are to make this kind of determination about the workings of eco-
nomic markets. 2 33 It follows for this functional reason that courts
should hesitate to condemn resident preferences in state-made trades.
Second, the Framers' central goal in forging the commerce clause
was not to maximize economic efficiency. 234 Rather, the core goal of
the commerce clause was and is to engender national solidarity.2 35
231. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 7 (1982).
232. There is another way of phrasing this point. One might say that free trade creates
wealth in two separate ways. First, even assuming a fixed number of goods and services, their
voluntary exchange creates wealth simply by moving them into the hands of those persons who
value them most. Second, unrestricted voluntary exchange maximizes the creation of wealth by
inducing the most efficient production of additional goods and services. Even assuming that in-
state preferences in state-made trades tend to undermine the latter tendency of free markets, such
preferences may be compatible with the former.
233. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985).
234. Eg., Regan, supra note 7, at 1124 ("[t]he people who wrote our Constitution were by no
means thoroughgoing free traders"); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
235. Regan, supra note 7, at 1114 (the Framers "feared not merely for the economic health,
but also and even more for the political viability of the infant United States"); see also THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1781) (recognizing principle of like treatment for resi-
dents and nonresidents "to secure and perpetuate mutual friendships and intercourse among the
people"); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 177, No. 22 (Hamilton), at 137 (citing "serious sources
of animosity and discord"); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 177, No. 42 (Madison), at 283 (citing
risk of "unceasing animosities"); Bane, supra note 223, at 122 (quoting letter by Madison urging
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Professor Regan has argued that "it just seems obvious that when
states distribute benefits they can prefer their own citizens. ' 236 It fol-
lows, he says, that such actions "seem less hostile to other states and
less inconsistent with the concept of union than discriminatory regula-
tion or taxation.' '237 The point may be made more forcefully. If it is
"obvious" that a state may prefer its own residents in distributing its
resources, then few nonresidents will take umbrage when a state does
so; and if few nonresidents take umbrage, then their home states are
unlikely to pursue the retaliations and reprisals the dormant com-
merce clause was meant to neutralize.238 To this thought, another
may be added: when a state passes out benefits in the specific context
of making contracts to buy or sell, its presumed right to distribute
benefits to its own citizens becomes aligned with the "long recognized
right" of the trader to determine with whom it will deal. 239 In this
specialized context, so marked by a tradition of free choice, the risk
posed to interstate cohesion by in-state preferences seems at its lowest
ebb.
Third, the built-in "expensiveness" of in-state marketplace prefer-
ences may brake the danger to commerce clause concerns that dis-
criminatory state marketplace actions pose.- As Professor Regan has
written: "The very fact that spending programs involve spending and
are therefore relatively expensive as a way of securing local benefit
makes them less likely to proliferate than measures like tariffs. They
therefore are less likely to damage the economy seriously in the aggre-
gate, if they damage it at all.''24° This "expensiveness" rationale is
debatable. The linchpin of the theory is that states will limit in the
aggregate expenditures favoring local commercial interests; such ex-
penditures, however, seem very much with us. 241 Moreover, discrimi-
natory state regulatory and tax programs, which do violate the
commerce clause, also may be said to be "expensive" to the state, for
they always entail at least those costs involved in their administration,
Even so, this expensiveness rationale packs at least some persua-
sive punch. Although discriminatory regulations and tariffs may in-
a constitutional convention because trade barriers "are destructive of the general harmony");
Varat, supra note 21, at 511 (commerce clause "designed to promote political and social cohesion
... as well as to establish a favorable framework for economic growth").
236. Regan, supra note 7, at 1194.
237. Id.
238. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935).
239. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
240. Regan, supra note 7, at 1194.
241. See generally infra notes 295-97.
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volve expense to the state, the costs they generate are less direct, less
visible, and less likely to be significant than the costs that flow from
conscious decisions to pay more or get less by choosing to deal with
only resident trading partners.242 These dynamics indicate that ordi-
nary political processes contain safeguards against the spread of mar-
ketplace preferences that are not applicable to discriminatory taxes
and regulations.243 If that is so, ample Supreme Court precedent sug-
gests that judges should relax dormant commerce clause scrutiny in
the marketplace setting.244
D. Formal Considerations Underlying the Market-Participant Rule
Some observers disagree with the proposition that there is a "func-
tional" justification for the market-participant rule based on the state's
status as a trader.24 5 Even accepting (as I do not) that these critics are
correct, they err nonetheless in approaching the constitutional ques-
tion from only one direction.
Judicial reasoning is never entirely "functional." It also, and al-
242. Professor Gergen questions this "expensiveness rationale" by noting that tariffs also
impose "internal costs" in the form of "the increased price of goods." Gergen, supra note 15, at
1135-36 n.201. It follows, according to Professor Gergen, that Professor Regan's argument must
rest solely "on the assumption that the cost of a subsidy is more obvious and so more likely to be
taken into account." Id. Professor Gergen is correct in emphasizing the visibility of the costs of
marketplace programs, but may be too cavalier in otherwise dispatching the "expensiveness"
rationale. The key point is that tariffs and spending programs have qualitatively different effects
than subsidy and marketplace programs on the state treasury operated by state legislators. Mea-
sured against the status quo, spending programs entail a direct outflow or reduction of state
treasury funds. Tariffs, on the other hand, constitute new revenue-raising taxes, which accord-
ingly (at least in the short term) may increase the level of state funds. Thus, the two forms of
legislative action have greatly different effects on the distinctly legislative mission of balancing
the state's budget. In this sense, marketplace preferences and other distributional programs are
"expensive" in a way that tariffs and discriminatory regulations are not.
243. See, eg., Gergen, supra note 15, at 1111.
244. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (validity of laws under commerce clause hinges in part on whether "a State's own polit-
ical processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations"); Raymond Motor
Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (focusing on whether a "State's own political processes
will act as a check on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce").
Notably, Professor Regan suggests that this "spending" rationale is inapplicable to a substan-
tial range of market-participant discrimination, including the type at issue in Reeves. See Regan,
supra note 7, at 1195. It is difficult to understand why. A state, after all, has only so much
money and only so much cement. Trading cement for fewer dollars is not functionally different
from trading state money for fewer desks, chairs, or schoolbooks. In both instances the exchange
is "expensive" in the relevant sense that the state fails to get the "biggest bang" it can, be it for its
buck or its bags of cement. Both forms of marketplace activity impose equally upon the state's
ability to balance its budget and reduce equally the number of benefits the state may turn over to
the people as a whole. See supra note 242. In these key senses, buying and selling discrimina-
tions are equally "expensive" to the state; it follows that they should be similarly unlikely to
proliferate in a world of scarce resources.
245. See supra note 226.
Michigan Law Review
ways, has a formal dimension. 246 When a court interprets a statute it
must pay heed to the text's language and legislative history even if to
do so produces results deemed unfair, unwise, or dysfunctional. 247
Similarly, in constitutional adjudication, courts must - and do - pay
attention to formal considerations raised by textual language and con-
stitutional history.248 As Professor Ely puts it, "positive law has its
claims, even when it doesn't fit some grander theory. ' 249 These con-
siderations have been at work in the market-participant cases. In par-
ticular, they underlie at least in part the Court's founding of the rule
on the "long recognized right of [the] trader or manufacturer" to
choose its own trading partners. 250
The text of the commerce clause grants Congress the power to
"regulate" interstate commerce;251 thus to the extent the clause em-
bodies a "negative implication, '252 that implication is that the states
may not "regulate" commerce in certain respects. 253 The term "regu-
late," of course, is not self-defining. It seems fair to say, however, that
when a state buys books or sells corn seed the ordinary person is less
likely to see a "regulation" than when a state, for example, excludes
out-of-state wares254 or promulgates minimum price laws governing
private transactions. 255 This textual justification for the market-par-
246. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 2-'
3 (1987).
247. See, eg., Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987); Badaracco v.
Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984).
248. See, eg., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
249. J. ELY, supra note 99, at 76.
250. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)); see also Transport Limousine, Inc. v. Port Auth., 571 F. Supp.
576, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (emphasizing that actions of a state agency in granting permits to
airport concessionaires "resembles the activities of a merchant in the private sector").
251. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
252. Eg., Wood Marine Serv. Inc. v. City of Harahan, 858 F.2d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1988);
see Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 65 n.79.
253. As the Court bluntly stated in United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 220 (1984) (emphasis added): "The Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint
upon state regulatory powers." See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2284
(1989) ("the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time it confers it on
Congress"); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988) (quoted infra at text accompa-
nying note 483); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (finding "great force" in the
argument that "as the word 'to regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be
regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same opera-
tion"); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-2, at 403 ("the constitutional limitations upon state interfer-
ence with interstate commerce . . . [originated] as negative judicial inferences from the
constitutional grant of power to Congress"); Gergen, supra note 15, at 1117 ("in [the] grant to
Congress of authority to regulate interstate commerce lies an implied denial of that power to the
states").
254. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
255. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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ticipant rule is more than an arguable abstraction. The Court itself
has endorsed it in observing that "[w]hen the State acts solely as a
market participant, no conflict between state regulation and federal
regulatory authority can arise."'25 6
The textual argument for excluding marketplace choices from the
dormant commerce clause draws additional support from the historic
perception that traders in the market - whether individuals or aggre-
gations of individuals - ordinarily are free to deal with whom they
wish.25 7 Such a shared assumption justifies giving special treatment to
the government as a market participant simply because it is a market
participant. Common assumptions provide an important part of law
because they make up the background against which law is made.258
Such assumptions are not easily overcome by vague constitutional lan-
guage or unfocused expressions of the drafters' intent.2 59
Finally, in both Alexandria Scrap and Reeves the Court invoked
constitutional history to bolster its conclusion that the dormant com-
merce clause does not reach state marketplace decisions. As stated by
the Court in Reeves: "[T]he commerce clause responds principally to
state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the
national marketplace. There is no indication of a constitutional plan
to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free
market. '2 60 Commentators have criticized this reasoning.261 Profes-
sor Varat, for example, has written:
The Framers' principal concern in fashioning the commerce clause may
well have been state interference with interstate private trade. There is,
however, no indication that they thought about state proprietary policy
at all. If state resident preference restrictions in proprietary policy
256. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984) (empha-
sis in original).
257. See supra text accompanying note 219.
258. See, eg., Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566 n.9
(1989) (noting, among other things, in interpreting federal statute, that "[tihe idea that Members
of Congress would vote for a bill subjecting their own political parties to bureaucratic intrusion
and public oversight ... is outlandish"); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304,
2305 (1989) (courts should consult "common usage" in interpreting the language of statutes).
259. See Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (ong-
standing practice "is a fact of considerable import in the interpretation of abstract constitutional
language"); Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 78 ("it would take more than a 'great silence' to sever
the special relationship between a State and its in-state residents and businesses"); cf Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921) (Cardozo, J.) ("Intention not
otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If
something else is in view, it must not be left to implication.").
260. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (citation omitted); accord, e.g.,
Gergen, supra note 15, at 1137 ("[t]he commerce clause always has focused on state interference
in commerce through taxes and regulations").
261. E.g., Blumoff, supra note 15, at 108; U. Pa. Comment, supra note 15, at 1326; see also
Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1589-90
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threaten the interstate unification or free-trade goals of the commerce
clause, it is difficult to see why commerce clause limits would not be
appropriate. 262
In fact, it is not so difficult at all. If the Framers envisioned the
protection of private trade to achieve national unity, but had no
"thought about state propriety policy at all," then why should we not
conclude that their relevant constitutional purpose was to protect pri-
vate trade? To carry the argument one step further, the Framers
surely intended to protect private trade to foster interstate unification
to achieve the greater good. That conclusion, however, hardly pro-
vides a judicial license to invalidate under the commerce clause all
laws that do not achieve the greater good.263 When, as here, constitu-
tional language is at best obscure, the absence of a specific design to
reach state discrimination in trading its own property cannot be dis-
missed as irrelevant. 264
E. Institutional Considerations
Institutional considerations provide a final justification for the
market-participant rule. First, because the dormant commerce clause
is the dormant commerce clause, Congress remains capable of protect-
ing national interests in this area even if the Court holds back. 265 This
262. Varat, supra note 21, at 505.
263. As Professor Gergen puts it: "To say that those who passed on the Constitution desired
national unity does not explain how they intended that dream to be realized without unduly
compromising state sovereignty." Gergen, supra note 15, at 1119 (emphasis added).
264. To put the point more generally, as one moves from a more clear and focused indication
of legislative purpose, to a more debatable and amorphous indication of purpose, that purpose
becomes less informative in judicially defining the enactment's effect. The Supreme Court's hold-
ing that the eighth amendment's excessive-fines clause does not reach punitive damage awards in
cases between private parties, Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909 (1989), provides a recent illustration of this recurring principle. In that case, the majority
reasoned that the purpose of the excessive-fines clause was to limit "those fines directly imposed
by, and payable to, the government," 109 S. Ct. at 2916, so that punitive-damage awards "in
private civil cases ... are too far afield from the concerns that animate the Eighth Amendment,"
109 S. Ct. at 2920, to trigger scrutiny under the excessive-fines clause.
Justice O'Connor viewed the majority's reasoning as resting on the "historical accident that,
prior to the mid-18th century, monetary sanctions filled the coffers of the King and his barons,"
109 S. Ct. at 2929 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and thus relied on a
more broadly formulated constitutional purpose - namely, preventing "the evil of exorbitant
monetary penalties," 109 S. Ct. at 2926. In short, the result in the case turned in large part on
the majority's decision to focus on "the text of the Amendment" and "the context where the
Framers clearly intended it to apply .... 109 S. Ct. at 2920 (emphasis added). That Justice
O'Connor condemned this analysis as "formalistic," 109 S. Ct. at 2932, is precisely the point:
formal considerations based on the specificity with which the enactors' purposes are discernible
count for something in constitutional interpretation.
265. Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286-
91 (1986) (market-participant rulings are always reversible by Congress); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) (recognizing that Congress may legislate to limit state marketplace
preferences); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1595 (the Court in Reeves "invited Congress to
promulgate legislation").
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consideration, however, might equally well justify judicial noninterfer-
ence with state regulatory and tax programs that discriminate against
interstate commerce. It thus provides at best a "background" justifi-
cation for judicial restraint if other factors counsel a cautious ap-
proach. Prior discussion suggests that such factors do exist in
evaluating discriminatory state marketplace programs. Additional in-
stitutional considerations point in the same direction as well.
A fair generalization of the Court's dormant commerce clause de-
cisions is that the Court has struck down two types of state laws: (1)
laws in which the state has discriminated overtly in favor of in-state
interests in the flow of commerce;266 and (2) laws in which the state
has acted in a facially neutral way to favor in-state interests on the
basis of a flimsy justification.267 In these sets of cases the Court has
intervened to protect the national-market values of the commerce
clause. The reason why is understandable: the state's interference
with free interstate commerce is great in each such case, while the
state's justification for the interference is of minimal legitimacy at
best.268 Precisely by limiting its incursions into these most-troubling
classes of cases, the Court has by and large avoided being accused of
acting as a "super legislature. '269 Beyond this range of cases, how-
ever, the Court has refused to tread.270
At first blush, laws preferring local residents in state marketplace
exchanges fall easily into the proscribed zone marked off by the
Supreme Court. They involve, after all, blatant discrimination against
out-of-staters.271 The considerations marshalled above, however, sug-
gest that these cases at least require a more subtle analysis than appli-
266. See, ag., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 23-25).
267. See, ag., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(discussed supra at text accompanying notes 26-33).
268. See, ag., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (quoted supra at note 26);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945) (inquiring whether safety advantages
of Arizona's train-length law were "so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national
interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it"); see
also Gergen, supra note 15, at 1102 (the Court's "focus, in practice, prohibits laws motivated by
protectionist sentiments or a desire to enrich citizens at the expense of outsiders"); Sunstein,
supra note 170, at 1707 (viewing dormant commerce clause "balancing" as essentially "a check
against the possibility of covert protectionism"). For an elaborate treatment of the Court's dor-
mant commerce clause decisions, contending that "[i]n the central area of dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence.., the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from
engaging in purposeful economic protectionism," see Regan, supra note 7, at 1092, 1206-87.
269. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 788 (Black, J., dissenting).
270. See, eg., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Baruwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938).
271. See, ag., Varat, supra note 21, at 509 n.87 (noting that, but for the market-participant
rule, a per se rule against state protective legislation would seem operative).
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cation of a per se rule of invalidity.272 Yet application of the
traditional balancing approach - with its focus on "the unavailability
of non-discriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local inter-
ests"2 73 - also presents profound problems in market-participant
cases. The main reason why is that the sow-and-reap and good-gov-
ernment "interests" justifying marketplace preferences have such a
fundamental quality.274 It is not hard to search for less restrictive al-
ternatives to achieve a focused local purpose, like securing a sanitary
supply of milk.275 But it borders on the incoherent to seek "alterna-
tives" to marketplace preferences that serve to vindicate the state's
interests in funneling state benefits to state residents and in directing
state resources to their optimum use.276 It follows - as the Court said
in Reeves - that "the competing considerations in cases involving
state proprietary action [are] difficult to assess under traditional Com-
merce Clause analysis. '277
The logical outgrowth of these institutional difficulties may be not
so much a strict, hands-off approach to market participant cases as the
adoption of a specialized dormant commerce clause framework for
testing market-participant issues. The trick is to find and map out that
272. See, e.g., Trelease, supra note 139, at 374 (developing constitutional complexity of state
controls over state water even though "economic protectionism is exactly what they seek");
Note, supra note 9, at 723 ("Given the Supreme Court's awareness that the challenged state
programs in Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White could not have survived under theper se rule of
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, one may suppose that the Court developed the market partici-
pant test in an effort to protect desirable state programs from the inflexible operation of that
rule."); Iowa Note, supra note 226, at 591 (criticizing purchasing preferences, but "assuming"
they may not be "invalid per se"). But cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 223 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding a per se rule applicable in
absence of market-participant principle); Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc. v.
Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass. 466, 425 N.E.2d 346, 354 (1981) (state Supreme Court ruling in
White, also applying per se rule of invalidity); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1590 (arguing
that preference in Reeves should have "patently" and "inescapabl[y]" fallen under aperse rule).
273. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
274. See Simson, supra note 190, at 398 (describing sow-and-reap objective as "open-
ended").
275. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951).
276. Cf Simpson, supra note 190, at 392 (failing to identify sow-and-reap and effective-feder-
alism considerations as pertinent in itemizing "goals" underlying in-state hiring preferences).
277. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980); see also Anson & Schenkkan, supra note
69, at 91 (citing the "Court's comparative institutional inability to analyze the economic and
political questions" involved); Tarlock, supra note 15, at 133 (balance is "complex"); Varat,
supra note 21, at 491 ("developing criteria to separate allowable from forbidden distinctions
between residents and nonresidents is a formidable task"); id. at 492 (noting "impressive obsta-
cles" posed by distinguishing between permissible and impermissible state programs reserving
state benefits for state residents); cf Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179,
188 (1950) (refusing to intervene, because "in a field of this complexity with such diverse inter-
ests involved, we cannot say that there is a clear national interest so harmed" that the Court
should act). But see Eule, supra note 139, at 484 n.318 (questioning Reeves' institutional argu-
ment for the market-participant rule); Varat, supra note 21, at 507 (same).
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framework. The preceding study of the roots of the rule should help
point the way.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR MARKET-PARTICIPANT ANALYSIS
The foregoing discussion, although detailed, points to a simple
conclusion: As a rule, when a state makes trades, it should be able to
prefer residents to nonresidents as its trading partners. To say this
much, however, is not to say that the Court should always apply the
market-participant rule to protect state proprietary activity. Indeed,
as we saw in Part I, the Court has not chosen the path of blind abdica-
tion in these cases.278 With the market-participant rule, as with other
legal principles, "the rule follows where its reason leads; where the
reason stops, there stops the rule." 279
To decide market-participant cases, then, courts must consider
whether the challenged program does or does not bring into play the
policies underlying the market-participant rule. In particular, they
must consider:
(1) whether the program reflects an effort of local citizens to reap
where they have sown;
(2) whether invalidation of the program is consonant with the un-
derlying values of federalism, including in particular the values of lo-
cal experimentation and optimal responsiveness to local concerns;
(3) to what extent the program threatens the underlying com-
merce clause values of a free market and unified nation; and
(4) whether the state bears the appearance of "participating in,"
rather than "regulating," the market.280
Application of such "soft" factors promises to be no easy task.
More discrete sub-inquiries, however, may make the undertaking
more manageable. In applying the third factor concerning the degree
of interference with commerce clause values, for example, a number of
familiar legal concepts should help guide the analysis. Thus, as in
other commerce clause cases, it will cut against judicial intervention if
in-state political processes naturally will discourage excessive use of
the challenged form of in-state preference. 281 As in other constitu-
278. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
279. K. LLEWELYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157-58 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
280. It is not through oversight that I include no fifth factor based on institutional difficulties
of judicial manageability and administration. That consideration, while justifying the market-
participant rule in general, seems to offer limited help in distinguishing appropriate cases for
applying the rule from inappropriate ones.
281. See supra note 244; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-35, at 541 n.72 (noting that
"surrogate representation analysis" is "central to commerce clause jurisprudence").
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tional settings, 282 the importance of the sought benefit also will have
significance.283 Exclusion from necessities, for example, surely will en-
gender greater interstate hostility and resentment among nonresidents
than exclusion from state benefits of more marginal importance.284
Similarly, the Court has recognized in other contexts that the degree
of the state's monopolization of a desired resource will bear upon the
strength of the excluded party's claim to access. 285 The degree of mar-
ket power may count in market-participant cases as well, particularly
because an absence of alternative sources of supply will heighten the
risk of bad feeling and retaliation when a state channels its resources
exclusively to its own citizens. 28 6 Finally, the degree of exclusion of
nonresidents from state programs may be a relevant factor.287 It is, for
example, less disruptive of commerce clause values to impose a
surcharge on nonresidents than to exclude them altogether from ob-
taining a state resource.288 Common sense suggests that this type of
factual difference may count in assessing the constitutionality of mar-
ket-participant programs.
This listing of informative "sub-considerations" is not exhaustive;
rather it is offered to show that the basic four-factor analysis proposed
here is both broadly inclusive of intuitively relevant considerations and
more manageable in application than first might appear. As with
other legal "tests," however, the proof is in the pudding. The next
282. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
283. See Varat, supra note 21, at 533-40.
284. See, e.g., id. at 534 (a "nonresident's claim to emergency medical ... services within the
state surely stands on a different plane than a claim of access to public golf and tennis facilities");
see also id. at 540 n.192 (noting the "greater importance of access to even nonemergency medical
care than of access to alcoholic beverages").
285. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) with United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 n.8 (1989)
(upholding state ban on the use of public facilities to perform abortions, but noting that a "differ-
ent analysis might apply if a particular state had socialized medicine").
286. See, eg., Varat, supra note 21, at 533, 558 & n.243 (favoring equal access to state
beaches and parks because they are "unique and not reproducible," even though the state may
deny access to its golf courses and tennis courts); see also Hardman, The Right of a State to
Restrain the Exportation of Its Natural Resources, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 13-14 (1919) (arguing
against ability to exclude in "excess capacity" natural resource cases). Notably, when monopoly
power is present, formal considerations may conjoin with functional concerns in bolstering the
case for not applying the market-participant distinction. See supra notes 245-64 and accompany-
ing text. This is so because, despite the law's general toleration of free choice in selecting trading
partners, there exists a "traditional public policy against discriminatory distribution of monopo-
lized benefits." Varat, supra note 21, at 537 (emphasis added).
287. See Fidelity Guar. Mortgage Corp. v. Connecticut Hous. Fin. Auth., 532 F. Supp. 81,
85 (D. Conn. 1982) (exploring the degree of the state's interference with interstate commerce in
deciding whether market-participant rule applies).
288. See, eg., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (quoted supra at note 189); Varat,
supra note 21, at 553.
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Part of this article examines both how workable the test is, and the
results it produces, in nine key categories of market-participant cases.
V. APPLYING THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT RULE
The Supreme Court's own decisions illustrate how varied market-
participant cases can be.289 Cases arising in the lower courts also re-
veal a rich factual diversity.2 90 This Part explores nine categories of
cases raising market-participant issues. The cases involve governmen-
tal favoritism of local interests in (1) state or municipal purchases and
sales; (2) authorization of access to the means of interstate commerce;
(3) state disposition of natural resources; (4) government operation of
landfills; (5) downstream conditions on trading partners imposed in
government contracts; (6) state subsidies; (7) state tax breaks; (8) state
rules requiring municipalities to deal only with state residents; and (9)
state programs disfavoring nonresidents who have substantial contacts
with the state.
A. State Purchasing and Selling
There exists no starker form of discrimination against out-of-state
commerce than when a state buys goods or services only from in-state
suppliers. 291 This blatant brand of favoritism, however, has stirred lit-
tle controversy among members of the Supreme Court292 or lower-
court judges.293 It is not clear why.
Preferential state purchasing policies seem, after all, to cause ineffi-
ciencies by directly insulating local producers from out-of-state com-
petition.294 In addition, government procurement now is big
289. See supra notes 36-66 and accompanying text.
290. See, eg., infra notes 293, 332, 335, 375, 382, and accompanying text.
291. See generally Comment, supra note 224, at 205-08 (detailing different forms of purchas-
ing preferences - namely, percentage preferences, tie-bid preferences, general preferences, abso-
lute preferences, and reciprocal preferences); Yale Note, supra note 179, at 1686-88 (describing
nature of municipal hiring preferences and places where they exist).
292. Indeed, even the dissenting opinion in Reeves flatly stated that "[iun procuring goods
and services for the operation of government, a State may act without regard to the private
marketplace and remove itself from the reach of the Commerce Clause." 447 U.S. at 450 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). But see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 819-23 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (challenging constitutionality of government purchasing preferences).
293. See Iowa Note, supra note 226, at 578 (citing a "long and remarkably consistent line of
both state and federal cases" supporting state purchasing preferences); see also Delta Chem.
Corp. v. Ocean County Utils. Auth., 231 N.J. Super. 180, 554 A.2d 1381 (1988) (upholding Buy-
American law as protected by market-participant rule).
294. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1101 (urging general invalidity of "buy-, hire-, and sell-
local laws"); Linde, supra note 145, at 53-55 (attacking flat preferences in purchasing); Melder,
supra note 223; Iowa Note, supra note 226, at 582; Comment, supra note 224, at 213-16 (arguing
that in-state purchasing preferences are economically inefficient); see also Recent Case, supra
note 221, at 1361; cf Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 820-21 (1976) (Brennan,
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business, 295 and resident preferences in state and municipal purchasing
are commonplace.296 For these reasons, resident preferences in gov-
ernmental purchases probably represent a greater threat to a
borderless national market than, for example, resident preferences in
state sales. Justice Powell sought to sidestep these difficulties by char-
acterizing and defending in-state purchasing preferences as a "tradi-
tional governmental function[ ].1'297 Even that focused line of
justification, however, is today unavailable, since a majority of the
Court rejected it in both Garcia and Reeves. 298
Nonetheless', the in-state purchasing preference does, and should,
represent the classic form of state action protected by the market-par-
ticipant rule. This conclusion follows from the justifications for the
rule distilled in Parts III and IV. First, the state as purchaser spends
its citizens' own money; thus, the sow-and-reap rationale pointedly
comes into play.299 Second, in some situations the pursuit of valuable
state projects may depend on the availability of in-state purchasing
preferences; thus, concerns about effective federalism provide at least
some support for discriminatory purchasing policies.30° Third, for
J., dissenting) (noting that purchasing preferences require "the relocation of labor" and tend" 'to
neutralize advantages belonging to' other States"). But see, eg., Boston College Note, supra note
15, at 907 (statutes requiring purchase of goods produced in state have only a "marginal" effect
on interstate commerce).
295. Iowa Note, supra note 226, at 577 (citing "vast amounts of money expended by state and
local governments" and providing data showing such expenditures in 1971 accounted for nearly
13% of the Gross National Product); Boston College Note, supra note 15, at 923-24 (citing "dra-
matic increase in state and local spending in the last several decades"); Wayne Casenote, supra
note 15, at 1584 (noting the "tremendous size of state budgets and the broad scope of state
spending power today").
296. See Blumoff, supra note 15, at 101 (stating that state and local purchasing expenditures
total almost $300 billion annually and that the cost of these preferences is "prodigious");
Leymore, supra note 149, at 578; Linde, supra note 145, at 53 ("In 1960 all states but one had
official purchasing preference rules."); Melder, supra note 223, at 140 (noting that "forty-seven
states have adopted at least one type of citizen preference laws"; that "[m]unicipal preference
ordinances are even more common"; and that "[p]robably hundreds of municipalities informally
practice such protection"); Iowa Note, supra note 226, at 576-77 (citing 1970 survey showing that
"a substantial majority of the states exercise at least some form of local preference"; concluding
based on empirical data that "it is certain that billions of dollars each year are spent by state and
local governmental units under contracts negotiated pursuant to ... policies openly calculated to
discriminate in favor of home-state products and labor"); Comment, supra note 224, at 206-09 &
nn.2-30 (collecting numerous state statutes providing for in-state purchasing or contracting pref-
erences); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1582.
297. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449-50 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
298. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
299. See Varat, supra note 21, at 546 ("opportunities to sell to the state exist only because
they were created by the state and its residents").
300. See, eg., Regan, supra note 7, at 1194 (suggesting that the "unquestioned benefit" pro-
duced by the construction projects at issue in White "probably would not have existed if the local
preference aspect had been forbidden"). But cf Varat, supra note 21, at 546 (arguing that "state
purchases of equipment and services will be made whether or not a rule of nonresident equality is
imposed").
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reasons already detailed, state purchasing preferences threaten to only
a limited extent the pro-national values underlying the commerce
clause.30 1 In particular, the inherent expensiveness of state purchasing
holds down the risk of effectuating rampant protectionism through in-
state purchasing programs.302 Finally, formal considerations strongly
favor validation of purchasing preferences, for in few other settings
does the state look more the part of the market trader. Given these
considerations, it is not surprising that resident preferences in govern-
ment purchasing have met with little judicial resistance. 303
As a rule, these same considerations apply in cases involving the
301. See supra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
303. Of course, purchasing rules subject to challenge under the dormant commerce clause
may take many forms. For example, a number of localities have enacted divestiture ordinances.
These ordinances require city agents - most significantly those agents operating city pension
funds - to eschew contracts with, or investments in, companies that have holdings or dealings in
South Africa. At least one court has upheld such an ordinance against dormant commerce
clause attack. Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 721, 562 A.2d 720, 756 (1989).
This result seems correct under the analysis proposed here. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 3,
§ 6-21. In particular:
(1) It may be an oversimplification to say flatly that city residents, through such ordinances,
are controlling the fate of their own property; after all, at least pension funds may be viewed as
belonging more to the discrete subgroups of city pensioners (eg., police officers, firefighters, and
other city employees) than to city residents in general. Cf infra notes 494-95 and accompanying
text. Even so, city residents at large did and do make the tax payments that are turned over to
pensioners, and the pensioners let the city so greatly control the funds that they may be said to
"'belong' to the City... as a trustee." 562 A.2d at 753. For these reasons, the sow and reap
rationale cuts against judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause.
(2) Considerations of federalism also counsel judicial restraint. The vigor of feeling about
spending city money to support apartheid underscores the importance of local responsiveness on
this issue, especially given "our society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination
based on a person's race or the color of his or her skin." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109
S. Ct. 2363, 2371 (1989). Moreover, to the extent that value maximization is a goal of free trade,
it seems proper to consider the moral and psychic costs inducing cities to eschew South African-
connected trading partners. See supra note 230.
(3) Perhaps most importantly, divestiture ordinances pose little risk at all to salient commerce
clause values. Such laws - restricting the channeling of only municipal funds to only one coun-
try for only a nonprotectionist purpose - impede in the most modest way, if at all, any free-
trade goals underlying the foreign commerce clause. Indeed, "because the Divestiture Ordi-
nances do not favor local residents at the expense of nonresidents, they pose a smaller threat to
the national common market than do the overtly discriminatory measures.., the market-partici-
pant doctrine sanctions." 562 A.2d at 750 (emphasis added). To be sure, additional commerce
clause concern may arise when states or cities interfere with private international transactions
having no connection with city money or trammel foreign policy concerns implicitly or explicitly
recognized by Congress. These considerations, however, do not seem relevant here. See 562
A.2d at 744-49, 756-57.
(4) Finally, cities that adopt divestiture policies look the part of traders in the market. In
fact, many private firms have adopted identical policies. For this reason in particulat, it seems
reasonable to say that "just as a private merchant may elect not to deal with companies doing
business in South Africa, the City too may make the same choice." 562 A.2d at 750.
Notably, divestiture ordinances raise a "downstream restraint" issue, concerning a city's or
state's ability to limit the trading partners of private citizens. This issue is discussed below with
other downstream restraint issues, at infra note 428 and accompanying text.
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sale of state-made services and goods. 3°4 Indeed, state-seller cases may
present even stronger equities for judicial restraint than cases involv-
ing state purchases. In Reeves, for example, the up-front risk incurred
by South Dakota in building a cement plant heightened its claim to
reap where it had sown. 30 5 In addition, state selling often will involve
- as it did in Reeves - the sort of innovative problem-solving that
our federalism invites and envisions. 30 6 As for the endangerment of
commerce clause values, a general skepticism about state entry into
the commercial supply business may reinforce the built-in constraint
that costliness places on rampant use of preferential state sales pro-
grams.307 Finally, formal considerations again strongly favor judicial
restraint; South Dakota, for example, "manifestly fit" the market-par-
ticipant description when it took to selling cement.30 8
Even so, cases involving states as sellers may present special diffi-
culties. Two particularly thorny problems - the gratuitous exclusion
of nonresidents from state sales programs and the "turncoat" state
seller's switch to serving only residents after earlier welcoming all
comers - merit special attention.
1. The Problem of Gratuitous Exclusion
Professor Varat has noted the special problem posed by state ac-
tions that gratuitously exclude nonresidents from the purchase of
state-made resources.30 9 For example, in Doe v. Bolton 310 the Court
struck down Georgia's denial to nonresidents of medical services per-
formed in state hospitals where there was "no intimation . . . that
Georgia facilities [were] utilized to capacity in caring for Georgia resi-
dents."'31t In such a case, Professor Varat says, there is good reason
304. See Varat supra note 21, at 548-49 ("When the state converts its fiscal resources into
goods or services that it makes available on a resident-discriminatory basis, the same justification
that supports state expenditures favoring residents should apply." Thus "the state should be able
to reserve in-kind resources created with state funds for its residents."). But see Geo. Wash. Note,
supra note 15, at 616 (objecting to Reeves' extension of the Alexandria Scrap rule to sellers).
305. Accord Houston Note, supra note 15, at 555 n.162.
306. See generally Varat, supra note 21, at 548-59 ("Different rules for state-created goods
and services and state payments to residents would unnecessarily narrow the ability of state
government to create new ways of serving its people.").
307. See supra note 147. In addition to widespread antipathy to government displacement of
private enterprise, the existence of numerous private producers in our essentially private econ-
omy provides a potent political check on aggressive state entry into the commercial service and
supply industry. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17
(1981) (noting that the "existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a
powerful safeguard against legislative abuse").
308. Creighton Casenote, supra note 67, at 635.
309. Varat, supra note 21, at 531-33.
310. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
311. 410 U.S. at 200.
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for requiring access for nonresidents if the state can recoup its added
costs through service charges.312 The merit of this argument is readily
discerned from the four-factor analysis suggested above.
First, the sow-and-reap rationale carries little weight in such a
case. The presence of excess capacity, together with the nonresident's
payment of all added costs, ensures that state residents will realize
without interference the full value of their investment.
Second, concerns of federalism provide little justification for the
exclusion of nonresidents when all costs are readily recaptured.
Rather, because affording benefits to nonresidents is a "no-lose propo-
sition" in these circumstances, forced inclusion of nonresidents in the
program should create no disincentive for undertaking the program in
the first instance.
Third, concerns about safeguarding functional commerce clause
values also cut against exclusion of nonresidents in these circum-
stances. Indeed, precisely because the discrimination against nonresi-
dents is gratuitous, it threatens to place a particularly severe strain on
interstate goodwill.
It follows that only the formal appearance of the state as a market
participant provides a reason to apply the market-participant princi-
ple. The Court already has signaled, however, that this factor, stand-
ing alone, will not suffice to trigger application of the market-
participant rule.313
This condemnation of gratuitous exclusions holds true, of course,
only to the extent that the state in fact can recoup its costs from the
nonresident buyer or user. Moreover, as Professor Varat explains,
such cases may well be rare because of the recurring "nonfinancial
costs of extending state services to nonresidents. ' ' 314 In cases of
claimed gratuitous exclusion, the key inquiry is whether the denial of
access is in fact fairly characterized as gratuitous. If it is, controlling
market-participant considerations require the state to deal with the
would-be nonresident purchaser.
2. The Problem of the Turncoat Seller
Special problems also arise when a state deals with nonresidents at
the outset of a sales program, but later changes course and services
only resident buyers. In Reeves, for example, South Dakota sold ce-
312. Varat, supra note 21, at 532-33.
313. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (discussed supra
at notes 55-59 and accompanying text).
314. Varat, supra note 21, at 532; see supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing
arguable propriety of a total exclusion of nonresidents from a state university system).
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ment to out-of-staters for approximately fifty years before turning off
the spigot. 315 This chronology triggered a claim that South Dakota's
"hoarding" was distinctly unfair and disruptive of the national mar-
ketplace. This charge rested on two separate grounds. First, the
would-be Wyoming buyer suggested that out-of-staters reasonably had
relied on the continuing availability of South Dakota cement in build-
ing up their operations. Second, it was argued, "free market forces
would have generated an appropriate level of supply" for out-of-state
purchasers had South Dakota not long undertaken to satisfy their
needs. 316 These arguments surely strengthened the hand of the plain-
tiff in Reeves. 3 17 The Court, however, correctly found each of them,
on balance, unpersuasive.
a. Reasonable reliance. The reasonable-reliance argument is at
bottom question-begging, for the reliance of nonresidents on South
Dakota cement was reasonable only if there was good cause to believe
South Dakota would continue to supply their needs in the event of a
shortage. The law, however, had provided no basis for such a belief
for it was not until the Reeves case arose that the courts were asked to
pass upon the claim of a continuing duty to supply cement. Moreover,
to the extent lower courts had hit around the issue, their decisions
pointed toward an ability to withhold.318 "Real-world" considerations
also signaled the riskiness of relying on an uninterrupted cement flow
from the South Dakota plant. Out-of-staters were at least.on notice of
the general freedom suppliers customarily enjoy to deal with whom-
ever they wish.3 19 And it took no delphic prescience to foresee that a
cement plant owned by South Dakota might well prefer South Dakota
customers in a time of shortage.
Notably, state purchasing programs, as surely as state selling pro-
grams, may cause reliance by out-of-state businesses in developing or
expanding operations. An out-of-state supplier - a seller of school
desks, for example - might well expand operations or hire additional
personnel in light of a pattern of earlier buying by a state or munici-
pality. Yet even the dissenters in Reeves seemed to agree that a shift to
an in-state purchasing program that excluded such a seller would be
constitutionally permissible.320 Indeed, in Alexandria Scrap the Court
had found it insignificant that, before Maryland effectively confined its
315. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 431-32 (1980).
316. 447 U.S. at 445.
317. See eg., Regan, supra note 7, at 1195-96; Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1592-93.
318. See 447 U.S. at 437 n.9 (collecting cases).
319. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 219.
320. See supra note 292.
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hulk "purchases" to Maryland operators, it had afforded equal bene-
fits to out-of-staters for five years.321 In short, potent prior authority
- as well as the dubious reasonableness of the claimed reliance -
weakened any fairness-based attack on South Dakota's withholding of
its cement.
b. Displacement of private producers. Apart from focusing on
past reasonable reliance, Professor Regan has argued that South Da-
kota should have had to replicate how the free market would have
operated because its actions "quite possibly prevented the emergence
of private suppliers for the foreign demand it was supplying. ' 322 The
Reeves majority cannot be faulted for failing to consider this conten-
tion; in fact, the Court responded to it directly:
This argument appears to us to be simplistic and speculative. The very
reason South Dakota built its plant was because the free market had
failed adequately to supply the region with cement.... There is no indi-
cation, and no way to know, that private industry would have moved
into petitioner's market area, and would have ensured a supply of ce-
ment to petitioner either prior to or during the 1978 construction season.
Indeed, it is quite possible that petitioner would never have existed - far
less operated successfully for 20 years - had it not been for South Da-
kota cement.323
Professor Regan's argument falters for another reason as well. He
concedes - as he must for purposes of his turncoat-seller argument -
that South Dakota could have limited cement sales to South Dakotans
if it had done so from the start. 324 If that were the constitutional rule,
however, it is predictable that South Dakota would have sold only to
South Dakotans from the inception of its cement production. South
Dakota's purpose in building its cement plant was, after all, to protect
South Dakotans from present and future cement shortages. 325
Would Wyoming - whose residents had suffered from the same
cement shortages that induced South Dakota to construct its plant -
preferred to have risked that result? More generally, is a rule that
encourages full-scale hoarding more consonant -with the open-market
values of the commerce clause than a rule that countenances periodic
preferences for local buyers? As stated by the Court in Reeves, the
argument raised by Professor Regan "proves too much, for it would
tolerate even a greater measure of protectionism and stifling of inter-
321. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809 (1976).
322. Regan, supra note 7, at 1195.
323. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 445-46 (1980).
324. Regan, supra note 7, at 1195.
325. See Eakins v. South Dakota State Cement Commn., 44 S.D. 268, 272, 183 N.W. 651,
652 (1921); see also Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1575.
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state commerce than the challenged system allow[ed]. ' ' 326 In short,
the turncoat-seller argument supplies insufficient cause in cases like
Reeves to depart from the general principle that states as sellers should
be sheltered from dormant commerce clause restraints.
B. State Control of the Means of Commerce
All that precedes broadly supports the proposition that a "state
should be able to reserve in-kind resources created with state funds for
its residents. '327 The market-participant rule, however, does not per-
mit a state to deny all forms of state-made benefits to outsiders. Con-
sider roads. States pay for and own state highways. Nonetheless, the
ordinary strictures of the commerce clause apply to state laws that
limit access to state thoroughfares.32
A powerful explanation for this "exception" to the market-partici-
pant rule is that the ready movement of goods is indispensable to the
operation of the national market. Roads are the arteries of the na-
tional market. If they may be clogged or blocked, then the free mar-
ketplace cannot operate, or at least not operate well. Each state's
interest in channeling state benefits to its own citizenry gives rise to a
countervailing claim that the state should be able to limit the use of its
roads as it wishes. 329 However, the national interest in a vibrant na-
tional market - especially given the states' practical monopolization
of local roadways - trumps this equity. 330 The message of the cases is
that states, as a rule, may not ignore the dormant commerce clause in
deciding who gains access to the infrastructure of interstate trade.33'
326. 447 U.S. at 445.
327. Varat, supra note 21, at 549.
328. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925); see also West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911) (holding unconstitutional state's denial of pipeline easements below
state highway to nonresidents).
329. Indeed, in one of its early road-use decisions, the Supreme Court evidenced sympathy
for this position, noting in upholding a challenged state road-access rule that "[ulnlike the rail-
roads, local highways are built, owned and maintained by the state or its municipal subdivi-
sions." South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938); accord
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945).
330. Moreover, concern about this particularly potent interference with the national market
does not stand alone. Thus, formal considerations support a more aggressive judicial role be-
cause a road "provider" looks little like a typical private seller. In addition, the effective-federal-
ism touchstone provides little basis for excluding nonresidents from state roads, because free road
access probably poses only modest disincentives to adopting otherwise needed local road-building
programs.
331. Accord Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 1989)
("right-of-way or transportation cases raise a discrete set of concerns"); Gergen, supra note 15, at
1132-33 (noting that "a general liberty of navigation and commerce has a long tradition in this
country"); Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 77 n.150 (citing the "Court's unwillingness to brook
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This line of reasoning best explains the result in a controversial
market-participant case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. In Smith v. Department of Agriculture,332 the
issue was whether the state could prefer in-state growers in renting out
prime spaces in a state-owned fruit and vegetable market. A divided
court invalidated this preference, asserting without meaningful expla-
nation that the state had acted as a "market regulator" and not as a
"market participant. '333 This conclusory reasoning is unsatisfactory,
particularly because the state in fact was leasing for money commer-
cial property that it owned.334 A more satisfying explanation for the
court's decision is that the farmers' market resembled state roads. The
market was more than an ordinary commercial building. It was an
artery of commerce, developed by the state for the very purpose of
facilitating private purchases and sales and through which - due to
its very existence - such trading had been channeled. To limit access
to this infrastructure, particularly for nearby out-of-state farmers, thus
was akin to limiting access to state roads.335
State discrimination against instrumentalities of interstate commerce"); Varat, supra note 21, at
535 (condemning "severe collateral effects" on free private exchanges flowing from, for example,
exclusion from state roads). Of course, this line of analysis is not meant to imply that a state may
exclude from its roads nonresidents who are not transporting goods. The Supreme Court, after
all, has recognized a generalized right to travel. See, e.g., supra note 214. The point is that the
value of unimpeded commerce provides a special - if not the central - justification for a
claimed right to free movement when the planned interstate travel has a commercial purpose.
332. 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981).
333. 630 F.2d at 1083.
334. 630 F.2d at 1082; see also Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 95 n.121 (arguing that
Smith was wrongly decided because the "initial disposition in this case is of rental space and as
such should be permissible"); Varat, supra note 21, at 496, 552 ("a state should be able to lease
state-owned commercial property to residents first"); Nat. Res. Comment, supra note 78, at 524;
cf. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395-96 (1876) (observing that state, in leasing state-owned
agricultural land to farmers, may rent only to residents).
335. Professor Gergen seems to agree. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1133 n.191; see also
Smith, 630 F.2d at 1086 (Gee, J., concurring). Special solicitude for open access to the channels
of commerce helps explain two other market-participant cases: Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa
Monica, 830 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1987), and Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340,
1342-43 (9th Cir. 1984), affd. per curiam by an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 81 (1985). Cory
involved a challenge to the amount of "rent" charged by California for the movement of oil
pumped by offshore rigs across state-owned tidal and submerged lands. The court refused to
apply the market-participant rule to "Itihis control over the channels of interstate commerce,"
especially because the state "has a complete monopoly over the sites used by the oil companies."
726 F.2d at 1343. In Shell Oil, the court again declined to apply the market-participant rule.
Here, upon expiration of a lease of a city's substreet land for operation of the plaintiff's oil
pipeline, the city offered to renew the lease only if paid such dramatically higher payments that
the plaintiff alleged an "undue burden" on interstate commerce. In finding the market-partici-
pant rule inapplicable, the court once again emphasized that "this case involves lands... that are
recognized transportation corridors for commerce." 830 F.2d at 1057. The reasoning of these
cases seems persuasive, although the court might have bolstered its analysis in each by noting
that both cases also concerned access to natural resources, giving rise to only a limited claim of
right to reap where state residents had sown. See Cory, 726 F.2d at 1341 (noting that tidelands
had been conveyed to California by Congress); Varat, supra note 21, at 557 ("tidelands are a
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This is not to say that the proper result in Smith is clear,336 as
application of the four-factor analysis reveals. Thus:
(1) The state in leasing farmers' market spaces clearly was making
available a tangible benefit its citizens had created with their own
funds.
(2) The development of a farmers' market reflected an innovative
attempt by Georgians both to help Georgia farmers market their crops
and to provide Georgia consumers with ready access to farm-fresh
produce. It is, moreover, at least a possibility that Georgia would not
have built its farmers' markets had decisionmakers known that equal
access for nonresidents was required.
(3) The risk posed to commerce clause values by excluding non-
residents arguably was limited; this is so because, unlike in the case of
state roads, ready alternative methods for marketing crops in Georgia
remained available to out-of-state growers.337 Indeed, Georgia did not
exclude nonresidents from its farmers' markets altogether; it simply
offered them less attractive sales locations.338
(4) Finally, despite the majority's suggestion otherwise, the state
as lessor clearly looked the part of a trader in the market. 339
Smith thus highlights the need for value judgments in market-par-
ticipant cases. While the proper resolution of the case is debatable, it
seems indisputable that the channels of trade - whether in the form
of a national stock exchange, a regional commodities house, or a local
farmers' market - are of special importance to the free flow of com-
merce. Moreover, concerns about predictability, equal treatment, and
efficiency require the formulation of legal standards at some workable
unique natural resource, not reproducible by the private sector and not established by a state
program"; it is therefore especially unfair to deny access because of the state's "monopoly
power" over such lands). See generally infra text accompanying notes 341-64.
In addition, formal considerations for characterizing the government as a "landowner" mar-
ket participant were weak in these cases, especially in Cory. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
402 (1948) (denigrating states' claim of "ownership" of sub-ocean land). But cf Hellerstein,
supra note 79, at 88-89 (arguing that state ownership of tidal lands is less "fiction[al]" than state
ownership of game). On the other side of the coin, these cases presented problems for the plain-
tiffs not present in other market-participant cases, insofar as the state frustrated access by both
residents and nonresidents for environmental reasons. See Note, State Control of Natural Re-
sources, supra note 145, at 643 ("the Court has been less sympathetic toward statutes, . . . the
effect of which has been to hoard rather than to conserve natural resources"); see also infra notes
424-25 and accompanying text (discussing reduced commerce clause concern where state's objec-
tive is environmental, rather than commercial).
336. See Varat, supra note 21, at 552 n.224 (criticizing result in Smith); Levmore, supra note
149, at 618 n.220; see also supra note 334.
337. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 n.17 (1980) (noting, in applying market-
participant rule, that alternate channels for securing cement remained available to out-of-state
purchasers); Nat. Res. Comment, supra note 78, at 543.
338. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
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level of generality. In short, Smith may reflect a sensible rule of
thumb: a state may not divert substantial marketplace activity to a
state-owned "exchange" and then greatly disfavor nonresidents' abil-
ity to trade there.34°
C. Natural Resources
In Reeves, the Court suggested an important limitation on the
"general rule" 341 sheltering state market participation from dormant
commerce clause attack. As stated by the Court:
Cement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or miner-
als. Cf Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, supra (landfill sites); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas) .... It is the end product of a complex
process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw
materials. South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's
limestone or other materials used to make cement. Nor has it restricted
the ability of private firms or sister States to set up plants within its
borders.... Moreover, petitioner has not suggested that South Dakota
possesses unique access to the materials needed to produce cement.
Whatever limits might exist on a State's ability to invoke the Alexandria
Scrap exemption to hoard resources which by happenstance are found
there, those limits do not apply here.342
This passage opened the door for recognition of a "natural re-
sources exception" to the market-participant rule.343 Moreover, in
Wunnicke, the Court moved further in that direction, by relying in
part on Reeves' natural-resources discussion in refusing to validate
Alaska's in-state timber-processing requirement.344 The significance
340. In Airline Car Rental, Inc. v. Shreveport Airport Auth., 667 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. La.
1987), the court did a better job than the Smith majority in identifying this salient consideration.
There a rental car business - which had leased no airport counter, but which met passengers
arriving at the airport - challenged a gross-receipts tax as unduly burdening interstate com-
merce. The Airport Authority sought dismissal of the suit on the ground that it was a market
participant, merely charging a fee for use of the airport grounds it owned. Relying on Smith, the
District Court rejected this argument by emphasizing that "the Authority has simply created a
suitable marketplace for the buying and selling of [rental car] services by private individuals."
667 F. Supp. at 306. (The court reserved judgment on whether the burden on interstate com-
merce imposed by the challenged tax was, in fact, undue.)
341. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
342. 447 U.S. at 443-44 (additional citations omitted); see also City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (citing "decisions holding that a State may not accord its own
inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located
within its borders").
343. See Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 15, at 610 ("Reeves opinion concedes the possibility of
a natural resource exception"); Houston Note, supra note 15, at 544 (Reeves suggests a natural
resources exception, but not whether "Pike balancing test" or "some modification of it" will
apply in such cases); Nat. Res. Comment, supra note 78, at 544 (the "Court... has suggested a
distinction between natural resources and state-manufactured goods").
344. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984).
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of this "element" 345 nonetheless remains clouded, both because the
Court has said so little about it and because nature's riches come in
such myriad forms.346 Two basic questions require investigation.
First, is a natural resources exception a good idea? Second, if it is, in
what circumstances should it apply?
1. The Propriety of a Natural Resource Exception
As a working proposition, a natural resource exception to the mar-
ket-participant rule is sound.347 Considerations of form and federal-
ism help explain this conclusion. As to the former, in many natural-
resource cases the state's claim of "ownership" will be so tenuous that
it will bear little resemblance to a private trader.3 48 As to the latter,
giving states freedom to prefer their own residents cannot even possi-
bly cause the creation of those nonreproducible assets - such as min-
erals and fossil fuels - that are central to any natural resources
exception.3 49 Even more important to explaining the exception, how-
345. 467 U.S. at 96.
346. See, e.g., Trelease, supra note 139, at 351, 363-64 (distinguishing between "unappropri-
ated" and "appropriated" resources); Varat, supra note 21, at 554-60 (distinguishing between
reproducible and nonreproducible resources).
347. The term "natural resource exception" has not been used by the Court itself, but it has
been used by others and seems fairly to encapsulate the view of the Court embodied in Reeves.
Of course, the term "natural resources" is not self-defining, and controversies may arise regard-
ing whether particular assets are "natural" or not. Professor Varat has said that "the common
characteristic of natural resources is that they are not the products of human creation." Varat,
supra note 21, at 555. Any such definition inevitably will pose difficulties, for "human creation"
may be said to "produce" things often thought of as natural resources (e.g., fresh water distilled
from salt water), and in other cases the resource at issue will involve both "created" and "uncre-
ated" elements (e.g., trees, crops, a landfill, an apartment building, or a cement plant located on
state land). Perhaps the best approach is to recognize that various assets fall along a continuum
from "very natural" to "very unnatural."
348. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950-51 (1982) (finding
view that state "owns" subterranean water a "legal fiction"); New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338-39 n.6 (1982) (rebuffing New Hampshire's claim of "ownership"
of the Connecticut River); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979) (view that state owns
wild game is a "pure fantasy"; quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284
(1977)); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1948) (viewing state claim of "ownership" of
migratory shrimp in the marginal sea as tenuous); Hardman, supra note 286, at 11-12 (develop-
ing weakness of state's claim of "ownership" of certain natural resources); Hellerstein, supra note
79, at 74 (distinguishing between "conventional" state ownership - e.g., trees on state land -
and "nonconventional" ownership - e.g., water in streams); Varat, supra note 21, at 498 (noting
that, under existing Supreme Court precedent, a state has "somewhat greater power" to discrimi-
nate against nonresidents "when a state's claim of ownership conforms more closely to tradi-
tional forms of private ownership"); Nat. Res. Comment, supra note 78, at 545 (citing "the
difficulty in determining when the state 'owns' natural resources").
349. See Varat, supra note 21, at 556 ("State experimentation and innovation are not cur-
tailed, because the resources exist without state action."); cf Gergen, supra note 15, at 1113
(suggesting that pro-conservation arguments for natural-resource preferences "are weak and
rarely withstand scrutiny").
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ever, are the other two components of the applicable four-part
analysis.
The fairness-based sow-and-reap rationale packs limited force in
these cases because of the nature of natural resources. It is one thing
for a state to keep for state residents those benefits actively produced
through their own investment and industry. It is another for the state
to hoard resources fortuitously located within its borders. 350 To be
sure, in some cases a state will expend its funds to acquire, extract, or
treat natural resources to ready them for the market. 351 Even in these
cases, however, the fairness-based sow-and-reap rationale is mitigated
by the state's natural access to the natural resources it controls.3 52
"Indeed, to the extent that these natural blessings provide the states in
350. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 n.6 (1982) (empha-
sizing that Reeves involved restricted "sale of products it produces") (emphasis in original);
Gergen, supra note 15, at 1112 n.79 (urging that sow-and-reap rationale "is not persuasive when
natural resources, goods not created by the community, are at issue"); Varat, supra note 21, at
555 (noting that at least nonreproducible natural resources "exist without the need for communal
cooperation"); see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532-33 (1978) ("the location in a given
State of a resource bound for interstate commerce is an insufficient basis for preserving the bene-
fits of the resource exclusively or even principally for that State's residents"); cf Anson &
Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 71-72 (distinguishing state ownership by "original endowment"
from ownership by "purchase out of state funds"). But cf U Pa. Comment, supra note 15, at
1330-31 (noting that in the post-frontier era, "natural resources ... increasingly owe their exist-
ence to some form of human investment," at least by way of "conservation" or "thrift"). This
"happenstance" factor explains at least in part the modem Court's unwillingness to permit states
to impose restrictions on the interstate disposition of privately taken game. See supra note 348;
see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948) (finding "ownership"
claim to peripatetic fish "inadequate" to justify discrimination against aliens). It also helps to
explain the Court's recent shift away from its early hands-off view of state water laws disfavoring
nonresidents. Compare Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908)
(upholding water-hoarding law in part because when a state "finds itself in possession of... a
great public good, . . . what it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its will") with
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (similar Nebraska statute held uncon-
stitutional under the commerce clause). As Professor Trelease observed: "Sporhase does not
explicitly overrule Hudson County, but it is difficult to find much left of its holding or doctrine."
Trelease, supra note 139, at 347 n.2.
351. See, eg., Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 89 ("If the States had expended large sums of
money to develop, manage, and cultivate oyster beds located in state waters, one might regard
the entire enterprise as a 'statewide oyster farm' subsidized by the State, to which access might
reasonably be limited to in-state residents .... "); Rodgers, supra note 179, at 380 (arguing for
state's market-participant status with respect to water because of "equity interest in water re-
sources that it has carefully created through water regulation and investment of its taxpayers'
capital"); Varat, supra note 21, at 558 (noting weaker case of nonresidents for access to reproduc-
ible natural resources because the "state may well have invested public funds in increasing the
originally available resource"); see also Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957 ("given [Nebraska's] conserva-
tion efforts, the continuing availability of ground water in Nebraska is not simply happenstance;
the natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced .... "); Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 398 (1948) (noting, in invalidating discrimination against nonresidents seeking to un-
dertake in-state shrimp fishing, that "[n]othing in the record indicates.., that any substantial
amount of the State's general funds is devoted to shrimp conservation").
352. See Varat, supra note 21, at 519 (emphasizing importance of "leav[ing] people free to
make their home in one state without sacrificing the opportunity to share in the bounty found in
others"); Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 96-97.
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which they are found with a sounder tax base and greater economic
potential, residents already enjoy a relative advantage over nonresi-
dents. A further advantage is not deserved .... -353
A natural resources exception also is defensible because state
hoarding of natural resources is distinctively disruptive of the goal of
national unification. 354 Our conception of nationhood entails viewing
states as equals - not in natural abundance but in the opportunity to
be productive.355 Precisely because natural resources are the irreduci-
ble - and thus critical - components of production,356 permitting
states to hoard them through state control severely diminishes this
equality of opportunity.357 It thus raises to the greatest degree the
threat of interstate disharmony and retaliation. 358
Others have suggested that this point of view has it backwards. 35 9
Professor Trelease, in particular, argued that states have a heightened
claim to favor residents in the disposition of "unappropriated" mineral
resources because such resources are quintessentially part of the terri-
tory over which the state is sovereign. 36 This argument, however, has
a hollow ring; state cement physically created with the sweat of state
353. Varat, supra note 21, at 556; see Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883
F.2d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1989) (it "would seem less fair" to permit hoarding of natural re-
sources than, for example, cement).
354. See, eg., Varat, supra note 21, at 554 (citing "Canada's recent experience" as showing
that "recognition of the power of constituent political units to reserve the natural resources
found within their jurisdiction for the use of their own inhabitants carries a serious potential for
division of the nation .. "); see also Levmore, supra note 149, at 565-66 (suggesting the particu-
lar appeal to states of hoarding natural resources despite resulting threat to interstate trade).
355. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-8, at 423 (citing "major concern of the commerce
clause" as "avoiding any state's exploitation of its geographical or resource position 'to the disad-
vantage and displeasure of [its] less strategically situated neighbors' "); Varat, supra note 21, at
519 (emphasizing importance of "leav[ing] people free to make their home in one state without
sacrificing the opportunity to share in the bounty found in others"); Ham'. J. Leg. Comment,
supra note 15, at 606 ("In forming the union, the states agreed to share one another's fate and
recognized that natural resources accrue to the benefit of all states.").
356. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978) ("oil and gas... are of profound
national importance"); see also Melder, supra note 223, at 127-28 (noting importance to nation of
access to minerals not domestically available).
357. See Swin Resource Sys, Inc., 883 F.2d at 251 (noting that "state does not have the
ability to develop a natural resource if it has not had the fortuity to be favored with such a
resource").
358. See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983)
("[c]onstitutional restrictions on the ability of the states to burden the flow of interstate com-
merce in natural resources lie at the heart of our national solidarity and prosperity"), later pro-
ceeding, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
359. See Nat. Rest Comment, supra note 78, at 545 (urging that each "state should have the
greatest autonomy" when "furthering the state's interest in initial distribution" of state-owned
natural resources); Hellerstein, supra note 79, at 77 ("To preclude the States from preferring in-
state interests in the distribution of state natural resources would deprive the States of an impor-
tant attribute of their separate existence as independent political units in the federal system.").
360. See Trelease, supra note 139, at 352, 361.
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workers, for example, may well be viewed as no less a "part" of the
state than subsurface minerals resting in the vicinity through the
whimsy of natural history. More potent is Professor Trelease's con-
tention that the power to discriminate in the disposition of natural
resources naturally follows from the state's unquestioned authority to
define local real-property rights.361 Professor Trelease urged, for ex-
ample, that the Court in McCready v. Virginia 362 was right to uphold
Virginia's exclusion of nonresidents from state-owned submerged
lands uniquely suited to the farming of oysters. 363 The essence of Pro-
fessor Trelease's argument seems to be that Virginia could have fa-
vored residents' access to this resource simply by structuring its
property law to vest ownership of these lands in Virginia residents (for
example, those persons owning adjacent unsubmerged lands). It
should make no difference, the argument continues, that the state
chose to retain title for a time and then favor residents in the initial
disposition of the resource through sale, lease, or grant.364
This argument is unpersuasive. It is one thing to recognize title to
shoreline property in the holder of the adjacent parcel (or, as more
commonly occurs, to vest title to subterranean minerals in an overly-
ing landowner). Such a title-refining rule comports with conventional
notions of property law, does not advantage in-state businesses lacking
a natural connection with the parcel, and for these reasons is unlikely
to generate reciprocal hoarding. It is quite another thing for the state
to declare that it will sell or lease mineral-rich lands it owns to any
and all - but only - state residents. The challenged action in Mc-
Cready, for example, resulted in the acquisition of Virginia's oyster
beds by in-state watermen to the exclusion of out-of-state watermen.
An outright transfer to adjacent shoreline landowners, in contrast,
would likely have resulted in self-interested retransfers to the highest
paying oyster farmers without regard to state of residence.
Indeed, a requirement that the state include nonresidents among
its offerees in disposing of valuable state lands or mineral rights serves
to provide a sort of commerce-clause "equalizer" for letting the state
initially vest title to such critical resources in itself. The very fact of
state ownership, after all, may be seen as frustrating commerce clause
values by restricting the free movement of naturally existing resources
into the hands of nonresidents in response to private needs and incen-
tives. It thus may be especially appropriate to require the state to wel-
361. See id. at 361-62.
362. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
363. See Trelease, supra note 139, at 365-67.
364. See id. at 362, 366.
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come nonresidents to the sales counter as soon as the state chooses to
part with ownership.
2. Applying the Natural Resource Exception
To recognize the general validity of a natural resource exception is
not to say how it will apply in practice. In Wunnicke, for example, the
Court cited the principle that natural resources might warrant special
treatment;365 in other cases, however, courts have found the involve-
ment of natural resources unpersuasive or inconsequential. 366 Three
main factors - extractable from the more general policies underlying
the market-participant rule - seem particularly important to these
decisions. First, it matters whether the state has special access to the
natural resource not enjoyed by other states. 367 Good luck provides
little justification for shunting nonresidents, and scarcity heightens the
need for open access to ensure equal opportunity. Second, it matters
whether the state has invested heavily in the development of the state-
owned resource.368 If it has not, then the state would essentially be
asserting a right to reap where it has not sown and can advance only a
weak claim that its program reflects the sort of meaningful innovation
envisioned by our federal system. Third, it may matter whether the
state exerts control over all or most of the natural resource that is
present within its borders. Even if the state lacks a monopoly or oli-
gopoly position vis-a-vis the national market, the greater the foreclo-
sure of purchasing options within a state the more likely is the
possibility of unhealthy resentment and retaliation.369
365. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984).
366. See, ag., infra text accompanying note 380.
367. See Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing
monopolization of the resource in upholding commerce clause attack), affd. per curiam by
equally divided court, 471 U.S. 81 (1985); Nat. Re,% Comment, supra note 78, at 515. In this
regard, one author reports:
Six states - Montana, Wyoming, Illinois, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania -
contain 76% of the country's coal. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DEMONSTRATED RE-
SERVE BASE OF COAL IN THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY 1, 1979 6 (1981). Montana
and Wyoming alone contain 40%. Id. Louisiana and Texas hold approximately 51% of the
nation's proved natural gas reserves. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, U.S. CRUDE OIL,
NATURAL GAS AND NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS RESERVES, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 18, Table
9 (1981). Those two states plus Alaska account for approximately 67% of proved natural
gas reserves. See id. Approximately 87% of total estimated proved crude oil reserves lie
beneath Alaska, Texas, Louisiana, and California. See id. at 14, Table 6.
Geo. Waskl Note, supra note 15, at 620 n.132.
368. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 448 n.2 (1980) (quoted infra at text accompany-
ing notes 370-72).
369. See also Varat, supra note 21, at 538 (noting distinction between statewide and national
monopoly). But see U. Pa. Comment, supra note 15, at 1338 (in-state monopoly counts little if
the "blockading state has no monopoly on the inputs necessary to create disposal capacity else-
where"). The listing of these three factors is not meant to suggest that other factors are inconse-
quential. Most importantly, the extent to which the state imposes resident-favoring contractual
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The Court's analysis shows that each of these three factors played
a role in Reeves. To use the Court's own words:
(1) "[P]etitioner has not suggested that South Dakota possesses
unique access to the materials needed to produce cement"; 370
(2) "[Cement] is the end product of a complex process whereby a
costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials"; 371 and
(3) "South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's
limestone or other materials used to make cement. '372
Toward the other end of the continuum may lie a case like Wun-
nicke. In striking down Alaska's requirement that buyers of state-
owned timber process that timber in Alaska, the Court relied in part
on the natural resources "element" and probably did so with good
reason. Thus:
(1) Although Alaska does not have unique access to timber, it
does have rich stores of timber in comparison to most other states.373
(2) The development of Alaskan timber had not been a costly en-
terprise requiring ingenuity and sacrifice by local residents. Indeed,
timber grown on Alaskan land was simply handed over to Alaskans by
the national government when Alaska was made a state.374
(3) It may well be - although Wunnicke does not answer this
question - that a large percentage of salable timber in Alaska sits on
state-owned land. To the extent this is true, the lack of alternative
Alaskan suppliers cut against application of the market-participant
rule.375
conditions on the use of the natural resource is a critical consideration. This subject of "down-
stream restraints," however, is taken up more systematically in section V.E below. Moreover,
other factors - such as the general importance of the hoarded resource - may be significant in
particular cases. See generally supra notes 281-88 and accompanying text.
370. 447 U.S. at 444.
371. 447 U.S. at 444.
372. 447 U.S. at 444.
373. See Envtl. L Rev. Note, supra note 145, at 598 ("timber is not available in marketable
quantities in all states"). But cf. Houston Note, supra note 15, at 547 (suggesting that Alaskan
timber is not an important part of the national timber market).
374. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 n.11 (1978); see Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 15, at
620 n.140 ("[c]ertainly the existence of timber on state lands was not due to Alaska's 'foresight,
risk and industry' "); Houston Note, supra note 15, at 555 ("[Alaska's] ownership of the timber
was not the result of its own industry or foresight, but rather the federal government's action in
granting the state ownership of federal land."); U. Pa. Comment, supra note 15, at 1325 n.91
("Nor had [Alaska] tended the trees; they had simply grown on its land.").
375. A focus on these factors would certainly have been more meaningful than the analysis
actually offered by the court in Tangier Sound Watermen's Assn. v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287
(E.D. Va. 1982). That case involved an attack on Virginia laws prohibiting all nonresidents from
harvesting blue crabs from Virginia waters. In responding to the plaintiffs' commerce clause
challenge, Virginia invoked the market-participant rule. The court dismissed this defense in a
short footnote, asserting that Virginia "operates more as a market regulator than a market par-
ticipant," thus making the case "analogous" to Smith v. Department of Agric., 630 F.2d 1081
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Of course, many cases lie between Reeves and Wunnicke. 376 In his
Reeves dissent, for example, Justice Powell noted that "[t]he extraction
of natural gas.., could hardly occur except through a 'complex pro-
cess whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw
materials.' ",377 Having made this point, Justice Powell sought to use
it to attack the Reeves majority's attempted distinction between natu-
ral and nonnatural resources.3 78 There is a basic difficulty with this
criticism: it fails to take account of all the considerations relevant to
proper commerce clause treatment of state hoarding of state-owned
natural resources. Most importantly, natural gas is the archetype of a
natural resource located by happenstance in only a few states.379 The
hoarding of natural gas thus differs fundamentally from South Da-
kota's "hoarding" of a finished product made with raw materials
widely available both inside and outside the state.
D. Landfills
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,380 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a New Jersey law prohibiting nonresidents from dumping trash
in privately owned New Jersey landfills. The Court, however, left
open the question whether it would invalidate a similar discrimination
in the operation of landfills owned by the state.381 A series of lower-
court cases decided in the wake of Alexandria Scrap have addressed
this issue.
In five separate reported decisions, courts have upheld resident-
preference restrictions on public landfill use.382 These lower-court de-
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981). Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1303 n.18. As
shown above, Smith was readily distinguishable because it involved exclusion from the infra-
structure of trade. See supra text accompanying notes 332-40. A sensitive focus in Tangier
Sound on the presence of state-specific and state-monopolized natural resources in their "unde-
veloped" state - together with attention to the state's evanescent claim of state "ownership" of
the controlled resource, see supra note 348 - would have substituted well for the court's con-
clusory "market regulator" reasoning.
376. Indeed, placing Wunnicke at the far end of this suggested continuum might be inappro-
priate. Alaska, after all, did not limit the end use of the natural resource, but only limited the
buyer's freedom toprocess the natural resource. Professor Varat argues, however, that this dis-
tinction should make no difference. See Varat, supra note 21, at 561.
377. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 448 n.2 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
378. See 447 U.S. at 448 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting); Creighton Casenote, supra note 67, at
636 n.70 (endorsing Justice Powell's argument); Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 15, at 610 n.63
(same); Wayne Casenote, supra note 15, at 1596 (same); cf G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN
& M. TUSHNET, supra note 167, at 327 (questioning whether majority's "complex process" dis-
tinction is persuasive).
379. See supra note 367.
380. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
381. 437 U.S. at 627 n.6.
382. Swin Resources Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), affg. 678
F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987);
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cisions are debatable, for landfill sites may well be characterized as
natural resources.383 At least on the records developed in the cases,
however, the lower-court landfill decisions seem correct. The three
salient "natural resources factors" identified above help show why.
First, the cases give no suggestion that the development of general
landfill sites requires any peculiar type of land to which only a few
states have special access. Land is land, and - unlike most, if not all,
other valuable natural resources - all states have it.3 *
Second, the development and operation of landfills entail substan-
tial absolute and opportunity costs. 385 As observed by one court:
The District also argues that landfills are much more than just a raw
resource. Rather, they are highly regulated, costly waste disposal facili-
ties. The District contends that it spends millions of dollars annually to
meet state and federal law and to provide leachate control, temporary
and final cover, roads, and drainage.
I agree with the District that a complex metropolitan landfill opera-
tion is not a natural resource to which commerce clause scrutiny should
apply. Like the cement plant in Reeves, Inc., the District has developed
a complex plant. The District is not hoarding raw land, it is providing a
public service to its residents. 386
Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986), affd., 820
F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C.
1984); County Commrs. v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
383. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443 (distinguishing cement case from one involving a natural
resource like landfill sites); Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 15, at 617 (reading Reeves as sheltering
state-run landfill preferences). Some courts have sought to escape the "natural resources" excep-
tion by reasoning that states operating landfills are restricting access not to a natural resource,
but instead to "landfill services" provided by the government. See, e.g., Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp.
at 1211 (urging that state in operating landfill "has entered the market for landfill services and
therefore is not a participant in a natural resource market"); CreightonlCasenote, supra note 67,
at 1123 n.331 (characterizing landfill operation as a service). This reasoning seems of limited
usefulness since the key "service" the state sells is access to scarce - and indubitably "natural"
- land. See supra note 347. Indeed, the "service" characterization highlights a particular prob-
lem in the landfill cases: the buyers of landfill "services," unlike more typical natural resources,
may not resell them outside the state. In this respect, the landfill cases provide a special justifica-
tion for judicial intervention not present in a case like Reeves, in which interstate commerce was
only partially obstructed because South Dakota cement buyers could resell to nonresidents. See
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444.
384. To this point may be added the further observation that the scarcity of undeveloped
land in any state may be attributed not solely to "happenstance," see Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444, but
to the state's own decisions concerning land-use control.
385. The costs are incurred, moreover, in "an area in which experimentation by the states is
devoutly to be wished." U. Pa. Comment, supra note 15, at 1334. See Swin Resource Sys., Inc.
v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1989).
386. Evergreen Waste Systems; 643 F. Supp. at 132; see also U. Pa. Comment, supra note 15,
at 1332-33 (noting subtle in-state costs of landfill operation, including increased "health risks and
environmental degradation"; emphasizing also expensiveness of landfill operation, especially
through "compliance with increasingly stringent environmental regulations").
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Notably, in McCready v. Virginia,387 the Court observed that a state
leasing arable land it owned could prefer resident corn farmers over
their nonresident counterparts. 388 To the extent this pronouncement
remains good law, it provides a powerful a fortiori argument in the
landfill cases. This is so because, if a state may limit access to raw
land provided with no accompanying service or expense, it surely
should have the option of restricting access to costly landfills devel-
oped and operated with government funds in an effort to help solve a
pressing local problem.
Third, the landfill cases involved local-government operators that
had not monopolized available in-state sites. In upholding a Maryland
county's landfill preference, for example, the court in County Commis-
sioners of Charles County v. Stevens 389 reasoned: "The County has not
closed its borders to anyone who wishes to construct landfills within
the County .... Nor has it been shown that the County possesses
unique access to potential landfill sites."' 390
A key teaching of the landfill cases is that the involvement of natu-
ral resources does not operate as a talisman to render the market-par-
ticipant rule inapplicable. Reeves and Wunnicke render suspect
preferential distributions of state-owned natural resources. In such
cases, however, courts still must balance the values underlying the
market-participant rule against the national-unification goal of the
commerce clause. The lower courts seem to have struck this balance
properly in the landfill cases they have encountered so far. However,
modest factual differences - such as the proven preferability of state-
specific geological conditions for disposing of certain types of waste or
the established inability of private entrepreneurs to develop competing
landfill sites in the state - may justify different conclusions in future
landfill cases. 391
387. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
388. 94 U.S. at 396.
389. 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
390. 299 Md. at 220, 473 A.2d at 21. Accord Evergreen Waste Systems, 643 F. Supp. at 132
("Here, nothing prevents private operators from purchasing land in the District and developing
it for landfill. Nor has Evergreen argued that the District owns all the potential landfill sites
...."); see Varat, supra note 21, at 558 (justifying McCready cornland rule in part on ground
that "[a]rable land is rarely unique; the private sector generally will control other land suitable
for planting").
391. See, eg., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 253-54 (3d Cir.
1989) (emphasizing that "[t]his is not a case in which a state has hoarded a resource like coal or
oil that is geologically peculiar to that state"); Rutgers Note, supra note 79, at 758 (arguing that
state could not couple access restrictions to public landfills with forced closing of private
landfills).
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E. Downstream Restraints
In White, there was no dissent from the conclusion that the com-
merce clause permits states to restrict state jobs to state residents.3 92
The logic of the market-participant rule supports this view as surely as
it justifies in-state purchasing preferences generally. State jobs, after
all, are benefits afforded through a marketplace exchange of state
money for valuable services. 393 White, however, involved an added
wrinkle, for Boston did more than limit its own hiring to Bostonians.
Boston required the private construction firms it contracted with -
and even the subcontractors those private firms engaged - to ensure
that at least half their workforce was made up of Boston residents.39
4
The preference in White thus created a "downstream restraint" requir-
ing private traders to prefer state residents in making otherwise private
hiring decisions.395
1. The Difficulties of Downstream Restraints
Downstream restraints raise two major problems with the ratio-
nales underlying the market-participant rule. First, a state or munici-
pality imposing such a contractual condition seems to act at least as
392. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983) (upholding Boston rule because construction workers were, in effect, "working for the
city"); 460 U.S. at 217 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (preference in hiring city's own workers
"would almost certainly have been permissible"); International Org. of Masters v. Andrews, 626
F. Supp. 1271, 1277-78 (D. Alaska 1986) (state can favor state residents in employment), affd. in
part and vacated in part, 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1228 (1988). But
cf Simson, supra note 190, at 394 (arguing that under privileges and immunities clause "the state
may not validly make state residence a qualification to run for local dogcatcher or to be hired for
the custodial staff in a state office building").
393. See Varat, supra note 21, at 546-48 (concluding that "the general principle supporting
state authority to prefer residents in the distribution of state-created resources applies fully to
state employment"; "state spends money to obtain labor, just as it might spend money to buy
goods or the services of independent contractors"); see also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv.
Commn., 424 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding resident hiring preference against
challenge that it burdened right of interstate travel). See generally supra notes 291-303 and ac-
companying text.
394. See 460 U.S. at 205 n.1.
395. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 15, at 75 ("White permits the govern-
ment to ... impose conditions on the way its partners operate"); cf Note, South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke: The Dormant Commerce Clause Fells Alaska's Primary Manufacture
Requirement for the Sale of State-Owned Timber, 5 N. ILL. L. REV. 155, 176 (1984) (viewing
White's validation of downstream hiring restraint as "arguably an undue extension" of prior
doctrine).
As with the term "natural resources," see supra note 347, the proper scope of the term
"downstream restraint" is not entirely clear. One might characterize the landfill cases, for exam-
ple, see supra notes 380-91 and accompanying text, as involving governmental sales of rights to
dispose of trash. If the state effectively bars the retransfer of those rights to nonresidents through
a rule flatly limiting dumping to in-state trash, has it burdened the sale of the right with a "down-
stream restraint"? Fortunately, in most cases the presence or absence of downstream restraints
will be clear. The cases discussed below involve state programs involving readily identifiable
downstream restraints.
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much as a market regulator as a market participant. 396 It so acts,
moreover, in a manner particularly at odds with the commerce clause
values the Court emphasized in embracing the market-participant
rule. This is so because the governmental entity that imposes such
restraints effectively limits the selection of private trading partners,
thus "impeding free private trade" 397 and subverting "the long recog-
nized right of [the] trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely pri-
vate business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal."'398
Second, the sheltering of such "downstream restraints" magnifies
dramatically the potential for widespread discrimination against out-
of-state commercial interests through the medium of government con-
tracts. This is so because the availability of downstream restrictions
greatly expands the "pool" of resident preferences achievable by
states. It is one thing to permit the state to prefer state residents in
direct exchanges; such exchanges reflect only a small percentage of all
trades in the national economy. It is quite another thing, however, to
let the state dictate all the private economic relationships that all of its
trading partners may have. To adopt such a rule is to authorize the
state to "reach through" its own purchases and sales to dictate the
terms of large numbers of private transactions. 399
396. See, e.g., Case Note, supra note 43, at 663 ("White stretches the market participation
exemption to encompass activities that are analogized more aptly to state regulation than to
transactions engaged in by private traders").
397. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) (emphasis added).
398. 447 U.S. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
Professor Gergen seems sensitive to this distinction, especially insofar as it rests on formal con-
siderations. Thus, he condemns downstream restraints, even while seeming to defend "subsidies
of like effect." Gergen, supra note 15, at 1144. In doing so, he reasons that "[w]hen states
require firms with whom they deal to favor citizens in other dealings, they appear to be interfer-
ing with the ability of out-of-staters to engage in entirely private transactions, something histori-
cally prohibited .... Id.
399. See Varat, supra note 21, at 561, 564 (decrying the "leverage" states might exercise
through downstream restraints and noting that such conditions permit the state "to accomplish
indirectly - and too effectively - what it is forbidden to compel directly"); Har. J. Leg. Com-
ment, supra note 15, at 603 ("Allowing the state to make use of its resources before it allows
them to pass out of its possession is a far less intrusive means of providing for its citizens than a
requirement that state resources, once reduced to private possession, must be used in certain
ways."); Rodgers, supra note 179, at 364 & n.35 (state should not have the ability to use market
participation as a "subterfuge to regulate the activities of other markets"). A poignant illustra-
tion of this danger is presented by Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), in which "Alaska had
attempted to pyramid its ownership of oil and gas into control of the private sector on such a
wide basis that the program of conditional distribution was barely distinguishable from regula-
tion." Varat, supra note 21, at 562. Notably, the Court has shown concern about "reaching
through" government spending decisions broadly to interfere with otherwise private decisions in
other constitutional contexts as well. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
3040, 3052 n.8 (1989) (upholding Missouri ban on the use of public facilities for abortions, but
noting that the "case might ... be different if the state barred doctors who performed abortions
in private facilities from the use of public facilities for any purpose"); 109 S. Ct. at 3059
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting facial attack on the Missouri ban, but noting that certain
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It may be said in response that downstream restraints are in func-
tional terms no different than permissible subsidies that favor in-state
traders. This is so, the argument goes, because the state simply pays
more money to the contractor with which it directly deals so that that
contractor can pass along higher rates to the favored in-state workers
or firms with which it is forced to deal.400
This "they're-just-like-subsidies" defense of downstream restraints,
however, ignores the real world. A contract that requires a state con-
tractor to hire a fixed percentage of state workers will operate directly
and effectively to get jobs for a targeted number of state residents. Di-
rect state payments to residents working on state projects (who in the-
ory will be more employable because they can "charge" less for their
services) simply will not be so readily achievable in practice. The
proper amount of the per-worker subsidy, for example, may prove im-
possible to calculate,4° ' and the difficulties of administering such pro-
grams may make them uninviting to pursue. In addition, there
invariably will arise more pointed problems of political salability when
the state considers favoring specific state citizens with direct cash pay-
ments, rather than indirect support through a mandated downstream
hiring or purchasing preference. 4°2 These considerations suggest that
there exist significant practical differences between direct subsidies and
downstream restraints that render the latter constitutionally more
problematic. As a result, all members of the Court in White properly
agreed that "there are some limits on a state or local government's
ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties
applications of the statute - for example, a "ban against private hospitals using public water and
sewage lines, or against private hospitals leasing state-owned equipment or state land" - "may
be... unconstitutional"); 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (attacking the Mis-
souri law on the ground that states "may not affirmatively constrict the availability of abortions
by defining as 'public' that which in all meaningful respects is private").
400. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wurmicke, 467 U.S. 82, 103 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Gergen, supra note 15, at 1111 n.76 (In Wunnicke, "[t]he law simply shifted state
revenues to the processing industry through the intermediary of private purchasers of timber.
The state charged considerably less than it otherwise would for timber sold subject to the restric-
tion, presumably to compensate purchasers for the increased cost of Alaskan processing.") (cita-
tion omitted); id. at 1138-39 (Wunnicke, in effect, concerned a subsidy); EnvtL L Rev. Note,
supra note 145, at 609-11 (arguing that Alaska could accomplish the same economic result by
paying rebates equal to difference between in-state and out-of-state processing costs to buyers
who process their timber in Alaska; reasoning that such payments would parallel bounties up-
held in Alexandria Scrap).
401. See Regan, supra note 7, at 1196.
402. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1144:
If downstream restraints are different from subsidies in any real respect, it is because their
costs are hidden. The cost of supporting local lumber mills is signaled more clearly if the
state grants the mills a subsidy, for example, instead of reducing the price of timber sold to
firms compelled to process it at the local mills. The state is less likely to take these hidden
costs into account.
See also supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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with which the government transacts business. '40 3
In Wunnicke, four members of the Court made even more explicit
their discomfort with broad validation of downstream restraints.
Writing for the plurality, Justice White reasoned that "the market-
participant doctrine ... allows a State to impose burdens on com-
merce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go
no further."4''4 He added that in applying this principle, "[u]nless the
'market' is relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the potential
of swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial bur-
dens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state
purpose of fostering local industry."'' 4 5 The plurality thus agreed that
Alaska could not condition the sale of its timber on the buyer's agree-
ment to process that timber in Alaska.4°6
The plurality in Wunnicke noted that its aversion to downstream
restraints had a doctrinal basis reaching back many years.407 Thus, as
far back as 1928, the Court in Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel4°8 confronted a Louisiana statute that required fishermen who
caught shrimp in local waters to process their catch within the state.
The Court decided the case at a time when it was well understood that
Louisiana owned the shrimp.4°9 As a result, the Louisiana statute, in
effect, told shrimpers: "We will transfer our state-owned shrimp to
you, but only on the condition that you process the shrimp in Louisi-
ana." That condition, the Foster-Fountain Court concluded, was im-
permissible under the dormant commerce clause.410
2. The Logic and Limits of White
Notwithstanding Foster-Fountain and the Court's expression of
concern about downstream restraints in White, the majority in that
case readily upheld the challenged downstream hiring restriction.
Then-Justice Rehnquist -joined by such unlikely compatriots as Jus-
403. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983) (emphasis added).
404. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984).
405. 467 U.S. at 97-98.
406. 467 U.S. at 98.
407. 467 U.S. at 96 n.9.
408. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
409. 278 U.S. at 11.
410. See also New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 n.6 (1982)
(market-participant rule does not permit restrictions on the sale of electricity by a private utility
because the utility uses state waters to produce the power sold); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979) (invalidating resale restrictions on captured minnows allegedly "owned" by the state);
cf Trelease, supra note 139, at 364 (characterizing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978), as a case invalidating a "downstream restraint").
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tices Brennan and Stevens - brushed aside the attack on the Boston
rule by asserting in effect that the case did not involve a downstream
restraint at all. Rather, it was the majority's view that "[e]veryone
affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for
the city.' "411 This analysis is puzzling. Construction workers, after
all, work for construction companies. They are hired, paid, and super-
vised by those companies. Company profits depend on labor costs and
labor efficiency. To say that construction workers "work for the city"
thus seems to blink at reality.412
Seeking to flesh out its notion of "working for the city," the Court
in White reasoned that "the Mayor's executive order covers a discrete,
identifiable class of economic activity in which the city is a major par-
ticipant. '413 Yet a "discrete, identifiable class of economic activity"
may still be very broad, and provide a medium for sweeping ripple
effects across the national economy. Under a commodious reading of
White itself, for example, the "class" of economic activity exempted
from commerce-clause scrutiny might embrace all purchases (as well
as all hirings) by all suppliers (as well as all contractors and subcon-
tractors) on all state and municipal construction projects.414 The diffi-
cult question left in the wake of White is how far its validation of
downstream restraints will reach.
The plurality in Wunnicke distinguished the Boston hiring prefer-
ence from the Alaska processing preference by noting: "In contrast to
the situation in White, this restriction on private economic activity
takes place after the completion of the parties' direct commercial obli-
gations, rather than during the course of an ongoing commercial rela-
tionship in which the city retained a continuing proprietary interest in
the subject of the contract. '415 In addition, as Justice Blackmun
pointed out in his dissent to White, there is a "unique aspect of em-
ployment in the construction industry. ' 41 6 Why? "Because many
construction contractors hire a substantially different work crew for
each project they undertake ... .,,417 Thus, a resident-hiring require-
411. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983).
412. See 460 U.S. at 223 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra
note 15, at 75 (viewing working-for-the-city rationale as "amorphous," "ad hoc," and "con-
clusory"); Contemporary Law Note, supra note 79, at 222-23 (characterizing the majority's opin-
ion in White as "cursory" and "superficially dismiss[ive of] the issue of market participation");
Note, supra note 395, at 177 (viewing the working-for-the-city rationale as a "thin thread").
413. 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
414. But see infra text accompanying notes 416-18.
415. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 99.
416. White, 460 U.S. at 223 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
417. 460 U.S. at 222 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ment incorporated into a construction contract (unlike, for example, a
resident-employee requirement attached to a furniture-purchase con-
tract) is not likely to have sweeping effects altering the pattern of who
is employed to work on other, purely private projects. Taken together,
the "working-for-the-city" and "limited-effects-on-other-projects" ra-
tionales could serve to limit White essentially to cases involving hiring
by construction contractors.418
White itself gives reason to believe that substantial limits exist on
localities' power to mandate hiring preferences by project suppliers.
This is so because the majority in White distinguished Hicklin v.
Orbeck419 by observing that Boston did not "'attempt to force virtu-
ally all businesses that benefit in some way from the ripple effect' of
the city's decision to enter into contracts for construction projects 'to
bias their employment practices in favor of the [city's] residents.' "420
Moreover, the Court in Hicklin condemned a downstream restraint
precisely because its "ripple effect" reached employment by suppliers
for state projects.421 In short, a combined reading of White and Hick-
lin suggests that, under the commerce clause, contractors - or at least
subcontractors - may not be forced to deal only with suppliers who
employ a specified number of state residents.
3. The Many Faces of Downstream Restraints
White and Wunnicke leave much in doubt about resident-favoring
conditions placed in government contracts. This uncertainty is height-
ened because these contractual conditions come in so many shapes and
sizes.
As in other settings, the easiest cases are identifiable. Is an ordi-
nance requiring that all print work done under city contract be as-
signed to local firms unenforceable if a city contracts not directly with
the print shop but with a sales intermediary who then must engage a
418. See Case Note, supra note 43, at 664 ("the fact that the Boston mayoral order was
directed at an employment market in which hiring took place largely on a temporary, ad hoc
basis must be considered as an essential limitation of the scope of White"); Gergen, supra note 15,
at 1143-44 ("Consider a state law requiring firms doing business with the state to hire only its
citizens. The implication of United Building and Hicklin is that such a restraint on unrelated
hiring by firms that do business with the state is prohibited.").
419. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
420. White, 460 U.S. at 211 (quoting Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531).
421. The Court in Hicklin, relying on article IV's privileges and immunities clause, invali-
dated an Alaska law requiring all companies providing supplies or support services to extractors
of Alaskan fossil fuels to prefer Alaskans in hiring. In taking this view, the Court specifically
observed: "The Act goes so far as to reach suppliers who provide goods or services to subcon-
tractors who, in turn, perform work for contractors despite the fact that none of these employers
may themselves have direct dealings with the State's oil and gas or ever set foot on state land."
437 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added).
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local printer?422 Almost surely not. As in White, the "condition" im-
posed on the salesperson raises little risk of distorting later private
transactions, and the printer (even more so than the laborers in Bos-
ton) seems actually to be the one who is "working for the city."' 4 2 3 On
the other hand, almost any downstream restraint on the retransfer of
raw natural resources disposed of by the state should be impermissi-
ble.424 Indeed, the most strident critic of a "natural resource excep-
tion" to the market-participant rule seems to concede that much.425
Even these principles, however, may be difficult to apply in prac-
tice,426 and other cases may present still greater complexities. In actu-
ality, most downstream-restraint cases have concerned laws requiring
state contractors to use in-state products in discharging contractual
duties. A sampling of these cases reveals the subtle problems down-
stream restraints can present.
a. Alexandria Scrap and in-state hulks. A "downstream re-
straint" issue lurked quietly in Alexandria Scrap, since the program
challenged in that case afforded cash payments to hulk processors only
if they disposed of Maryland-titled cars.427 Was this requirement an
impermissible "downstream restraint" because it conditioned state
payments to processors on their exclusive "use" of Maryland prod-
ucts? One senses that the answer is no, although the reason why is not
self-evident. Probably the best explanation is that Maryland's decision
to exterminate hulks (unlike, for example, its decision to favor Mary-
land processors) was not in any meaningful sense protectionist, or
even commercial.428 Because Maryland's ridding itself of hulks re-
422. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 723 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (uphold-
ing printing preference statute requiring contracts with residents or nonresidents with local
plants), affd. mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1973); In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911) (same);
cf State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258
(1917).
423. See Recent Case, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1347, 1360 (1967) (implying that state "locally
produced goods" requirement is unobjectionable if it creates downstream restraints only for
"middlemen").
424. See Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp 828, 839 (W.D. Tex.) (invalidating statute barring with-
drawal of water with intent to transport it in interstate commerce), affd. mem, 385 U.S. 35
(1986).
425. See Trelease, supra note 139, at 351-52 (suggesting impropriety of state restraints on
dispositions of "appropriated" waters and minerals); see also Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69,
at 92 (emphasizing importance of applying downstream-restraint limitations to distributions of
natural resources).
426. See, e.g., infra note 428 (suggesting "upstream restraint" inherent in local landfill's in-
state trash requirement is constitutional although it involves natural resource).
427. See Rutgers Note, supra note 79, at 757.
428. As explained in greater detail below, see infra notes 460-61 and accompanying text, this
same analysis probably best explains the validity of a downstream restraint (or more accurately
an "upstream restraint") requiring users of municipal landfills to secure for such disposal only in-
state trash. There seems, after all, to be little functional difference between automotive junk and
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flected a choice about aesthetics, rather than about commerce, it seems
logical that the commerce clause would have little to say about it.429
To find no objectionable downstream restraint in Alexandria Scrap,
however, sheds little light on the validity of more ordinary in-state
product requirements.
b. Allen, Treat, and in-state stone. A more typical problem con-
cerning in-state product requirements is illustrated by two early cases,
Allen v. Labsap430 and People ex rel. Treat v. Coler.431 Each case con-
cerned a state law requiring government contractors to use only stone
that had been finished within the state. In Treat, but not in Allen, the
court found the statute unconstitutional. The cases thus starkly invite
an inquiry into which holding is correct under modern market-partici-
pant analysis.432
Treat and Allen clearly involved downstream restraints; just as in
White, the contractor could get the government job only if the con-
regular junk. See Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir.
1989) (arguing that the Maryland-hulks-only rule of Alexandria Scrap is indistinguishable from
local-trash-only rules adopted by states and municipalities). Similar reasoning (coupled with a
far more limited exclusionary sweep, see supra note 303) also serves to justify downstream re-
straints incorporated in recently enacted divestiture laws - Le., state or municipal provisions
that ban persons having a contractual relationship with the local government from retaining
holdings in South Africa. To carry forward the analogy, a state or municipality should have
broad authority free of the commerce clause, to rid itself of a moral, no less than a visual, blight.
See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720, 751 (1989) (emphasiz-
ing that Baltimore ordinances have the primary purpose of removing a perceived moral taint
from the city's investments).
429. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (distinguishing
restraints on water exports based on protecting local economic interests from restraints designed
to protect local health interests). But cf City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(holding, in a case not involving public benefits, that discrimination against out-of-state articles
of commerce may violate the dormant commerce clause even if undertaken for a broader goal of
environmental protection). Other explanations are also available. First, in keeping with the for-
mal aspect of the four-factor analysis, it might be said that Maryland looked like a "purchaser"
of hulks. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976) (characterizing Mary-
land as a "purchaser, in effect"). This circumstance may suggest, to track the reasoning of the
Wunnicke plurality, that Maryland in Alexandria Scrap discriminated only in the market it had
entered - namely, the market for the purchase of hulks. One might argue in response that
Maryland did not really purchase hulks at all, but rather subsidized the services that hulk proces-
sors provided. The per-vehicle nature of Maryland's payments, however, give at least some sup-
port to the "purchaser" characterization, which would not have applied had Maryland simply
afforded a flat payment or some other form of subsidy to hulk processors. Second, in keeping
with the sound-federalism line of analysis, it may be significant that Alexandria Scrap involved a
government's dealing with an "externality" not remediable by free market forces. See, e.g., P.
SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, EcONOMICS 47-48 (12th ed. 1985). In such circumstances, it
may be argued, government should have the freest hand, so as to facilitate government interven-
tion in the field where government intervention is most required.
430. 188 Mo. 692, 87 S.W. 926 (1905).
431. 166 N.Y. 144, 59 N.E. 776 (1901).
432. When such statutes are challenged it is an insufficient answer to respond that the statute
permits both residents and nonresidents to finish stone, so long as they operate in the state.
"mhe dormant commerce clause is aimed not at discrimination against out-of-staters, but
against interstate commerce." Sunstein, supra note 170, at 1706.
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tractor favored in-state commercial concerns. White's "work-for-the-
city" rationale, however, seems inapplicable to Allen and Treat be-
cause stone-finishers, unlike construction workers, often are both
physically and temporally removed from the construction project.
This is so because finished stone frequently is not a job-specific build-
ing product; as a result, its preparation often will not occur either on
the construction site or even during the pendency of the construction
project. For these reasons, such work will not be subject to monitor-,
ing and supervision by the city or its architect in the same day-to-day
fashion as the labor of construction workers. In such circumstances, it
is hard to say that stone finishers are "working for the city." 433
On the other hand, the result in White rests in part on the notion
that resident preferences on discrete government construction con-
tracts will not significantly "spill over" to distort contractor-worker
employment relationships for purposes of private projects. 434 Because
stone suppliers typically bid and work on a project-by-project basis,
this limited spillover reasoning of White should apply with equal force
to cases like Allen and Treat; just because contractors use in-state
stone for public works projects does not mean they will do so in con-
structing privately owned buildings.435 Allen and Treat thus raise the
subtle question whether White's implicit "spillover" reasoning should
be dispositive even if its more explicit and more formal "work-for-the-
city" rationale is inapplicable. For reasons already given, a formal fo-
cus is not necessarily ill-conceived;436 indeed, the plurality in Wun-
nicke distinguished White largely on formal grounds, even though the
Alaska program probably had no influence on timber owners' choices
of timber processors for trees felled on private lands.437
Like Allen and Treat, modern decisions may well break different
ways in passing upon these statutes. Moreover, factual nuances -
such as whether stone finishing occurs before or after commencement
of the project, or on or off the construction site - might well prove
decisive in these cases. In general, however, the dubious legitimacy of
downstream restraints438 suggests that courts should hesitate to up-
hold this form of in-state product restriction.
433. Cf South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1984) (emphasiz-
ing that required in-state work performed on timber was to occur after the state surrendered
control of the timber).
434. See supra notes 416-18 and accompanying text.
435. See Case Note, supra note 43, at 664-65.
436. See supra notes 245-64 and accompanying text.
437. See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 95 (the "fact that the employees were 'working for the city'
was 'crucial' to the market-participant analysis in White").
438. See supra notes 396-410 and accompanying text.
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c. Garden State Dairies and in-state milk Even if White's rea-
soning does protect statutes like those considered in Allen and Treat,
not all downstream purchasing restraints should meet with judicial ap-
proval. Consider Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills. 439 In that case,
the New Jersey Supreme Court faced a statute requiring milk distribu-
tors seeking state-supply contracts to certify (1) that they would
purchase in the contract year at least as much New Jersey milk as they
were to sell to the state under the contract, and (2) that they had
purchased at least as much New Jersey milk as they contracted to sell
to the state in the previous year as well. The New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to uphold the statute ipso facto because of the state's
"proprietor" status, but also declined to invalidate the statute summa-
rily.440 For three reasons, however, the spillover effects of the milk
statute were so plain and substantial that the court should have struck
down the statute on its face.
First, the statute permitted New Jersey, in effect, to "double its
money" by forcing an equivalent purchase of New Jersey milk in both
the contract year and the year preceding the award of the contract.
The sow-and-reap rationale suggests that New Jersey fairly could in-
sist at most on a flow-through of its own money to New Jersey milk
producers; the statute, however, conditioned state contracts on the di-
version of "matching" amounts of purely private money to New Jersey
producers as well.441
Second, because of the statute's "preceding year" requirement,
prospective sellers had to buy substantial volumes of New Jersey milk
simply to be in a position to compete for a state contract. The conse-
quence of such a requirement is to cause purchases from in-state pro-
ducers even by private suppliers who will wind up getting no state
contract, and thus no state money whatsoever. 442 Finally, regardless
of the "previous year" stipulation, the "same year" requirement might
as a practical matter induce more than equivalent in-state purchases.
In particular, it is predictable that the hired supplier will exercise care
not to under-order in-state milk so as to jeopardize her entitlement to
payments and continued eligibility under the program. For all these
reasons, the condition at issue in Garden State Dairies - and other
conditions resembling it - should not survive dormant commerce
clause attack.
439. 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126 (1966), remanded, 98 N.J. Super. 109, 236 A.2d 176 (Ch.
Div. 1967), revd., 53 N.J. 71, 248 A.2d 427 (1968).
440. See 46 N.J. at 358-59.
441. See Recent Case, supra note 423, at 1360 n.24.
442. Id. at 1360.
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d. A final word on downstream restraints. These varied examples
signal the danger of generalizing about downstream restraints. The
four-factor analysis developed here, however, suggests that at least
with respect to commercially motivated contractual conditions, courts
should pause long before extending White's validation of downstream
restraints significantly beyond the specialized setting of construction-
worker hiring requirements. 443 Such wariness should not impinge un-
duly on the ability of states to channel state benefits to state residents,
for states may still favor state residents in direct dealings with them.
Nor should intolerance of downstream restraints interfere too much
with a state's ability in a federalist system to help certain of its indus-
tries, since other approaches - such as direct subsidies - will remain
available. A general rejection of downstream restraints will keep
states from end-running the dormant commerce clause by vastly ex-
panding private in-state commercial preferences, and a restrictive ap-
proach to downstream restraints will confine the market-participant
rule to cases in which the state most looks and acts like a market
trader. All these considerations point to the same conclusion: the
safer, sounder, and more judicially manageable course is to invalidate
preferential downstream restraints as the general rule.
F. Monetary Subsidies
The Court in Alexandria Scrap upheld a Maryland subsidy pro-
gram that starkly discriminated in favor of in-state businesses. The
Court also recognized that the state's central motivation in adopting
the subsidy was no more complex than "to channel state benefits to
the residents of the State... ."444 Notwithstanding its endorsement of
the discriminatory subsidy at issue in Alexandria Scrap, the Court in
Reeves pointed out that "subsidy programs unlike that involved in Al-
exandria Scrap" may not enjoy the protection afforded by the market-
participant rule.445 The Court echoed this same point in Limbach.446
The Court's reservation about sheltering all monetary subsidies
from commerce clause attack seems to flow from the formal justifica-
tions for the market-participant doctrine. As the Court explained in
Reeves: "South Dakota, as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits the
443. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 69, at 92-95; Case Note, supra note 43, at 664 n.105
(noting the potential for "substantially alter[ing] employment patterns" if the White holding
were extended beyond construction contracts).
444. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443 n.16 (1980) (discussing Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)).
445. 447 U.S. at 440 n.14.
446. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. 1803, 1809 (1988).
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'market participant' label more comfortably than a State acting to sub-
sidize local scrap processors." 447 If, as previously suggested, a rele-
vant inquiry in applying the market-participant rule is whether the
State looks like a trader in the market, there is at least some basis for
scrutinizing monetary subsidies more closely than state purchases and
sales.448
What subsidies, then, remain insulated by the market-participant
doctrine? We know that the subsidy attacked in Alexandria Scrap
passes muster. There, however, the government's per-hulk payment
made Maryland indeed look like a traditional "purchaser" - either of
individual hulks or of the services performed in destroying automotive
eyesores.449 Other subsidy programs look less like "purchasing." Into
this category fall, for example, flat payments to favored manufacturers
or payments to producers reflecting some percentage of losses or in-
come. Are such subsidies, when limited to in-state businesses, sustain-
able against dormant commerce clause attack?
The Court's decision in Limbach suggests they are. In Limbach,
the Court struck down an Ohio tax credit given only to Ohio ethanol
producers. In doing so, however, the Court specifically distinguished
Indiana's own program, which afforded monetary subsidies to only In-
diana producers. The Court flatly stated: "Direct subsidization of do-
mestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of ... [the commerce
clause] prohibition .... -450
This conclusion seems sensible in light of the policies underlying
the market-participant rule. In-state subsidies - no less than in-state
buying, selling, and hiring - reflect the collective decision of state
residents to expend their own resources to further their own inter-
ests.451 In-state subsidies - no less than in-state buying, selling, and
447. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
448. See generally supra notes 245-64 and accompanying text.
449. Cf Note, supra note 9, at 709 (noting that "in form[,] Maryland's entry into the market-
place to buy abandoned cars resembled the actions of a private market force").
450. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. at 1810. Support for resident-preferring subsidies also comes from
Wunnicke, in which even the plurality did not question Alaska's ability directly to subsidize in-
state timber processors. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95 (1984);
Nat. Res. Comment, supra note 78, at 537-38 (reading Wunnicke as endorsing "subsidies distrib-
uted solely to local businesses"); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982) ("State
may make residence within its boundaries more attractive by offering ... direct distribution of its
munificence"). Commentators also have defended resident preferences in affording in-state subsi-
dies. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1134-38; Regan, supra note 7, at 1193-95; see also Linde,
supra note 145, at 49-67 (generally criticizing preferential distribution of state-made goods, but
noting that "in the selective use of direct subsidy . . . the states perhaps retain some means
immune from constitutional attack to let charity, and economic self-help, begin and end at
home").
451. See supra notes 170-93 and accompanying text.
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hiring - embody governmental experiments designed to improve the
lives of the local citizenry.4 52 And in-state subsidies, for the most part
at least, seem no more intrusive on commerce clause values than pref-
erential trading or in-state hiring; indeed, the built-in "costliness"
check on the proliferation of discriminatory programs 453 may reach its
apex with direct subsidies because unrequited payments usually will be
more expensive than outlays for which state governments receive some
value in return. 454
Finally, typical production subsidies resemble governmental ac-
tions that few would find constitutionally objectionable. States, for ex-
ample, often battle to attract firms about to build new plants. They do
so by offering those firms state benefits, such as flat monetary support,
expanded government services, or free land. If states constitutionally
may use state resources to woo new businesses,4 55 then why should
states not be able to use their resources to keep old businesses where
they are?456
452. See supra notes 194-217 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
454. See Gergen, supra note 15, at 1135 ("because subsidies entail a conscious expenditure of
public funds, the state is likely to weigh the costs and benefits of its actions"); Levmore, supra
note 149, at 585 ("[w]here the funds for a subsidy or preference benefitting some state residents
come out of the state treasury, reviewing courts might assume that the state legislature has con-
sidered the burdens and benefits .... "). Subsidies may be less objectionable than tariffs - and
less antithetical to the values of national union - for other reasons as well. See, eg., Gergen,
supra note 15, at 1135, 1137 (noting that persons may "perceive subsidies as fair interstate com-
petition and not as a point of special offense" in part because subsidies "encourage... reduced
commodity prices" and "unlike tariffs, benefit foreign buyers"); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
supra note 79, at 61 (noting that effect of subsidies, "at least in the short-run, is imposed not on
consumers"; thus while tariffs and regulations burden both out-of-state competitors and consum-
ers, subsidies burden only out-of-state competitors); cf Recent Case, supra note 423, at 1360 n.21
(suggesting that subsidies are more defensible than purchasing preferences because subsidies "do
not preclude the possibility of interstate competition").
455. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A State
clearly may undertake to enhance the advantages of industry, economy, and resources that make
it a desirable place in which to live."); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318,
335-37 (1977) (holding that "a State may [not] tax in a manner that discriminates between two
types of interstate transactions in order to favor local commercial interests," but emphasizing its
refusal "[to] hold that a State may not compete with other States for a share of interstate
commerce").
456. Varat, supra note 21, at 545 (citing as functionally akin efforts "to attract industry...
or to keep it in ... the subsidizing state"). It merits mention that the preceding discussion
considers subsidies generally. Professor Varat takes a different approach, dividing the world of
subsidies into two categories. Id. at 540. The essence of Professor Varat's distinction is that the
nonresident who pays state taxes should not be denied equal access to state subsidies, for such a
denial is functionally indistinguishable from affording the resident taxpayer an impermissible tax
advantage. See infra notes 472-76 and accompanying text.
Professor Varat's analysis is problematic, however, for a number of reasons. First, Professor
Varat himself generally is willing to accept nonresidence as a proxy for noncontribution to public
benefits sought by the nonresident without inquiring into the details of the particular nonresi-
dent's tax bill. Varat, supra note 21, at 527-30. For reasons already given, this approach is
sound, see supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text, and it is not apparent why Professor Varat
chooses to depart from it in this particular setting. Second, Professor Varat's proposed distinc-
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All subsidies, however, are not created equal. Thus, while subsi-
dies may be generally safe from dormant commerce clause challenge,
at least two types of subsidies raise special problems.
1. Subsidies and Downstream Restraints
In WC.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi,457 Judge Posner wrote: "[I]f
.. the State of Illinois subsidized the electrical generating plants in
Illinois that buy coal, it could.., forbid them to buy coal produced
out of state. '458 The accuracy of this assertion is not as clear as its
categorical rendition suggests. It is one thing directly to subsidize
coal-burning utilities or in-state coal producers, but quite another to
pay money to in-state electrical plants only if they buy coal exclusively
in state. In Judge Posner's hypothetical case, Illinois in substance is
saying: "We will pay you money in return for burning coal, but on the
strict condition that you buy coal only from in-state suppliers." Such
a condition resembles the "downstream restraint" deemed invalid by a
plurality of the Court in Wunnicke: in both cases, the recipient of the
government benefit is required to deal only with in-state private parties
as a price for getting a government benefit.459
The key policy consideration casting doubt on downstream re-
straints also applies in this context: if the state may condition any
tangible benefit it grants to residents in any way it likes, the risk of
widespread and proliferating discrimination in otherwise private trans-
actions is increased enormously. It seems to follow that downstream
restraints attached to subsidies should be scrutinized with no less vigor
than downstream restraints attached to state purchases and sales. In-
deed, since formal considerations suggest that discriminatory subsidies
tion invites confusion and difficulties of administration. For example, it is not clear whether
Professor Varat would apply his parallel-subsidy rule narrowly to only those cases in which the
nonresident and resident businesses are "equally taxed," Varat, supra note 21, at 542, more
broadly to cover all cases in which the nonresident has paid some tax, see id. at 542, or adopt
some intermediate position based on "the comparative tax obligations of resident and nonresi-
dent taxpayers," id. at 541. Each of these alternatives, however, seems either unduly wooden or
practicably complex. Third, as explained below, there are sound reasons to reject Professor
Varat's equation of denying subsidies to taxpaying nonresidents with granting tax breaks to tax-
paying residents. Simply stated, there exist important formal and functional differences between
tax breaks and subsidies, and this is so whether or not the nonresident can show that she has paid
taxes to the state. See infra notes 478-85 and accompanying text. Finally, requiring that mone-
tary subsidies be extended to taxpaying nonresidents raises significant problems under existing
case law. The Court, after all, did not ask in Alexandria Scrap or Reeves whether the out-of-state
scrap processor or ready-mix plant had paid any state taxes.
457. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
458. 730 F.2d at 494.
459. See supra notes 55-59, 404-06, and accompanying text (discussing Wunnicke and down-
stream restraints).
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are more questionable than discriminatory purchases and sales,460 per-
haps downstream restraints attached to subsidies should receive more
careful scrutiny.
Professor Varat's work casts doubt on this analysis by suggesting
that Alexandria Scrap validated monetary subsidies conditioned on
dealing with resident businesses461 Alexandria Scrap, however, did no
such thing. Although Maryland's differentiated documentation rules
had the effect of causing unlicensed suppliers to favor Maryland scrap
processors, Maryland's subsidy payments went solely to scrap proces-
sors, and those payments were not conditioned on processors' dealing
with Maryland, rather than non-Maryland, hulk suppliers. 462
It is true that the program challenged in Alexandria Scrap involved
a form of downstream restriction because it afforded subsidy payments
only to processors that destroyed Maryland-titled cars. This aspect of
Alexandria Scrap suggests that some forms of downstream restraints
attached to subsidies are constitutionally permissible.463 It would be
difficult to distinguish from Alexandria Scrap, for example, a case
challenging per-ton payments made to landfill operators for burying
trash generated in Maryland, but not elsewhere.46" Approval of that
subsidy, however, hardly requires approval of the coal-restrictive util-
ity subsidy described by Judge Posner. The reason why has already
been suggested: Maryland's noncommercial aesthetic goals in destroy-
ing automotive eyesores reduced commerce clause concern about its
"in-state hulk" requirement.465 This rationale might well cover ordi-
nary, as well as vehicular, junk. It can supply no justification, how-
ever, for a conditional subsidy designed to enhance the competitive
position of in-state coal producers or their workers.
There is another important reason why Judge Posner's hypotheti-
460. See supra notes 447-48 and accompanying text.
461. See Varat, supra note 21, at 562.
462. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812 n.22 (1976) (suggesting that
only licensed suppliers - as to which no challenge was raised - had to be from Maryland); 426
U.S. at 803 (noting concession that prior to change of documentation requirement, program was
constitutional, thus revealing absence of any attack on requirement to use unlicensed Maryland
processors even if such a requirement existed).
463. See supra notes 427-29 and accompanying text.
464. See Rutgers Note, supra note 79, at 757 (suggesting that Alexahdria Scrap would permit
a state to pay subsidies to private landfills "for each ton of solid waste originating within the state
which is deposited at one of [its] landfills"). Notably, although such a subsidy resembles the
Maryland subsidy attacked in Alexandria Scrap, the two subsidies may be distinguishable. This
would be especially true if the central purpose of the trash-disposal subsidy were to advantage
resident trash-producing businesses, see supra notes 427-29 and accompanying text, or if the
subsidized landfills had such limited capacity they could not as a practical matter simultaneously
serve nonresidents, see infra note 466 and accompanying text.
465. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
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cal utility subsidy is not properly analogized to either the Maryland-
hulk subsidy or the posited in-state trash-disposal subsidy. These lat-
ter subsidies encourage the handling of in-state materials, but do not
preclude the subsidy recipient from simultaneously handling like
materials from other states.466 These "non-exclusive" per-unit subsi-
dies thus are far less sweeping in their discriminatory effect (and less
unlike typical state "purchasing") than subsidies subject to such
"blunderbuss" conditions as one flatly prohibiting a utility's use of any
out-of-state coal. For reasons already developed,467 such a rigid and
restrictive "downstream restraint" on subsidy payments should re-
ceive the most exacting scrutiny.
2. Tariff-like Subsidies
In many respects, subsidies resemble tariffs. Indeed, the key effect
on interstate commerce of subsidies and tariffs are the same: both
forms of state intervention steer business to local producers at the ex-
pense of more efficient out-of-state competitors. 468 Even so, tariffs are
unconstitutional, while in-state subsidies generally are not. This result
rests on the core purposes underlying the market-participant rule:
subsidies reflect a state citizenry's entitlement to enjoy and experiment
with its own resources and carry a reduced risk to interstate har-
mony.469 These policies, however, apply with reduced force when a
subsidy alters the market to favor local producers at minimal cost to
the state. As Professor Regan has observed:
A carefully calibrated subsidy that was passed on to consumers in a rela-
tively competitive market could achieve a substantial redirection of busi-
ness to local producers at very little cost. The state might get so much
market distortion for its subsidy dollar that the expense of providing this
benefit to locals would not be an effective constraint. In principle, I
think such direct subsidies should probably be forbidden. 470
Stated another way, some subsidies "act" just like tariffs.471
Should the Court recognize a rule invalidating such subsidies?
Probably it should not. First, for at least formal reasons, subsidies are
466. See Rutgers Note, supra note 79, at 757-58 (arguing that a state could not "enact a
subsidy conditioned upon a private operator's agreement to take only garbage originating in New
Jersey"; such a program would "go beyond . . . Alexandria Scrap" because "[i]n Alexandria
Scrap, the state's offer to subsidize scrap processors for each Maryland-registered hulk they took
was not conditioned on a requirement that they were to take only cars registered in Maryland").
467. See supra notes 396-410, 443, and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 251-64 and accompanying text.
470. Regan, supra note 7, at 1196.
471. See Varat, supra note 21, at 544 ("The result of an effective local subsidy program will
be the same as that of a tax or minimum pricing scheme .... "-
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always different from tariffs.47 2 Second, subsidies differ from tariffs for
an important functional reason as well: even low-cost subsidies pre-
sent visible preferences of one in-state constituency over another; thus,
they are more likely than tariffs to engender resistance in the local
legislative process.473 Finally, there will be great difficulties both in
creating and in sorting out the type of "carefully calibrated" subsidies
Professor Regan identifies. 474 Lack of necessity and problems of judi-
cial manageability thus converge to favor restraint in invalidating
"tariff-like" subsidy programs.475 On balance, these considerations
suggest that, in at least all but the rarest case, state subsidies
unadorned by downstream restraints should survive dormant com-
merce clause attack.
G. Tax Breaks
Recognition that discriminatory commercial subsidies normally
survive commerce clause scrutiny raises a related problem: What
about tax breaks for in-state producers? Consider Bacchus Imports v.
Dias.476 That case concerned a Hawaii law exempting local wine and
brandy producers from Hawaii's liquor tax.477 The economic effect of
the tax exemption, which was clearly designed to support these local
producers, surely paralleled the effect of a direct cash subsidy. The tax
exemption, no less than a subsidy, provided the producer with a calcu-
lable state-awarded monetary benefit permitting the producer to cut
prices and undersell more efficient out-of-state competitors.478 None-
theless, the Court struck down the tax exemption in Bacchus Im-
ports. 479 Thereafter, in Limbach, the Court specifically held that such
472. See supra notes 251-64 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 453-54 and accompanying text.
474. Cf Gergen, supra note 15, at 1137 ("formulating a simple rule that can distinguish
wealth-creating subsidies from those that are inefficient is virtually impossible").
475. Professor Regan seems to agree, at least with respect to the difficulty of framing such
subsidies. See Regan, supra note 7, at 1196 ("the informational demands for designing the dan-
gerously cost-effective subsidy are just too great").
476. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
477. 468 U.S. at 265.
478. See South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 1360 n.5 (1988) ("one could argue that
any law exempting state bond interest from the tax applicable to interest on other bonds is, in
effect, a subsidy"); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (noting that "[g]ranting tax
exemptions... necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit"); Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 910 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court in Walz
"noted that... tax exemptions may have the same economic effect as state subsidies"); Recent
Case, supra note 423, at 1360 n.21 (characterizing tax exemption as a form of subsidy).
479. 468 U.S. at 273. Notably, the particular law at issue in Bacchus Imports may have failed
even if viewed as a subsidy. This is so because the tax preference afforded by Hawaii applied to
"fruit wine manufactured in the state from products grown in the state." The Hawaii law ac-
cordingly not only favored local wineries, it effectively coerced local wineries to buy local fruit.
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tax breaks were not sheltered from dormant commerce clause chal-
lenge by the market-participant rule.480 Why should a subsidy, but
not a tax break, be permissible? Is the distinction simply one of form
rather than substance?481
The first answer to these questions is that form matters. The com-
merce clause took focused aim at state tariffs.482 The Hawaii tax pro-
gram resembles a tariff because it operates to impose on all wine and
brandy importers a tax burden not borne by local producers. Thus, as
a matter of constitutional history and intent, the Hawaii tax-prefer-
ence law is suspect in a way a discriminatory subsidy is not. To be
sure, the tax break at issue in Bacchus Imports was not identical to a
tariff. In particular, it gave local fruit wineries a tax break vis-A-vis
both in-state and out-of-state producers of competing products. Even
so, the operation of the discriminatory tax on out-of-state producers
puts it in a different class, as a formal matter, from a traditional sub-
sidy or state "purchase" transaction. As Justice Scalia explained in
Limbach:
The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give
its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that
description in connection with the state's regulation of interstate com-
merce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run
afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manu-
facture does.48 3
Other distinctions between subsidies and tax exemptions transcend
form. Most importantly, discriminatory tax exemptions may be more
politically palatable to state legislators than monetary subsidies and,
therefore, more likely to take hold and engender retaliation. This is so
because: "A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to
the subsidized enterprise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as
a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, . . . assists the exempted
enterprise only passively .... -414 In addition, tax laws, which are
Such a "downstream restraint" is, as already shown, constitutionally questionable even if at-
tached to a subsidy. See supra notes 457-67 and accompanying text.
480. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. 1803, 1809 (1988); accord, e.g., Russell Stewart
Oil Co. v. State, 124 Ill. 2d 116, 529 N.E.2d 484 (1988) (invalidating tax exemption for sale of
gasohol containing ethanol distilled in Illinois); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State ex rel.
Allen, 315 N.W.2d 597, 599-60 (Minn. 1982).
481. Cf Levmore, supra note 149, at 566 (criticizing the court for treating taxes and subsi-
dies differently "even though they may have the same effects on interstate commerce").
482. E.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
483. 108 S. Ct. at 1810 (emphasis in original).
484. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added); accord Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 910 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In addition, tax exemptions might be more attractive because "a direct money subsidy... could
encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships." 397 U.S. at 675.
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effective until repealed, differ from subsidies as a legislative matter be-
cause subsidies require appropriations typically made on an annual ba-
sis. It follows that subsidies have a heightened "political visibility"
that puts a check on their perpetuation not applicable to tax exemp-
tions.485 At a minimum, the annual revisitation of legislated subsidies
should assure that the state interest supporting the program remains a
keen one.4 86
Finally, this context may be one of those in which "a page of his-
tory is worth a volume of logic. ' 48 7 It runs deep in the American
marrow that tax laws are susceptible to abuse when they disfavor
those with no say in the political process.48 8 Indeed, it was "taxation
without representation" that in large measure accounted for the birth
of the nation that the commerce clause seeks to hold together.
Against this historical and psychological backdrop, even when dis-
criminatory subsidy and tax programs have functionally identical eco-
nomic effects, discriminatory taxes may in a very real sense present a
greater threat than subsidies to the healthy spirit of nationalism envi-
sioned by the commerce clause.
H. State-Mandated Preferences by Local Governments
There is a longstanding and widespread brand of state discrimina-
tion that raises a substantial market-participant issue. Some state leg-
islatures have passed laws requiring local governments to deal in the
485. See Spending by Not Taxing, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1988, at 51 (tax breaks are
"preferred because they are less obvious than budgeted spending, and so harder for opponents to
attack - and for governments to cut"); Miami Note, supra note 79, at 735 ("there are built in
political limits on the use of subsidies" because "bounty-subsidy money comes out of the state
budget"; noting that these "countervailing forces... do not confront discriminatory regulations
or taxes"). See generally supra notes 453-54, 473, and accompanying text.
486. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 167, at 276
("visibility in the political process of an annual direct appropriation may be greater than that of a
one-time 'permanent' exemption"); Varat, supra note 21, at 549-50 ("state representatives proba-
bly will consider the extent to which state residents will benefit from a proposed investment of
state funds"). The point made here harkens all the way back to the famous footnote four of the
Carolene Products case, since it hinges on holding suspect "legislation which restricts those polit-
ical processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation."
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
487. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
488. See, ag., J. BLUM, W. MCFEELY, E. MORGAN, A. SCHLESINGER, K. STAMPP & C.
WOODWARD, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 90-98 (6th ed. 1985) (detailing colonists' opposition
to parliamentary taxes, including those imposed by the Sugar, Stamp, and Townshend Acts;
noting in particular that "Parliament, they believed, had some right to legislate for them; but it
had no right to tax them" and that "colonists in 1764 and 1765 were remarkably unanimous in
adopting this distinction between taxation and legislation"). The special dangers of taxation have
long been recognized by the Supreme Court. See, eg., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 431 (1819) ("[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy ...."); Levmore,
supra note 149, at 592 ("Historically, the Court has treated taxes affecting interstate commerce
less deferentially than subsidies .... ).
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marketplace only with state workers or firms.489 Should these statutes
survive dormant commerce clause attack?
The answer is not apparent. On the one hand, local governments
are creatures of the state, exercising delegated state power and perse-
vering solely as a result of state authorization;490 from this perspective,
it should make little difference that the state that chooses a preferential
trading policy chooses also to extend that policy to the state's compo-
nent parts. On the other hand, local governments possess substantial
autonomy and distinctiveness from the state;491 viewed from this an-
gle, the market-participant rule perhaps should not validate these laws
because they do not concern a state's trading on its own account.
The Seventh Circuit is the only court to have confronted this co-
nundrum.492 In an opinion by Judge Posner, that court held that the
market-participant rule did not insulate such state laws from com-
merce clause challenge. 493 The four-factor market-participant analysis
developed in this article suggests that the Seventh Circuit was correct.
Consider first the sow-and-reap rationale. The money raised by a
locality is not the money of a state - at least in the same sense as
funds in the state's own treasury. Different localities impose different
taxes, issue different types and numbers of bonds, and save or spend
the resources they gather depending on local preferences. Thus, when
all the citizens of a state tell only the residents of a particular locality
that they may not distribute resources as they wish, the sow-and-reap
rationale does not come fully into play. This is so because the state is
not redistributing its own largess. 494 Instead, one group of citizens is
telling a subgroup how it must spend its money.495 This is not to say
that states may not exert broad control over local spending decisions.
As a rule, they surely may. It is to say, however, that a powerful
489. See Comment, supra note 224, at 209 ("Many preference statutes... apply to all public
contracts entered into by all levels of government.").
490. See, eg., 56 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivi-
sions §§ 23, 28 (1971).
491. See, eg., Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (recognizing that
cities are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though states are not).
492. Notably, this issue also has escaped altogether the notice of commentators addressing
the market-participant rule. For example, the most thorough studies of purchasing preferences
nowhere suggest that there may be a special argument for invalidating state laws requiring in-
state preferences by local political subdivisions. See, e.g., Iowa Note, supra note 226; Comment,
supra note 224.
493. W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
494. See 730 F.2d at 495 (noting that the municipal project at issue was in no part funded by
the state, and suggesting that a different rule would apply to state-funded projects).
495. Cf. 730 F.2d at 496 ("When the project on which the state impresses a home-state
preference is undertaken by a unit of local government without any state financial support or
supervision, the state is not a participant in the project but a regulator.").
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equity for mitigating the general constitutional limitation on state dis-
crimination against interstate commerce diminishes when a govern-
mental unit is not distributing resources fairly attributable to all
residents of the state.496
Concerns about fostering federalist experimentation and local re-
sponsiveness also diminish when a state dictates with whom local gov-
ernments must deal. The reason is simple: a rule requiring all
localities to hire or buy in-state imposes uniformity and cramps the
ability of local governments to respond to the local will.497
The third prong of market-participant analysis - focusing on the
degree of interference with unfettered interstate commerce - also cuts
against upholding state-imposed municipal hiring and purchasing
preferences. When a state government forces municipalities to deal
exclusively with their own residents, it tampers with exchanges other
traders wish to make and undermines any possible free-trade justifica-
tion for the market-participant rule.498 More importantly, mandated
municipal preferences heighten dramatically the dangers to national-
market values posed by the rule. If local governments are left to their
own devices, some will and some will' not adopt resident-preference
rules. State legislatures, however, may pass laws compelling broad
municipal resident-preferences in one fell swoop.499 The danger that
such laws pose to the national common market is especially acute be-
cause a state law requiring that localities favor residents extracts no
funds from the state treasury. Any built-in "expensiveness" restraint
on the proliferation of such programs is therefore minimal, if present
at all.5° °
Finally, a state that forces municipalities to make marketplace de-
cisions they otherwise would eschew looks far less like a market par-
ticipant trading on its own account and much more like a regulator of
496. Cf Blumoff, supra note 15, at 92 (under state-imposed local purchasing preference,
"counties [are] not as free as their citizens").
497. Of course, it may be observed in response that the Constitution envisioned quasi-sover-
eign status for states, and not for municipalities. Thus, the Constitution anticipated experimenta-
tion and responsiveness primarily on the statewide level or at least that a state's choices properly
would trump those of its constituent parts. Accepting these premises, the argument made here
may seem dubious, since it would be odd to jettison a duly enacted statewide choice of policy
(here, a policy favoring statewide purchasing preferences) on the basis of safeguarding "federal-
ism." Nonetheless, municipalities in reality are key governmental actors, and the population of
many cities today far exceeds that of whole states at the time of the Constitution's adoption. In
this context, the tradition and policy underlying our constitutional plan provide at least some
support for favoring flexibility in municipal choice to ensure local responsiveness and meaningful
innovation..
498. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
499. See generally supra note 489 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
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others' conduct.50 1 Formal considerations thus confirm the view that
the market-participant rule should not protect state laws mandating
municipal preferences for state residents in the market.50 2
I. PROGRAMS PLACING SPECIAL BURDENS ON LOCAL
NONRESIDENTS
A final market-participant problem cuts across each category of
cases discussed above. All that precedes quietly assumes that the mar-
ket-participant rule operates in an all-or-nothing fashion. Either the
commerce clause lets the state favor its residents or it does not, and if
it does the state may exclude nonresidents without exception. In other
words, all nonresidents stand together, for better or worse. This con-
ception of the market-participant rule is sound as a general proposi-
tion. Under our Constitution, persons are "citizens... of the State
wherein they reside. ' 50 3 A person can no more be "partly resident"
than she can be "partly pregnant"; rather, it seems that for constitu-
tional purposes we are residents of one - and only one - state.504 A
rigid resident/nonresident distinction also reflects a central purpose of
the market-participant rule. That rule, after all, flows from the propri-
ety of a state's serving those persons it was "created to serve"505 -
namely, the state's own residents. Finally, an uncomplicated dichot-
omy between residents and nonresidents provides a steady tool for
forging clear and workable constitutional rules.50 6
Notwithstanding these considerations, there may be good reason to
stray from a rigid resident/nonresident distinction in particular types
of market-participant cases. The most attractive candidates for apply-
ing a flexible approach are'those cases involving an important, state-
monopolized product withheld from a nonresident who has a continu-
501. See generally supra notes 245-64 and accompanying text.
502. Constitutional history also suggests an argument for-the view that states should have no
more ability to force protectionism on municipalities than on private corporations. This is so
because, when the Constitution was framed, "municipal corporations were analogized to private
corporations," and not viewed as a "legal form exercising government powers delegated by the
state." P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELA-
TIONS 804 (1987). See generally Fletcher, 4 Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment: A Narrow Construction of an 4ffirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
4gainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN L. REv. 1033, 1100-01 (1983). This argument, however, probably
proves too much, since it suggests that municipalities - like private corporations - are not
properly subject to the dormant commerce clause at all. Under settled Supreme Court authority,
however, they unquestionably are. See, eg., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951).
503. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
504. See, eg., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
505. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980).
506. See generally supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
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ing physical presence in the state. 50 7 Consider the case of the state-run
utility. Can that utility constitutionally cut off the power it supplies to
a manufacturing plant situated in the state - say a chair factory -
because that plant is owned by a nonresident proprietor, partnership,
or corporation? If the state may not, then must it also continue to
provide power to another manufacturing plant - say a table factory
- located just across the state border?
There is little authority addressing such questions.50 8 In fact, how-
ever, there is good reason to say that the "present," but not the "ab-
sent," nonresident has a constitutional right of access to the power.
Formal considerations do not support this conclusion, for in each case
the state is selling (or not selling) electricity. The three other consider-
ations properly guiding market-participant analysis, however, do sup-
port this distinction.
First, as previously shown, the fact of local residence generally pro-
vides the sole proper proxy for saying that a person who claims a state
benefit is in fairness entitled to it. °9 Even so, it is apparent that the
"present" chair factory operator has a far stronger fairness-based
claim than the "absent" table factory operator to reap the benefits of
state-made power. This is so because, even though the "present"
operator may enjoy some tax and other immunities not shared by full-
fledged state residents,510 she also is subject to in-state taxation in a
way the "absent" operator is not. The "present" chair factory opera-
tor most likely pays local income tax, local real estate tax, local ad
valorem tax, and local withholding tax by reason of her physical nexus
with the state.51' Moreover, the "present" chair factory owner con-
tributes indirectly to the public fisc, including by employing individual
state residents who in turn pay state taxes. In short, the continuing
physical presence of the chair factory in the state renders its operator
507. An illustrative case is suggested by the bug-resistant cornseed hypothetical discussed
earlier in this article. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. What if, in connection with
its hypothetical local-distribution program, South Dakota refused to sell its bug-resistant seed to
foreign corporations conducting farming operations on South Dakota land? One senses that such
a refusal would, at least, be more constitutionally problematic than a refusal to sell seed for use in
distant California or South Carolina.
508. See Fidelity Guar. Mortgage Corp. v. Connecticut Hous. Fin. Auth., 532 F. Supp. 81,
85 (D. Conn. 1982) (upholding statute requiring mortgage lenders seeking to use state funds to
have three years' experience in state; court emphasizes that law does not discriminate against
nonresident corporations with continuing presence in the state); Varat, supra note 21, at 550
n.219 (noting that the reference in Reeves to state ability to confine benefits of police, firefighting,
and electrical service probably concerned a "claim that . . . services be provided beyond the
state's borders").
509. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
510. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
511. See, eg., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (physical presence creates sufficient nexus
to justify state taxation of nonresident).
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much like local residents, and much unlike the "absent" table factory
operator. Physical presence will have caused the nonresident chair
factory operator to contribute to the creation of the benefit she now
seeks to enjoy.512
Second, considerations of federalism also weigh in on the side of
favoring the "present," but not the "absent," factory operator. It is
farfetched to believe that states considering the construction of utilities
will be deterred by the prospect of having to supply power to nonresi-
dents physically located in the state. This is especially true of nonresi-
dent businesses, which employ local workers and which the state has
every interest in supporting.5 13 On the other hand, a state may well
balk at developing even much-needed utilities if it must afford full ac-
cess to homes and businesses located outside the state. Of no less im-
portance, a rule requiring the provision of service beyond the state's
borders would trench on the state's territorial integrity. In our federal
system, states are fixed by geographic boundaries that define in a cen-
tral way the scope of state sovereignty. 51 4 Forced enlistment of a state
to supply benefits beyond its borders thus represents an intrusion on
core notions of state self-definition.
Third and finally, the concerns of national unification underlying
the commerce clause operate to distinguish the "present" and "ab-
sent" nonresident factory operators. The Framers gave little attention
to creating the most efficient market as envisioned by today's advo-
cates of free trade.515 They clearly did desire, however, to break down
state-made obstructions that impeded easy movement across state bor-
ders.516 This central constitutional principle of interstate mobility
suggests a special need to afford vital and monopolized state services
512. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973) (noting, in invalidating New York's
restriction on public employment of legal aliens, that a "resident alien... must pay taxes" and
"may reside lawfully in New York for a long period of time"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 376 (1971) (denying states the power to exclude aliens physically living in a state from state
welfare benefits; the Court reasoned: "'... Aliens like citizens pay taxes .... [A]liens may live
within a state for many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the
state.' . . . There can be no 'special public interest' in tax revenues to which aliens have contrib-
uted on an equal basis with the residents of the State.").
513. It is thus not surprising that many in-state preferences in reality require only in-state
presence rather than in-state residence. See, eg., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 800-01 (1976); Exparte Gemmell, 20 Idaho 732, 736, 119 P. 298, 299 (1911) (upholding law
requiring that printing work be done in the state); State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book &
Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 260, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917) (upholding state printing preference
including nonresidents with local plants).
514. Trelease, supra note 139, at 361-68.
515. See generally supra notes 139, 234, and accompanying text.
516. See, eg., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 68 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
need to protect "the mobility so essential to the economic progress of our Nation, and so com-
monly accepted as a fundamental aspect of our social order").
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to nonresidents when they choose to enter the state to conduct busi-
ness. Otherwise, such nonresidents cannot as a practical matter exer-
cise their right to enter the state at all.517 This norm of interstate
mobility obviously supports the claim of the chair factory operator,
since she in fact chose to expand across the state's border in establish-
ing additional operations. The same norm, however, affords no help
to the "absent" table factory operator, for the simple reason that he
chose not to enter the state.
These considerations show that physical presence may justify com-
merce clause protection of some nonresidents under some circum-
stances notwithstanding the market-participant rule. Not every form
of presence, however, will mandate entitlement to every form of state
benefit. The continuing physical presence of the nonresident chair fac-
tory operator, for example, makes her case far stronger than that of
the Wyoming concrete firm in Reeves, which briefly sent its trucks into
South Dakota for the sole purpose of expropriating South Dakota ce-
ment for use in out-of-state operations.5 18 Similarly, the vital impor-
tance of electricity and the state's natural monopoly over it make the
hypothetical chair factory operator's claim to state-made power more
compelling than, for example, a claim to tap into a state chair-pro-
ducer subsidy program. The key point is that in some cases a distinc-
tion between "present" nonresidents and "absent" nonresidents will be
proper, while in other cases it will not. As in other market-participant
cases, the four-factor analysis suggested here should help point the
way to an "appropriate accommodation." 519
CONCLUSION
The market-participant rule reflects a conscious choice by the
Court to limit the reach of the dormant commerce clause in order to
517. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985) ("promotion of
domestic business within a State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to
compete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose"); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (reading article IV's privileges and immunities clause as "unmistaka-
bly secur[ing] and protect[ing] the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of
the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molesta-
tion"); see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532 (1978) (citing common origin and "shared
vision" of privileges and immunities clause and commerce clause); Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Commn. of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978) (same). As Professor Varat has put it: "[If
state-owned public utilities could limit in-state customer service to state residents, then nonresi-
dent freedom to... live in one state and operate a business in another.., would be drastically
curtailed." Varat, supra note 21, at 535; see also Linde, supra note 145, at 67 (expressing concern
that right "against absolute exclusion... will remain hollow" if state can deny important benefits
to outsiders).
518. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 433 (1980) (noting that Wyoming buyer did
physically send trucks into South Dakota in effort to buy cement).
519. Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 15, at 1134.
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protect important state interests. The rule reflects a mix of justifica-
tions: the sensed rightness that citizens comprising political units mgy
dispense their own property as they see fit; the values in a federalist
system of facilitating local experimentation and differentiated re-
sponses to different local needs; the reduced risk that marketplace
preferences pose to the dormant commerce clause's goal of economic
nationalism; and formal and institutional considerations counseling ju-
dicial restraint in this distinctive setting.
This article has undertaken to show why these forces justify the
market-participant doctrine as a general rule. It also has undertaken
to show that the Court's existing market-participant decisions are rec-
oncilable and defensible in light of these considerations. Application
of the market-participant rule - like application of other constitu-
tional rules - calls for a balancing of competing constitutional values.
This article has suggested a proper accommodation of those values by
offering a more systematic framework for analyzing market-partici-
pant cases and a sampling of the results that approach will produce.
New market-participant issues will continue to crop up. My hope
is that the analytical framework proposed here will aid courts in
resolving those issues. At the least, that framework should help to
illumine the subtlety of the judicial task in untangling the market-par-
ticipant rule.
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